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FOR CONSIDERATION

MEMORANDUM

TO : THE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS

FROM : Vincent O. NMEHIELLE
Secretary General

SUBJECT : COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT RESULTS
OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP 2004-2013*

Please find attached the above-mentioned Report.

Attach:

Cc: The President

*** Questions on this document should be referred to:**

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Evaluator General
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
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GROUPE DE LA BANQUE AFRICAINE DE DEVELOPPEMENT



COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT RESULTS OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP 2004-2013

DEPARTEMENT IDEV
November 2016



IDEV

Independent Development Evaluation
African Development Bank

Comprehensive Evaluation of the Development Results of the African Development Bank Group 2004-2013

Synthesis Report - November 2016

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AfDB	African Development Bank Group	MfDR	Management for Development Results
CEDR	Comprehensive Evaluation of the Bank's Development Results	NTF	Nigeria Trust Fund
CFR	Contextual Factor Review	PAR	Project Appraisal Reports
CSP	Country Strategy Paper	PCR	Project Completion Reports
CSPE	Country Strategy and Program Evaluation	PFM	Public Financial Management
CODE	Committee on Operations and for Development Effectiveness	PPP	Public–Private Partnership
CPIA	Country Policy and Institution Assessments	PRA	Project Results Assessment
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo	QCA	Qualitative Comparative Assessment
DP	Development Partner	RBF	Results-based Framework
ESW	Economic and Sector Work	RMC	Regional Member Countries
EU	European Union	RMF	Results Measurement Framework
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment	SMART	Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, Time-bound
ICB	International Competitive Bidding	SME	Small or Medium-sized Enterprise
IDEV	Independent Development Evaluation	ToC	Theory of Change
KPI	Key Performance Indicator	TS	Transition states
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation	UA	Unit of Account
		WHO	World Health Organization

Senior Independent Advisers' Report

A. Introduction

We were called upon to assess and attest to the independence and quality of this evaluation and more precisely to comment on the methods used, the processes followed and the deliveries.

We gathered in June 2014 at the outset of the evaluation process. During and after this meeting we provided advice on the evaluation design. Subsequently some of us provided methodological advice. Next, we commented on the draft version of this report. All of us responded on an individual basis and we are satisfied that our comments received a fair hearing. This statement was written collectively through three rounds of email exchanges. None of us had any previous relationship with the Bank that would create a conflict of interest.

Our terms of reference required us to use the assessment criteria of "independence and quality". We defined independence as the integrity of the process and the absence of bias favoring Bank management interests or the interests of other stakeholders. We defined quality in terms of the clarity, conclusiveness and transparency of the report and the application of appropriate and robust evaluation methods reflecting the DAC quality standards for development evaluation.

B. An independent evaluation process

We consider that the evaluation process has been independent from Bank management. Formally, the authors of (and contributors to) the evaluation report were either IDEV staff members who operate at arm's length from management or external evaluators recruited and steered by IDEV. Moreover we note that the evaluation builds on primary sources (i.e. created on purpose) which are themselves informed by interviews of which only 10 percent were Bank staff. The uncompromising ratings of project quality further confirm that the evaluation has exercised independent judgment. We were provided with Bank management comments on the draft report and we are satisfied that they were addressed in an independent manner.

Overall, we find that the report describes the evaluation process in a fair and transparent manner. The scope and the questions addressed are in line with the purposes set for the evaluation although more rigorous evaluative scrutiny should have been directed towards non-lending instruments such as economic and sector work and the use of various

instruments in a complementary way. Evaluation criteria are explicitly framed and the report tackles the questions raised in the terms of reference. Finally, the findings derive from gathered evidence and the recommendations, while in line with findings, are sometimes too broad and generic.

C. Use of traditional methods

The terms of reference were ambitious. The assessment of a large set of interventions comprising diverse instruments and targeting multiple categories of beneficiaries in multiple sectors was a challenging task. The inception report envisaged the application of 'state of art' methods such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis and Theory Based Evaluation. Given the skills deployed and the difficulties of the task, these methods were used in an abstract and generic way that added little substance to the evaluation. Accordingly the evaluation team chose to revert to IDEV's traditional and time tested approach.

Thus, the evaluation relied heavily on ratings aggregated across projects and countries. All multilateral development banks adopt a similar approach that uses project level evaluations as building blocks for country, thematic and corporate evaluations. Fourteen country level evaluations were carried out to reach overall judgments about the Bank's performance. In this process IDEV took care to validate ratings based on the judgments of two evaluators working independently. This enhanced the credibility of the ratings. On balance we conclude that the conclusions reached were grounded in reliable evidence.

On the other hand a richer set of evaluative findings would have materialized had the evaluation team heeded our recommendation to assess Bank and borrower performance separately. In the absence of such separate ratings the report seems to equate outcome ratings with Bank performance ratings, something which is neither fair nor accurate. In that respect the report does not make clear enough how the evaluation team reached its overall judgment in light of the distinctive perspectives of IDEV, Bank and borrowers. The latter were given considerable voice as 60 percent of the 1,900 interviewees belonged to government and state institutions in borrowing countries.

Despite these shortcomings we conclude that the methods used were adequate and broadly responsive to the evaluation purpose with appropriate triangulation of sources and with limitations properly acknowledged.

D. Using the evaluation for accountability

Has the Bank reached its intended objectives? Since the primary purpose of the evaluation was accountability for results we consider this question to be the main one. The report answers it in a forthright manner: the Bank did not live up to its full potential and has yet to achieve fully satisfactory and sustainable outcomes. This is a wakeup call. It points to the need for follow up reviews focused on the drivers of institutional effectiveness in line with (and possibly beyond) the authors' recommendations.

As noted above the sobering conclusions reached by the evaluation team derives from the independent rating of 169 projects in 14 countries. We consider the sample to be representative and the ratings credible and harmonized. We also agree with the authors of the report about the limitations of a rating process which is based on project goals that may differ from outcomes at the overarching Bank level and do not address the question of whether the Bank has 'made a difference in Africa'.

The main conclusion of the report is that the Bank did not deliver fully satisfactory results or lived up to its full potential. This finding is based on a reasonably rigorous assessment of project outcomes and sustainability both rated as "moderately unsatisfactory". While agreeing with this assessment, we wish to stress that the ratings combine the contributions of the Bank and its borrowers rather than Bank performance only. We also warn against seeking to compare these ratings with those of other MDBs given that their rating processes are not identical and cannot be used for inter-institutional assessments in the absence of rigorous benchmarking analyses.

E. Using the evaluation for learning

We screened the report in search of findings not already known from past evaluations or incorporated in Bank strategy documents. We concluded that the report mostly confirms prior lessons, something which is valuable in itself. Furthermore among the conclusions and lessons that we consider relatively new and deserving of follow up action we identified the following and confirm their credibility:

- i) In fragile situations sustained relationships enable the Bank to engage in influential policy dialogue and facilitate its works even in constrained settings.
- ii) Risk averse behavior limits the effectiveness of the Bank, something which suggests a need to reconsider staff incentives.
- iii) Slow progress can be attributed to learning

from experience that continues to be weak, suggesting that sharing knowledge and learning lessons should become a formal part of staff accountability.

F. Next steps

We read in the report that the main obstacles to development effectiveness are: a) weak project designs that fail to fully identify contextual risks and b) inadequate supervision that fails to guide adaptation to changed circumstances. These problems have been addressed through multiple reforms and the report makes several recommendations aiming to move further in the right direction. However, these recommendations need to be prioritized this should be done at the follow-up phase of the evaluation process.

G. Concluding thoughts

In the initial meeting we expressed doubt about the feasibility of completing the task within the prescribed time line given the major logistical and conceptual challenges involved. Indeed we judged the remit of the evaluation a "*mission impossible*". As things turned out the process was five months longer than planned and a substantive part of IDEV's Work Program for FY14 and 15 was refocused to feed into the CEDR. We nevertheless give the evaluation team credit for delivering credible answers to strategic questions raised in line with CODE's request.

We recognize that this huge and unprecedented evaluation absorbed considerable human and financial resources that distracted efforts from other evaluation exercises that might have added more value. In future we advise CODE to opt for alternative approaches that would satisfy learning and accountability requirements in a lighter manner, e.g. by tasking IDEV to address timely and relevant evaluation topics as well as high quality annual reviews of development effectiveness.

Panel members' bios

Ousmane Badiane is the Africa Director for the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Before his current tenure at IFPRI, he was Lead Specialist for Food and Agricultural Policy for the Africa Region at the World Bank and Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. He received a PhD in agricultural economics from the University of Kiel in Germany. His awards include a Doctoral Degree Honoris Causa from the University of KwaZulu Natal in South Africa, induction as Distinguished Fellow of the African Association of Agricultural Economics, and the 2015 Africa Food Prize, recognizing his

leadership in developing and guiding the implementation of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).

Mustapha Kamel Nabli is currently international consultant. He was Governor of the Central Bank of Tunisia from January 2011 to July 2012. Prior to that he was at the World Bank as Senior Advisor at the Global Prospects Group (1997-1999), Chief Economist for the Middle East and North Africa Region (1999-2008), and Senior Advisor to the World Bank Chief Economist (2008-2010). Previously he was an independent consultant and researcher (1995-1997), Minister of Planning and Regional Development in the Government of Tunisia (1990-1995), and Chairman of the Tunis Stock Exchange (1988-1990). From 1975 to 1988 Dr. Nabli was Professor of Economics at the University of Tunis, and visiting professor at various international universities. He holds an MA and a Ph.D. degrees in Economics from the University of California at Los Angeles.

Robert Picciotto taught evaluation at King's College (London) until 2015. A graduate of the Ecole Nationale Supérieure de l'Aéronautique (France) and of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (Princeton University) he is a member of the Academy of Social Sciences and a board member of the European Evaluation Society. At the World Bank which he joined in 1962 Robert Picciotto held several operational and corporate management positions including Director of Projects Departments in three Regions, Vice-President, Corporate Planning and Budgeting and Director-General of the Independent Evaluation Group (1992-2002). Since his retirement from the World Bank, Robert Picciotto has provided independent evaluation advice to governments, development finance agencies, and policy research organizations.

Jacques Toulemonde works as evaluation expert. He has co-founded Eureval, a consultancy that has carried out a number of evaluations for the European Union, including several comprehensive evaluations. He has created a master programme in monitoring and evaluation at Lyon University. He is the author and editor of articles and books dealing with quality and professionalism in the field of evaluation, evaluation techniques and causality analysis, performance monitoring, evaluation in partnership, and evaluation cultures.

Executive Summary

Background and context

The Comprehensive Evaluation of the Development Results (CEDR) of the African Development Bank Group (AfDB, or Bank) has been undertaken at the request of the Board Committee on Operations and Development Effectiveness (CODE). The CEDR aims to provide an independent, credible and evidence-based assessment of development results achieved by the Bank between 2004 and 2013. In addition to contributing to accountability, it identifies lessons and makes recommendations to strengthen development outcomes and aims to inform the implementation of the Bank's new strategic priorities.

The scope of the CEDR is the Bank portfolio. But as it is not cost-effective to review all Bank interventions exhaustively, a sample of representative countries was selected for examination. The countries were selected using a purposive sampling strategy to represent a significant share of the Bank's portfolio and reflect its composition in terms of regions, language, eligibility for various sources of Bank financing¹, and fragility status, insofar as possible.

The final sample of 14 countries² represented almost 60 percent of the Bank lending portfolio, based on approvals during 2004–2013. (See Annex A: Methodology and Figure 1: CEDR Countries Sample). For each of the countries in the sample, an evaluation of the Bank's country strategies and program (CSP) was conducted. This was complemented by a number (169) of Project Results Assessments (PRAs). The CEDR was designed as a synthesis of these building blocks.

Figure. 1. CEDR Countries Sample



In addition to the evaluations conducted for the purpose of the CEDR, other evaluations and studies, including past IDEV evaluations, were used in the synthesis. They allowed triangulating the evidence emerging from the CEDR building blocks with evidence from other sources. (See *Annex A: Methodology* for the comprehensive list).

The CEDR synthesis is based on a theory of change (ToC) (see *Annex B: Theory of change*) depicting the linkages between Bank activities, outputs, and outcomes. It was developed by the evaluation team after a thorough review of relevant documents: Bank policies, operational strategies and guidance documents, evaluations and assessments, and comparable documents from major Development Partners³. Complemented by a narrative, it provided a detailed description of impact pathways or how outputs contribute to intended outcomes.

The ToC guided the design of the 14 evaluation questions that structured this synthesis (see *Annex C: Evaluation Matrix*). A six-point rating scale⁴ is used to respond to the questions about the achievement of development results (See *Annex D: Rating scale used for the synthesis*).

ADF-13 Resource Allocation Framework - Operational Guidelines, AfDB, April 2014: based on a cut-off defined for FY14 by the 2012 per capita Gross National Income (GNI) of US\$1,205: (i) Countries above cut-off and creditworthy are only eligible for ADB resources (non-concessional loans); (ii) Countries below cut-off and not creditworthy are only eligible to ADF resources (concessional loans and grants); and (iii) Countries below cut-off and creditworthy (Blend countries) are eligible for ADB resources and for ADF resources subject to a cap and blend terms. Transition states are eligible for additional financing through the Transition States Facility.

² The 14 countries are: Burundi, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, and Zambia.

In addition to the three main strategic documents, other documents consulted include: Review of the AfDB 2003-2007 Strategic Plan (2008); Evaluation of the Quality at Entry of Country Strategy and Regional Integration Strategy Papers (AfDB, 2015); Staff Guidance on Project Completion and Rating (AfDB, 2012); Staff Guidance on Implementation Progress and Results Reporting (IPR) for Public Sector Operations (AfDB, undated); Annual Development Effectiveness Review 2014 - Towards Africa's Transformation; Results and Performance of the World Bank Group 2014; and the AfDB One Bank Results Measurement Framework (2013-2016).

⁴ HU: Highly Unsatisfactory; U: Unsatisfactory; MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory; MS: Moderately Satisfactory; S: Satisfactory; and HS: Highly Satisfactory.

As with any evaluation, the CEDR has its limitations. The main limitation is related to the challenge of assessing results along the impact pathways defined in the ToC. Project level intervention logics were not always consistent with the theory-defined outcomes. Moreover, when they were, the indicators were not always aligned.

Has the Bank achieved its objectives?

Table 1. Overview of ratings

Evaluation criteria	HU	U	MU	MS	S	HS
Relevance				●		
Alignment				●		
Conduciveness of design to achieving results			●			
Effectiveness			●			
Achievement of outcomes			●			
Benefits for targeted groups				●		
Sustainability			●			
Technical Soundness			●			
Financial and Economic Viability		●				
Institutional sustainability and strengthening of capacities			●			
Efficiency			●			
Timeliness		●				
Cost efficiency				●		
Consideration to cross-cutting issues in design				●		
Inclusiveness				●		
Environmental sustainability / transition to green growth					●	

The Bank delivered results. However, it has not done so to its full potential, especially with respect to delivering sustainable outcomes.

The relevance of Bank interventions was rated moderately satisfactory. Relevance was stronger at the planning and strategic levels than at the operational level, where beneficiary needs may not have received enough attention. The Bank was able to reach stronger alignment with country needs when it mobilized interests across diverse stakeholders and was able to identify challenges to effectiveness and propose responsive actions.

Effectiveness was rated moderately unsatisfactory. Only close to 30% of Bank interventions had achieved or were likely to achieve their intended outcomes. The same proportion had achieved or was likely less than half of planned outcomes.

Internally, the limitations to effectiveness were weak design that did not fully integrate and manage contextual risks, and weak supervision that did not help change the course of the project when necessary. Leadership, ownership, and the capacity to implement were the driving factors behind achievements of results on the national side. This was also an explanatory factor for differences among various operations, such as lower effectiveness in transition states and higher effectiveness for larger operations, budget support in particular, in countries in the higher end of the income range.

Sustainability was rated moderately unsatisfactory. The weakest component of sustainability was found to be financial and economic viability for public sector operations. Less than a third of projects (28%) had robust mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability to ensure that the achieved outputs and outcomes were maintained beyond project closure. Technical soundness of design and attention to strengthening institutional capacity were also found to be insufficient.

The sustainability of project outcomes was associated with ownership at country level and the integration of a long-term vision into sector-specific strategic analysis and planning. By coordinating with other Development Partners (DP), creating a context-informed project design, and building institutional capacities, the Bank was able to create the conditions to improve sustainability.

Efficiency was rated moderately unsatisfactory. While cost efficiency indicators were overall positive, timeliness compromised the overall efficiency of Bank support. Approximately half the projects took more than the target 12 months from approval to first disbursement. Nearly one-third of the projects

took more than 25% more time than foreseen in the initial plan to implement.

Weaknesses in the design phase compromised project efficiency, leading to poor or delayed outcomes. Project delays were also associated with lengthy Bank procedures and complicated arrangements with other DPs. For private sector operations, supervision and administration were the weakest components of efficiency. Just slightly above half of the projects reviewed (52%) scored positively and only 7% scored satisfactorily.

Finally, crosscutting issues were well considered in the design of country strategy papers (CSPs) and projects. Inclusive growth was largely included in CSP goals and project outcomes alike. Outcomes related to regional disparities were included across a range of sector projects whereas gender and age outcomes appeared less frequently. Green growth outcomes were routinely integrated in some sectors (e.g. energy) but not in others (e.g. transport). More than half of the projects were assessed as likely by design to lead to positive benefits for targeted groups (men, women, youth and girls). Their effectiveness was similar to other projects, showing that the Bank can make a difference in the lives of people. The evaluation did not however specifically rate the achievement of outcomes in cross-cutting areas.

Has the Bank proposed results-focused strategies and programs?

The ambitious reform agenda on which the Bank has embarked to transform itself into a results-oriented learning institution has set it in a right direction. The agenda is still to yield its full results, in particular due to the behavioral change issues that were not specifically addressed.

Selectivity has improved over time. However, country strategies have failed to systematically select sector-specific objectives that focus Bank efforts in its areas of comparative advantage. Furthermore, strategic selectivity did not always translate into a selective portfolio of projects. This dispersion created limitations to achieving results, as, for example, in governance operations in Cameroon.

At the operational level, managing for results remained in transition:

- The quality of project-level intervention logic improved over the evaluation period. However, the focus on outputs remained greater than the focus on outcomes, and the quality/appropriateness of indicators⁵ varied.
- Project design was not optimal. Lower scores were often attributed to shortcomings in risk analysis and mitigation strategies. Examples were identified in almost every country.
- The quality and frequency of supervision increased over time. However, project performance information was mostly poor/misleading and its frequency varied by sector. Supervision was particularly weak for private sector operations.

Design and supervision are widely recognized in the Bank and beyond as key determinants of achievement of results. Multiple reforms have been undertaken in these two areas and the direction of travel is positive. However, deeper issues related to the existence of the right incentives and to the culture and behaviors at the Bank have limited their full implementation.

Learning remained weak. Country teams did not fully leverage the lessons from previous CSPs: No clear pattern of improvement emerged over time, and lessons learned from supervision or other oversight mechanisms were not always fully taken into account.

The presence of a country office was found to be an enabling factor for all aspects of performance. But

while decentralization supported improvements over time, presence alone did not suffice. Country offices were not always able to achieve their full potential due to lack of capacity and risk-averse behavior.

⁵Good indicators are Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, and Time-bound, or SMART.

Has the Bank emerged as a valued partner at country level?

The Bank had strong relationships with its clients and development partners. However, these relationships were not fully backed by the relevant capacity for broadly positioning the Bank beyond a provider of financing as an influential advisor for policy making.

Despite some recent improvements, the Bank is still perceived as a financier rather than a provider of knowledge and advice. The discourse and volume of analytical work has increased since 2008, but there is only limited evidence that they made tangible contributions.

Insufficient communication about opportunities offered by the Bank meant that economic and sector work (ESW) and technical assistance (TA) were not fully leveraged to respond to country needs. The exception was fragile situations in which the Bank was able to use its brand and relationships to engage in influential policy dialogue. By contrast, no specific pattern emerged for MICs and LICs.

Coordination with other partners was given consideration in the strategies. However, this did not systematically translate into an alignment of priorities and cooperation at the operational level. However, building on long-standing relationships with the government, the Bank did play a positive role in fragility and emergency contexts. Overall, the effective engagement in partnerships depended on the existence of an established framework of country coordination partnerships. Where they did not exist, the Bank did not take counter-initiatives, in particular with emerging donors.

Setting aside the mobilization of resources at the corporate level⁶, leveraging in projects was more ad-hoc than driven by strategic goals set forth in the country strategies. The focus was on co-financing rather than actively mobilizing additional resources, although positive practices were also encountered in some cases. One example of this was promoting and attracting private sector financing into private-public partnerships (PPPs).

⁶ There was a quadrupling of financing through trust funds between the two halves of the period examined to reach more than UA 1.1 billion in 2009-2013

Conclusions about Bank performance

Overall, the Bank delivered results that could make a difference in the lives of people in targeted groups. However, it has not done so to its full potential, especially with respect to delivering sustainable outcomes. Its strong relationships with its clients and partners were an asset, but these were not fully backed by the relevant capacity for positioning the Bank beyond a provider of finance. .

Unsurprisingly, the Bank's performance was influenced by country conditions. Where leadership, ownership and national capacity to implement existed, interventions were more effective and more sustainable. Similarly, the pre-existence of frameworks for country dialogue favored the engagement of the Bank in well-coordinated, sustainable partnerships and initiatives to leverage additional development resources.

However, when country conditions were less favorable, the Bank did not systematically gather a deep enough understanding of contextual constraints (such as lack of ownership or capacity). This insufficient understanding was found to be a key factor of low effectiveness and sustainability. It did not allow for adapted responses to specific needs at the strategic level, or for establishing context- and capacity-appropriate realistic outcomes at the project level.

The presence of the Bank country office provided a positive context for a better understanding of country constraints and needs. In particular, it allowed for improved dialogue and consultation with a diversity of stakeholders. This created favorable conditions for Bank interventions to be relevant, effective, and sustainable. In fragile situations, longstanding partnerships facilitated the Bank's work, despite the challenges of working in settings constrained by capacity or resources.

Country presence alone, however, was not a sufficient condition for the Bank to effectively perform its various roles. The Bank was still perceived as a project and finance partner, as opposed to a knowledge broker or advisor. Task management and supervision of operations from headquarters did not facilitate contextual learning. Low flexibility of corporate procedures limited usefulness. Moreover, capacity constraints and risk-averse behavior were found to limit the effectiveness of the Bank's presence at country level.

Finally, the quality of design and effective supervision proved to be the most important yet most limiting

factors in country portfolio performance. The importance of these two factors was clearly recognized and multiple reforms related to them, albeit not exclusively, were initiated. Recent evaluations found that the direction of travel was positive. However, slow progress was seen across case studies, which can be attributed to learning from past experience that continues to be weak. It also suggested that deeper behavioral issues hinder the full implementation of reforms more generally.

Recommendations

The evaluation makes the following recommendations aimed at informing the implementation of the new strategic priorities of the Bank. These recommendations are framed by the transformational agenda for implementing the High 5s. Where actions are already ongoing, the recommendations are proposed to integrate lessons from experience into the process and facilitate the identification of the high priority issues to tackle.

Positioning in context

- i) Expand the analysis of comparative advantage in country strategies beyond sectoral considerations. This would mean analyzing the type of role the Bank should/could play to add value, depending on the country context and priorities (e.g. knowledge broker, advisor, and/or project financier). This should include an understanding of how government and key partners perceive the Bank in relation to the strategic directions it wishes to take.
- ii) Generalize the analysis of potential partnerships at country level. This includes possible strategic roles, contributions and constraints, as well as associated threats and opportunities. Partnerships could include both the traditional knowledge/financing partnerships with development partners, but also new partnerships with civil society, the private sector, and emerging donors.
- iii) Strengthen the analysis of risks related to implementation and sustainability at the strategic country level and in projects. Risk analysis should include a detailed, context- and capacity-appropriate mitigation strategy to tackle constraints to implementation. For sustainability in particular, this would involve determining lending and non-lending contributions based on the capacity of the country to maintain project operations, and developing long-term partnerships. At project level, tools such as the “readiness filter” that mitigates the risk of delayed startup could be streamlined and generalized.
- iv) Enhance learning both at project and strategic level. Lessons learned should receive fuller, more detailed discussion in country strategies and project documents. They should also better integrate possible views of other stakeholders on Bank support. Sharing lessons could become a formal part of staff accountability so that lessons become more structured and more usable.
- v) Improve the design of country strategies based on the foregoing analysis. This implies (i) clarifying the strategic roles the Bank wishes to play in the country; (ii) positioning the Bank in broader partnerships, and (iii) clarifying the intervention logic and narrowing the Bank's contribution to a select set of sectors, and considering fewer and more modest CSP indicators.
- vi) Clarify the terms of references for country offices depending on the country context and the Bank's strategy. This includes defining performance with clear indicators for ensuring accountability on results. It also implies making the appropriate skills and adequate resources available for the office to fulfill its various possible roles in country (e.g. representation and liaison with stakeholders; strategic thinking and policy advice; technical design; risk management; and monitoring and evaluation). Special attention should be given to transition states where the Bank has a comparative advantage with respect to relationships and dialogue.

Improving corporate services

- vii) Clarify and streamline the suite of ESW products (following on the 2013 ESW evaluation recommendations). The anticipated role of the ESW alongside the CSP should be revisited and appropriately resourced. Building on existing good practice, appropriate resources should be made available in countries where the Bank can fill knowledge gaps in specific niches related to its strategies and propose a relevant combination of ESW, dialogue and financing instruments to the client.
- viii) Ensure that corporate strategies (e.g. sector strategies) are based on a well-designed ToC shared with stakeholders as the basis for defining the outcomes guiding Bank interventions and common indicators. Mechanisms to have outcomes and indicators trickle down to country strategies and projects should be proposed.
- ix) Enhance flexibility and customization to country context in Bank procedures. A good example is the new procurement policy that proposes a flexible, risk-based approach. Special attention should be given to transition states to support the comparative advantage of the Bank in terms of relationship. In these countries, the Bank might consider consolidating multiple financing sources and streamlining trust funds to avoid delays and disruptions. In higher income countries, greater flexibility in Bank lending procedures could be considered (e.g. the need for sovereign guarantees).

Enhancing delivery

- x) Strengthen accountability frameworks and align incentives to influence changes in behavior moving towards a performance culture. This should include the revision and alignment of key performance indicators (KPIs) at all levels to ensure their coherence in driving results-oriented action (e.g. lending targets could be accompanied

by quality and results targets).

- xi) Enhance the depth and quality of supervision for private sector operations. Options for enhancement include: (i) framing supervision on the basis of a project's risk profile, (ii) improving the results focus in particular with respect to development outcomes, and (iii) clarifying the frequency requirements for supervision of private sector operations.
- xii) Strengthen the implementation of supervision for public sector operations. This could be done by: (i) strengthening accountability and aligning incentives around supervision, (ii) improving existing tools as needed (e.g. tracking disbursement performance against a benchmark disbursement profile by sector), and (iii) strengthening capacity at country level on the side of the Bank and of its national counterparts. This should be done when possible by using national monitoring and evaluation systems and/or advancing their institutionalization.

1. What is the CEDR?

This first section presents the purpose, scope, and method of the Comprehensive Evaluation of the Bank's Development Results (CEDR), and its limitations.

Purpose and Scope

The Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV) of the African Development Bank Group (AfDB, or the Bank) launched the CEDR at the end of 2013, at the request of the Committee on Operations and Development Effectiveness (CODE) on behalf of the Bank's Board of Directors. The CEDR primarily serves an accountability purpose by providing an independent, credible, and evidence-based assessment of Bank development results⁷ between 2004 and 2013. The CEDR also identifies lessons and recommendations about Bank performance to strengthen development outcomes and to inform the implementation of new strategic priorities, the High 5s⁸, for learning purposes. The scope of the CEDR covers all Bank interventions (lending and non-lending) approved between 2004 and 2013.

Reviewing and discussing the strategic priorities of the Bank within the context in which it operates does not form part of the objectives of this evaluation, by design. Based on the initial consultations with Bank management and Board members, it was agreed the CEDR would take these priorities as a given, and examine the conditions by which they were successfully operationalized.

This report presents the responses to the objectives set out for the CEDR. It seeks to respond to three questions to structure the Bank's performance narrative: (1) Has the Bank achieved its objectives? (2) Has the Bank proposed results-focused strategies and programs? and, (3) Has the Bank emerged as a valued partner at country level? The report proposes broad conclusions about the Bank's performance and, finally, proposes a set of recommendations.

Methodology

The CEDR is designed as a synthesis of evaluation studies (building blocks) undertaken at country level. As it is not cost-effective to review all Bank interventions exhaustively, a sample of countries was selected for examination. To ensure representativeness, the countries were selected using a purposive sampling strategy. The objective was to represent a significant share of the Bank's portfolio and reflect its composition in terms of regions, language, eligibility for various sources of Bank financing⁹, and fragility status, insofar as possible.

⁷ "Results" is used as a generic term referring to outputs and outcomes of Bank interventions. To the extent possible, the CEDR synthesis used the definition of outcomes used in contribution analysis, namely that an outcome is a change in behavior that can be expected based on delivery of an output and if other assumptions hold true. For example, whereas building a road would be an output, use of the road would be an outcome, which might be measured in terms of lower travel times and access to services.

⁸ African Development Bank Group, May 2016, Scaling up implementation of the Ten Year Strategy: the High 5s Agenda: "The Bank is responding to the challenge of supporting inclusive growth and the transition to green growth by scaling up investment and implementation of the TYS by focusing on five priority areas, referred to as the High 5s. These priority areas are: Light up and Power Africa, Feed Africa, Industrialize Africa, Integrate Africa and Improve the Quality of Life for the People of Africa," p. 1.

⁹ ADF-13 Resource Allocation Framework - Operational Guidelines, AfDB, April 2014: based on a cut-off defined for FY14 by the 2012 per capita Gross National Income (GNI) of US\$1,205: (i) Countries above cut-off and creditworthy are only eligible for ADB resources (non-concessional loans); (ii) Countries below cut-off and not creditworthy are only eligible to ADF resources (concessional loans and grants); and (iii) Countries below cut-off and creditworthy (Blend countries) are eligible for ADB resources and for ADF resources subject to a cap and blend terms. Transition states are eligible for additional financing through the Transition States Facility.

The final sample of 14 countries¹⁰ represented almost 60% of the Bank lending portfolio, based on approvals during 2004–2013. (See Figure 2 and *Annex A: Methodology* for details). For each of the countries in the sample, an evaluation of the Bank's Country Strategies and Program (CSP) was conducted as well as a number (169) of evaluations of project results.

Figure 2. CEDR Countries Sample




The CEDR synthesis is based on a Theory of Change (ToC) (*Annex B: Bank's Theory of change*) depicting the linkages between Bank activities, outputs, and outcomes. The ToC was developed by the evaluation team after a thorough review of relevant documents that included Bank policies, operational strategies and guidance documents, evaluations and assessments, and comparable documents from major DPs. A narrative explaining the ToC components and flow provides a more detailed description of impact pathways i.e. how outputs contribute to intended outcomes.

The ToC guided the design of the 14 evaluation questions that structured this synthesis. These questions, together with related indicators, are presented in *Annex C: Evaluation Matrix*. A six-point rating scale¹¹ is used to respond to the questions about the achievement of development results (See *Annex D: Rating scale used for the synthesis*) based on an aggregation of ratings from the different lines of evidence.¹² For data tables of indicators used to respond to the evaluation questions as per the evaluation matrix, see

Annex E: Data tables.

The synthesis drew on multiple lines of evidence (Figure 3). Country performance case studies included reviews of Bank performance based on the ToC, i.e. reviews of factors assumed to influence whether or not results are achieved. They were undertaken as an integral part of the Country Strategy and Program Evaluation (CSPE) process in all 14 countries, using the Context Factor Review (CFR) framework. Detailed Project Results Assessments (PRAs) were carried out for projects that were completed or ongoing and close to completion (169 projects) in all 14 countries. CFRs and PRAs went through a rigorous quality assurance process to ensure consistency across countries. Ten recent evaluations and studies were used to triangulate the evidence gathered through the CEDR building blocks with evidence from other sources (see *Annex A: Methodology*).

Figure 3. Multiple lines of reference for CEDR synthesis



Each evaluation building block constituting the lines of evidence generated findings using a mix of methods (qualitative and quantitative) and triangulation. These included document reviews, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and data analysis. Overall, close to 1900 persons were interviewed. Of these, 10% were Bank staff and 90% were government counterparts and national stakeholders, including private sector and civil society representatives (see *Annex F: Implementation information*). PRAs and CFRs also used the six-point rating scales described in *Annex G: Rating scale used in PRAs* and *Annex H: Rating scale used in CFRs*.

¹⁰ The 14 countries are: Burundi, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, and Zambia.

¹¹ HU: Highly Unsatisfactory; U: Unsatisfactory; MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory; MS: Moderately Satisfactory; S: Satisfactory; and HS: Highly Satisfactory.

¹² For example, in the rest of the document, U- refers to the % of ratings in the line of evidence examined that are unsatisfactory or below, while MS+ refers to the % of ratings that are moderately satisfactory or above.

Two additional documents completed the background documents used in this synthesis: a broad review and analysis of the portfolio of operations examined by the CEDR¹³ and a cross-country qualitative review¹⁴ of factors enabling or hindering the achievement of results.

Limitations

An important challenge encountered in preparing this synthesis concerned identifying intermediate outcomes across the projects examined according to both the project ToC and the Bank's ToC with its sector-specific outcomes, which served as basis for this evaluation (*Annex B: Bank's Theory of change*). Sector-specific outcomes were often not reflected in a project ToC. This disparity limited the conclusions about the effectiveness of the impact pathways described in the Bank's ToC (Box 1). In addition, the structure of the project ToCs in the projects examined in depth varied considerably. For example, when sector-specific outcomes were included, they were presented as "direct," "immediate," "intermediate," "medium-term," "final," or "long-term" or even "impact." To mitigate this drawback, the information in the PRA intermediate outcome section was used systematically to assess the achievement of outcomes. The analysis was based on all data -- indicators and detailed narratives -- in this section.

Box 1. The disconnect between ToCs at project level and the overall ToC for the CEDR limits conclusions

Given that the Bank's ToC was constructed as part of this evaluation, there was a disconnect between it and the ToCs examined at project level. However, positive cases of alignment were also noted.

- In the transport sector, outcomes related to *Enhanced mobility and accessibility for people, business and trade* and *Enhanced competitiveness & access to markets of private sector* were consistently included. Fewer projects included outcomes related to *Decrease in transport related injuries*. This was the case for the Singida-Babati-Minjingu Roads Upgrading project.
- In the water and sanitation sectors, outcomes related to *Reduced incidence of W&S related disease* and *Reduced burden in water collection* were cited more often than outcomes related to *Reduced W&S related pollution*. Some projects included the capacity to measure water treatment, community mobilization, and job creation as intermediate outcomes that do not explicitly link to sector specific outcomes.
- In the agriculture sector, projects were more likely to include sector-specific outcomes related to *Increased rural household income* and *Improvement in national food security* rather than *Improved resilience of producers and national supply to shocks*. However, the connection between food security and measured indicators was unclear in some cases. Measured outcomes tended to focus on increased crops, other staple food production or other indicators such as institutional capacity building or disease prevalence reduction. These indicators alone do not allow an assessment of the project's effect on food security, which also requires considering aspects of food quality and availability to the end-consumer.
- In the energy sector, sector-level outcomes related to *Increased access to reliable, quality and sustainable electricity to private and business customers in rural and non-rural areas*, and *Reduction in pollution related to energy generation* were randomly included in projects. Morocco's Ain Beni Mathar energy project is a positive exception. It addressed both sector-level outcomes, and scored well in achieving its outcomes (i.e., reducing energy cost, reinforcing the electricity grid, increasing electricity production through renewable sources and limiting the production of greenhouse gases, increasing employment). Some projects included employment as an outcome, as well as economic growth and the reduction of poverty/unemployment. These were assessed as overambitious and beyond the direct control of the project, and therefore inappropriate. This was the case for South Africa's Eskom Holdings Corporate Loan energy project.
- Finally projects from the governance and finance sectors often lacked a clear articulation between the Bank sector-specific outcomes, the project ToC, and measured outcomes. For example, logic models in the finance sector were often overly generalized, with objectives that could not be easily linked to measurable indicators. At the same time, positive examples were also found in these sectors. In Ethiopia and in line with the Bank's governance sector-

¹³ A review of the portfolio of PRAs for the CEDR: Coverage, trends and features.

¹⁴ A qualitative comparative analysis of the Bank's ToC for the CEDR: Evaluating factors thought to contribute to AfDB performance at country level.

specific outcomes, the Protection of Basic Services project aimed to improve financial transparency at regional and sub-regional (woreda) levels to ensure that resources for public sector services were available for public services. The project achieved its objective of informing citizens about woreda budgets, and the narrative explicitly made the connection between this and achieving *Increased public accountability & oversight*.

Assessing the achievement of outcomes faced another challenge: poorly articulated linkages or no linkages between sector-level outcomes in the project ToC (where present) and outcome indicators used to assess project effectiveness. Some projects measured outcomes without an explicit link to sector-specific outcomes. Others used indicators that are inadequately connected to the Bank's sector-specific outcomes and the project ToC. For example, logic models for financial sector projects were often overly generalized, with objectives that could not be easily linked to measurable indicators. Where sector-level outcome(s) were present in both the ToC and outcome indicator sections of the project, the absence of baseline data, or shortcomings in indicators, or the uncertainty of data quality and reliability often hindered an assessment of the achievement of pre-established outcomes. Here again, as mitigation, the analysis relied on all data available in the PRA, including both indicators and narratives.

Also, when there was either no description or only a poor description of the project's ToC in the design phase (which was therefore retrospectively reconstructed by the evaluation team), it was difficult to assess the achievement of outcomes. This often led to very low ratings. However, the risk of bias among evaluators needs to be acknowledged with these lower and also with higher ratings associated to clearer outcomes, or clearer causality chains that made the assessment easier. The quality assurance process that was established mitigated this risk by having ratings reviewed by at least 2 people.

Another challenge encountered was that taking by design countries as a basis of analysis resulted in project samples that were not statistically representative of the overall Bank's portfolio. The 14 countries were selected to ensure that the sample included the largest proportion of the volume of approvals in the period examined and was as close as possible to the composition of the Bank's overall portfolio. The resulting sample of projects also globally matched in proportion the composition of the Bank's portfolio. However, findings were not generalized directly to overall Bank performance from this data assuming that the sample was statistically representative of the entire population. Instead, for generalization, two approaches were used. First, findings and conclusions from the analysis conducted as part of the CEDR were triangulated with evidence from other sources. Second, findings were generalized through theory to the extent possible.

A related limitation stemmed from the centrally-decided selection criteria for those projects to be examined through PRAs to ensure a standard approach across countries. This purposive sampling approach was based primarily on the maturity of the project. While the teams had a narrow margin of customization, the centralized approach largely determined the sample size and sector composition. This resulted in a low, variable size of samples of projects examined for each sector of Bank activity. Consequently, comparing performance across sectors was not considered feasible or credible in this evaluation.

Formulating fully consistent evaluation questions across all lines of evidence was the final design challenge. Despite an effort to standardize the framework of analysis across lines of evidence, boundaries and conceptual overlaps among terms may have limited the selection of data to formulate findings. For example, questions related to "Selectivity" and "Strategic Focus" in different lines of evidence addressed the same issues conceptually but used slightly different terms. In addition, for each line of evidence, evaluations were conducted by different teams. This created a risk of non-consistency across projects and countries that would limit the value of the aggregated result. Mitigation actions during implementation relied on issuing clear guidance for assessments and on establishing a quality assurance process to ensure consistency across evaluations. At the synthesis stage, the mitigation action relied on a careful interpretation of the qualitative data analyzed according to the analytic question without including in the analysis data that did not specifically address it.

2. What did the CEDR examine?

This section presents the Bank context in the period from 2004 to 2013 that the CEDR covered. It proposes a brief overview of Bank strategies and operations over the period, and presents the specific portfolio examined in this evaluation.

Bank strategies

The Bank's strategic objectives remained largely consistent over the evaluation period. They focused on poverty reduction, equity, and economic development as described in Table 2.

Table 2. Bank Corporate Strategies 2004-2013

Document	Strategic Objectives
2003-2007 Strategic Plan	Poverty reduction through improved productivity and economic growth.
2008-2012 Medium Term Strategy	Poverty reduction through improved productivity growth and economic diversification. Contribution to the achievement of the MDGs.
2013-2022 Ten Year Strategy	Inclusive and sustainable (green) growth through economic transformation.

Recent developments included a focus on five priority areas, the High 5s, to scale up investment and implementation of the Ten Year Strategy¹⁵: These are: (i) Light up and Power Africa; (ii) Feed Africa; (iii) Industrialize Africa; (iv) Integrate Africa; and (v) Improve the Quality of Life for the People of Africa. Priority areas were complemented by an emphasis on four critical cross-cutting areas: climate change, fragility, gender and governance. To accelerate implementation, the Bank embarked on a transformational agenda with four main components/principles¹⁶:

- New Business Delivery Model, including a new largely decentralized organizational structure, innovative financing mechanisms and instruments, and leveraging innovative partnerships with non-traditional actors;
- New Results Measurement Framework for 2016-2019, aligned with the High 5s and representative of the Bank's delivery goals;
- Leveraging, Partnership and Coordination emphasizing the Bank's systematic leveraging of its own resources and becoming a catalyst, and expanding its operations and services (including more non-sovereign financing and advisory and knowledge services) to better respond to the demands of a differentiated client base;
- Selectivity and focus, with an emphasis on continuing to use the Country and Regional Integration Strategy Papers as the main vehicles to translate the High 5s into practice, the need for Bank programs to remain selective and focused in areas of comparative advantage, but also to propose multi-dimensional and cross-sectoral approaches.

¹⁵ African Development Bank Group, May 2016, Scaling up implementation of the Ten-Year Strategy: the High 5s Agenda.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Bank lending

The Bank approved approximately UA 32.9 billion in lending (expressed as net-loans¹⁷) for 1319 projects/programs between 2004 and 2013. Annual lending has increased steadily since 2004 (Figure 4). It almost doubled (from UA 11.3 billion in the first half of the period examined (2004-2008) to UA 21.5 billion in 2009-2013). The average project size increased slightly from UA 22 million to UA 27 million respectively.

More than half of the lending in the period was for infrastructure projects, including transport, energy, and water and sanitation. Multi-sector operations accounted for more than one fifth of the lending¹⁸. The energy sector, and to a lesser extent the transport sector, increased their already high share of the total lending between the first and the second half of the period examined by the evaluation, 2004–2008 and 2009–2013. The largest decline between the two halves of the period was in the share of the agriculture sector lending (Figure 5). This evolution is in line with the increased emphasis on hard infrastructure following the adoption of the Bank-wide Medium Term Strategy (2008-2012).

Figure 4. Volume of approvals 2004-2013






Figure 6. Evolution of portfolio composition in line with strategic directions



The ADB and ADF windows, corresponding respectively to non-concessional and concessional lending, were the main sources of financing for RMCs. Together, they represented over 95% of net loans over the period. Lending from both windows increased sharply in volume between the two halves of the period examined. (Figure 6). However, the share of ADF financing declined from 57% in the 2004-2008 period to 44% in 2009-2013. It should be noted that an outlier operation (large budget support to Botswana approved in 2009) distorted the picture for the 2009-2013 period. However,

The Bank's commitment between 2004 and 2013 to transition states (TS)¹⁹ was approximately UA 3 billion (9.1% of total net loans). Overall commitments rose from 2.5% in 2004 to 12.0% in 2013. There were fluctuations but no significant variation in lending to these states between the two halves of the period despite the adoption of a "Strategy for enhanced engagement in transition states" in 2008.

Figure 5. ADB financing surpassed ADF over time



¹⁷ Net-loan refers to the total amount approved from which amounts canceled are deducted.

¹⁸ "Multi-sector" is the generic name used in Bank systems to cover a range of interventions mostly in the governance area. The largest share of multi-sector interventions is taken by support to reforms through budget support, but this category also includes institutional support operations.

¹⁹ This analysis considered the list of countries categorized as transition states during the review period on an annual basis. As such, it takes into account countries entering and exiting the category each year.

the trend reflected the sharp increase in non-sovereign lending, which more than doubled between the two periods. Other sources of financing -- the Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF) – remained below 0.5% over the period. Financing from other sources²⁰ rose from 2.3% in 2004-2008 to 5.2% in 2009-2013.

Bank portfolio examined by the CEDR


Bank lending to the 14 CEDR countries amounted to UA 16.7 billion, or almost 60% of all approvals during 2004-2013²¹. The sectoral distribution of the portfolio in the 14 CEDR countries showed patterns similar to those of the overall Bank portfolio during 2004-2013, with few variations (Figure 7). The power sector had the largest share in the CEDR sample, while transport had the largest share in the Bank-wide portfolio. It should be noted that the CEDR portfolio included the single biggest energy project (in South Africa), which partly accounted for this difference from the overall portfolio.

The ADB window represented 57% of the total net loan while ADF resources accounted for almost 40%. Resources from other sources amounted to less than 4%, while NTF resources represented 0.1% of the total. This was not significantly out of line with the portfolio as a whole, although the ADB window was better represented than the other windows in the 14 countries. The three transition states represented slightly more than 7% of the total.

In the total portfolio of 14 countries, a sample of projects was selected for an in-depth assessment through a Project Results Assessment (PRA). The selection criteria was; (i) a net-loan above UA one million; and (ii) disbursements above 80 percent or completed/closed project. Overall, PRAs covered 169 projects representing total net loans of UA 9.4 billion in the 14 countries. Of these, South Africa had the largest share of PRAs by volume (30%) followed by Morocco and Tunisia, which represented 17% and 15% respectively. The shares by country in the project sample were broadly in line with the country shares in the overall portfolio.

Although the sample of PRA projects was not statistically representative of the Bank's portfolio, it presented similar characteristics. The sectoral distribution of the PRA sample deviated only slightly from the Bank-wide pattern – looking only at projects complying with eligibility criteria for PRA. Power and multi-sector operations represented the largest shares within the sample (28% and 23% respectively) while transport represented 12% (Figure 8). The portfolio data also showed that the ADB window financed the largest share of projects covered by PRAs (68%). This was not surprising since middle-income countries such as South Africa, Morocco and Tunisia represented the largest share of the PRA sample. ADF resources amounted to 31%; the remainder came from other sources such as trust funds. Of the 169 projects examined, 41 used the budget support instrument, representing 37% of the volume examined.


Figure 7. The CEDR country sample nearly matched the composition of the Bank's portfolio



²⁰ Accelerated Co-Financing Facility for Africa (ACFA), the Clean Technology Fund, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program Trust Fund, the Strategic Climate Fund, the Africa Water Facility, and OPEC.

²¹ This amount does not include multinational operations in particular those implemented by Regional Economic Communities and other bodies that cover many countries as there are practical challenges to estimating an individual country's share. But multinational infrastructure projects such as roads, electricity and agriculture are included in their respective countries estimation. The share of CEDR countries would be 50.8% of approvals if multinational operations approvals were counted as part of total approvals. The multinational operations have not been excluded from the analysis itself.

Figure 8. The PRA sample matches the composition of the Bank's portfolio with only slight divergence



3. Has the Bank achieved its objectives?

This section responds to the first question defined for the CEDR: *To what extent has the Bank achieved its objectives?* To respond to this question, the CEDR reviewed whether Bank's interventions have been relevant, have delivered results, have delivered result efficiently, and whether the results are sustainable. The rating scale used is presented in *Annex D: Rating scale used for the synthesis*. Data from the various lines of evidence is presented in detail in *Annex E: Data tables*. When assessing performance, this data was examined against the S+ bar for all criteria in this section. This evaluation believes that as the Bank sets itself ambitious targets for the future, it should proactively look at its experience and aim for a rating of satisfactory or above for achievement of results.


Relevance

The relevance of Bank interventions was assessed as moderately satisfactory. It was stronger at the planning and strategic levels than at the operational level where beneficiary needs were sometimes neglected. Alignment between the Bank's country investments and RMC needs at all levels was found to be stronger when the Bank was able to adopt responsive actions adapted to developing needs and when it mobilized the interests of diverse stakeholders.

Assessment Criteria	Rating
Extent to which objectives of Bank interventions are aligned with the country's development strategies, applicable Bank strategies, and beneficiary needs	Moderately Satisfactory
Extent to which design of interventions is conducive to achieving results	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Relevance	Moderately Satisfactory


The alignment of Bank interventions was assessed as moderately satisfactory. Just over half of all country strategies and programs (57% S+ in case studies) were found to include interventions that were precisely defined in line with country and beneficiary needs i.e. presenting either no or only minor shortcomings (Figure 9). The ratings provided by the evaluation of the Quality at Entry (QaE) of CSPs for the Bank's alignment with country development plans showed a similar pattern (55% S+). CSPs were also adequately aligned with most of the Bank's core priorities as defined in its strategies. At project level, the overall assessment showed a very high rating (more than 90%) for the relevance of project objectives that are aligned to the CSPs and to national priorities (Figure 10). Bank management's Project Completion Reports (PCRs) ratings and IDEV ratings of project relevance were consistently high but the strength of this corroboration must be considered in light of the limited number of projects (50 projects) that have completed PCRs and PRAs.

Figure 9. CFR ratings for alignment



Project design was rated moderately unsatisfactory. The design in less than half the projects examined (37% S+) was largely conducive to achieving results (Figure 10). This rating was corroborated by those from country case studies that often described projects as having important limitations, especially in identifying and managing risks. This is particularly important in fragile contexts where at the design stage, about one in five projects fail to identify the best way to tackle issues and manage risks. Weak results frameworks is another design issue consistently identified. (cf. section focusing on management for results in this report).

Figure 10. PRA ratings for relevance (% in number)



The Bank's active involvement and sustained dialogue with the RMC at each planning level was found to be a condition for designing relevant, selective strategies and programs that respond to beneficiary needs. The Bank could develop relevant CSPs but additional conditions are required for a selective portfolio. Sustained dialogue with the RMC at all planning and operational levels positively influenced the vertical coherence of national, sectoral, and operational level considerations in CSPs. Desk reviews of country context documents (including national strategies and priorities, and the macroeconomic climate) accompanied by economic and sector work (ESW), set the stage for aligning the Bank's CSPs with national and sector-specific development needs. When needs assessments were further used to construct the intervention logic at national and sector-specific levels, the CSP's results measurement framework was stronger and the Bank portfolio responded directly and explicitly to the objectives of the RMC general strategies and in sectors. This strong alignment was noted in Ethiopia and Tunisia. In these countries, the section on CSP pillars/sectors of intervention were anchored in a sequence of detailed analyses, including, for example, the country growth agenda, the involvement of other DPs, and sector constraints. Responsiveness to

Box 2. Cases of misalignment

Two situations were described in country case studies as resulting in a misalignment between Bank and RMC needs.

- A 'missing-link approach', which occurred in Ghana, where, although the Bank's poverty reduction program was defined in terms of its contribution to the strategy of the Government of Ghana, strategy, the specific strategy adopted by the Bank was not stated. As a result, the selection and design of projects were not connected to an explicit and precise plan.
- A 'client-demand-centered approach,' was apparent in Mozambique and South Africa, where the Bank had relatively little influence on country reforms and the CSPs neglected to address fundamental policy and regulatory issues that could limit the achievement of CSP objectives. Constructive negotiations between the Bank and the RMC that could have permitted appropriate adaptations were missing in both cases.

By contrast, by adapting to rapidly changing country contexts and responding to new needs, the Bank remained relevant in Senegal for example.

beneficiary needs was further facilitated by the active role assumed by the RMC through in-house feasibility assessments²². Having CSPs and projects include explicit effects for target groups in log-frames also increased responsiveness to beneficiary needs. By contrast, targeting interventions by zones of beneficiaries was not necessarily associated with Bank projects being responsive to beneficiary needs. A qualitative analysis also revealed that limitations in project selectivity negatively influenced the alignment of Bank interventions with the needs of the country and of beneficiaries.

A second condition was the mobilization of a wide range of partners. Mobilization of stakeholders could happen at the national and sector planning levels by harmonizing contributions with other DPs and through dialogue with civil society organizations. This contributed to the alignment of the CSPs with other DPs priorities and interventions, and to explicitly outlining the Bank's comparative advantages. A broad mobilization of diverse stakeholders (e.g., private sector, local administration and civil organizations) further contributed to a selective project portfolio. Such mobilization was particularly strong in Tunisia and Ethiopia but weak in South Africa, for example (Box 2).

A third condition was the identification and implementation of responsive actions to remedy country shortcomings. Weak government capacities and analytic skills were often identified yet appropriate measures were not always implemented. This limited the effectiveness of Bank projects. Other related shortcomings included the lack of consideration of past performance issues and, in contexts of fragility, of factors of fragility. From this perspective, CSPs in transition states were described as being aligned with Bank strategies addressing factors of fragility. Yet there might have been improvements leading to a more integrated approach and better-defined intervention location to more effectively target the most impoverished regions.


Effectiveness

Effectiveness was rated moderately unsatisfactory. Leadership, ownership, and the capacity to implement were the driving factors behind results on the national side. On the Bank side, the identification of implementation constraints at the design stage was insufficient.

Assessment Criteria	Rating
Extent to which intermediate outcomes have been achieved	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Extent to which Bank interventions have led to positive benefits for target beneficiaries	Moderately Satisfactory
Effectiveness	Moderately Unsatisfactory

Effectiveness was rated moderately unsatisfactory. Less than a third of Bank interventions (27% S+) had achieved or were likely to achieve the intended intermediate outcome (Figure 11). Even more critically, less than half (49% S+) of operations were found to have achieved most of their planned outputs. This obviously does not mean that the Bank was not delivering results, but that it did so in a limited way. The disconnect between PCR and PRA ratings for effectiveness was also examined, and showed a marginal difference: PCRs rated 4% higher than PRAs. However, this is based on a subset of 79 projects that had both ratings. This therefore limited any conclusions about the existence and magnitude of the disconnect. Unintended outcomes (or their absence) were reported for 76% of the projects examined. In

Figure 11. PRA ratings for effectiveness (% in number)




²² This was clearly the case in Ethiopia and South Africa regarding road development and economic empowerment, respectively.

Mozambique, for example, an agriculture sector program cited positive unintended effects including the growth of crops and a successful partnership between a private Chinese company and a state-owned Mozambican company.

The extent to which Bank interventions have led to positive benefits for target beneficiaries was rated moderately satisfactory. A qualitative analysis of projects shows that more than half the Bank-financed projects (64%) led to, or were likely to lead to, positive benefits for target groups. Outcomes of the project's direct benefits on a target group — men, women, youth and girls—were based overwhelmingly on exposure to project services such as training and employment opportunities. The identification of a beneficiary group in the ToC and the output/outcome measures were highly consistent. Outcomes most often addressed the provision of training (52%) and the creation of employment (26%). Also, in projects with training and employment outcomes, women were specifically targeted in approximately 20% of the cases and youth in 3% of the cases. Youth were identified as target beneficiaries in only one training project and one job creation project. Other outcomes specific to target groups included i) education, ii) quality of life (i.e., access to water, electricity or roads) and iii) credit (i.e., microfinance). These included approximately 10%, 7%, and 4% of beneficiary outcomes respectively, with women or girls being specifically targeted in approximately half the projects. When a project included any one of these outcome measures (training, employment, education, quality of life or credit) with a clearly defined target group, overall effectiveness was 4.1. When the project did not include these outcome measures, their overall effectiveness was 4.2. In this respect, projects with an outcome measure for a beneficiary group were equally likely to achieve their outcomes as those without this measure.

Effectiveness was lower in transition states. This was especially true at the S+ level of achievement. By contrast, the MS+ level showed comparable or slightly higher values in transition states (Figure 12). As noted in the next section, the results in transition contexts were much less sustainable, reflecting the difficult context. Indeed in fragile situations, performance suffered particularly from weaknesses in government ownership and leadership, and capacity constraints related to the high turnover or absence of qualified personnel to implement and monitor programs. Where these factors were not duly considered, the design and implementation of reforms or programs were less likely to succeed. However, this does not mean that the Bank was ineffective in fragile situations. With the additional financing provided through the Fragile States Facility, factors of fragility have, on the contrary, been addressed, although not necessarily fully or sustainably (Box 3, example of Togo).

Figure 12. PRA ratings for effectiveness by country classification (% in number)



Box 3. Addressing fragility in Togo

The Bank worked in Togo on many factors contributing to fragility in its sphere of competence. Overall, through interventions and dialogue, the Bank has influenced a number of these, namely support for post-conflict recovery and development, support for economic governance and infrastructure, and capacity building. This however remains limited, as growth has remained below target and structural fragility factors remain rooted in the country. In addition, the Bank intervened only very indirectly on extreme poverty and only marginally on inequality and the environment.

The relatively large proportion of ineffective projects in MICs can be related to the combination of the small sample size and the issues described in the limitations section. These included weaker interventions logics, for example, for finance projects, which led to lower ratings. Most of the non-performing projects are lines of credit in South Africa.


ADB financed projects performed better than ADF-financed projects. This is visible against the S+ bar even though there is no significant difference against the MS+ bar (Figure 13). This

can be related to better design and to a context that is more conducive to achieving results, as the case studies showed. Interestingly, a symmetrical situation was shown by ratings in volume, most probably linked to large lines of credit operations in MICs that rated negatively on effectiveness, as described above. For budget support operations, effectiveness is significantly higher at the S+ level only looking at percentage in volume. In this case, larger budget support operations were undertaken in countries in the higher end of the income range where the context is favorable for effectiveness.

Government ownership and leadership were important determinants of effectiveness. They provided high-level support for necessary administrative processes and fostered effective political dialogue. The capacity of actors responsible for project implementation and monitoring also played an important role at all levels—including local implementation units and government counterparts. This included having stable, qualified local human resources with the appropriate technical and administrative capacities.

On the Bank side, design and supervision were found to be the most important determinants of effectiveness. Both on the positive and negative sides, ratings for outcomes achievement were consistent with ratings for project design. This connection was confirmed by a qualitative assessment of project reviews. Weak design that did not fully integrate and manage contextual risks, and/or weak supervision that did not help change the course of a project when faced with implementation issues, impacted effectiveness. In Ghana, for example, reforms in public financial management appeared to have addressed systems, but by design did not address culture. This led to limited effectiveness as evidenced by the increase in corruption over the 2009–2013 period. This finding from project level assessments was also corroborated by the Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the 14 country performance case studies highlighting supervision, project design, national capacity, and partnerships as critical elements for achieving results.

Figure 13. PRA ratings for effectiveness by window (% in number and volume)



Sustainability

Sustainability was rated moderately unsatisfactory. The sustainability of project outcomes was associated with RMC project ownership and the integration of a long-term vision into sector-specific strategic analysis and planning. By coordinating with other DPs, creating context-informed project designs, and building institutional capacities, the Bank created conditions that favored sustainability.

Assessment Criteria	Rating
Technical Soundness	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Financial and Economic Viability	Unsatisfactory
Institutional sustainability and strengthening of capacities	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Sustainability	Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall, the sustainability of Bank-financed project outcomes was rated as moderately unlikely. Weak S+ ratings across lines of evidence indicated a low proportion of projects with a likelihood of sustained results or sufficient mechanisms to ensure that likelihood, by definition of the threshold. Across the projects reviewed, three explanatory factors were considered critical (Figure 14).

Financial and economic viability was the main factor limiting sustainability. It was assessed as unsatisfactory. Nearly half of Bank projects (41% MU-) had few mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability to ensure that achieved outputs and outcomes will be maintained beyond project closure. Less than a third (28% S+) had robust mechanisms in place. Smaller projects in transition states in agriculture, social, and water and sanitation were the worst performers. Examples of good practice existed across sectors (energy, agriculture, governance) with projects setting in place conditions (e.g. fees for using the infrastructure built) and national authorities taking ownership and responsibility, including budgets, for maintenance.

The technical soundness of Bank projects was rated moderately unsatisfactory. The achievement of results for about half the projects reviewed was likely to be adversely affected by factors related to their technical design (47% S+). A deeper qualitative analysis found strong evidence of weak project design and its effect on delays and cost overruns. This, in turn, lowered outcome achievement.

Institutional sustainability and strengthening of capacities were rated moderately unsatisfactory. A significant number of Bank-financed projects reviewed did not contribute to strengthening necessary capacities (41% S+). Country systems and capacities remained somewhat weak

in ensuring that achieved project outputs and outcomes were maintained beyond closure. The strongest and weakest ratings were not associated with any particular sector or country. Rather, they occurred across sectors in fragile and non-fragile states alike. Bank mechanisms and investments influenced sustainability, but the presence of country systems and capacities integrating a long-term vision were essential for sustaining project outcomes.

The environmental and social sustainability of Bank-financed projects was also found to be insufficient. Other elements of sustainability were analyzed across the projects, and the environmental and social sustainability of Bank-financed operations was found to be insufficient. While this aspect is given consideration at design stage, less than half of projects reviewed (45% S+) presented environmental and social mitigation plans largely implemented in a timely, satisfactory manner with institutional capacity and funding deemed sufficient for sustainability.

Sustainability was related to both project size and country conditions.

Sustainability was much lower in fragile contexts where the main limiting factors were financial and economic viability and the political and governance environment (Figure 15). Similarly, ADB-financed projects were more likely to be sustainable than ADF-financed projects, reflecting the fact that they are implemented under stronger country conditions and capacity (Figure 16). Sustainability ratings invariably increased when looking at percentage in volume compared to percentage in number. This indicated that sustainability was positively

associated with project size. When discussing sustainability, project assessments did not refer to project size, and projects were more sustainable when government and government partners assumed project ownership. This suggested that both conditions applied, or might have been linked with favorable conditions that were more likely to be present when loan amounts were higher. The sample also showed diverging variations, for example a lower proportion of S+ in volume for the ADB window or a lower proportion in volume for budget support at the MS+ level. Given the small sample size, these can be related to specific outlier cases. For example, in the case of budget support, one large post-revolution budget support in Tunisia was assessed negatively in terms of sustainability.

Four overarching, interconnected internal factors were found to influence sustainability: (i) country strategies planning for sustainability and incorporating lessons from the sustainability of past projects; (ii) project selection based on country capacity; (iii) partner coordination and long-term vision, and (iv) project design identifying risks and mitigation measures. The Bank favorably influenced sustainability with a broad range of “upstream” strategies targeting policy and institutional development along with innovative funding mechanisms. For example, it built partnerships that leveraged project achievements and invested in institutional sustainability; it contributed to government management and technical

Figure 14. PRA ratings for sustainability (% in number)






Figure 15. PRA ratings for sustainability by country classification (% in number)



capacities at central, provincial, and district levels; it assured sufficient investment in the financial sector including the development of PPPs, and it supported sustainable regional integration strategies and discussed project ownership with RMCs.

First, incorporating a vision of sustainability in CSPs, particularly with respect to sector programming, was identified as a practice that positively influenced project outcome sustainability. However, this factor alone was insufficient to guarantee sustainability without the presence of other favorable conditions. For example, Cameroon identified and integrated lessons on sustainability issues in CSPs and projects, but lack of engagement in the public administration limited their influence on the sustainability of achievements. A promising practice notwithstanding, the government lacked the capacities and resources to build sufficient momentum to support required changes.

Figure 16. PRA ratings for sustainability by window (% in number and volume)



Second, country ownership was essential for sustaining project outcomes. It was associated with project selection based on a country's self-identified needs and took into consideration present and future resources and capacities in government and in intermediaries. In terms of facilitating sustainability, ownership also considered the institutionalization of monitoring and evaluation practices. Sector sustainability was found to vary in a country while ownership and capacities could vary between ministries.

Third, the mobilization of partners to coordinate contributions and build lasting relationships was identified as having influenced sustainability. The sustainability of results of a water and sanitation project in Burundi (PREIHRM), for example, was strengthened by mobilizing partners to contribute to key project components that were not completed during the project's lifespan.

Last but not least, sustainability was found to be associated with the technical design of the project. When the assessment of risks and the elaboration of key assumptions were generic and superficial, project outcomes risked becoming unsustainable. Conversely, when projects were reinforced and built on the technical successes of previous projects, sustainability was strengthened. Technical design was also weak when projects could not generate sufficient revenue because they did not take into account beneficiaries' ability to pay for services. This was true for energy projects (e.g. in Tanzania), where the viability of the utility company was strongly associated with its capacity to generate a strong customer revenue base. Box 4 illustrates various other practices of sustainability at country level.

Box 4. Practice of sustainability

- Project outcomes in Morocco were likely to be sustained when country ownership was strong. Sustainability was attributed to the presence of essential skills in the sector to achieve and ensure ownership. The instruments used by the Bank to support Morocco to conduct complex, long-term reforms further contributed to creating these conditions. For example, in partnership with the Government of Morocco, the Bank completed a diagnostic growth study that led to making education and professional integration strategies central to national priorities and to receiving additional financing from the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Similarly, the Moroccan finance project (PADESFI III) relied on access to the human resources, technical equipment, and engagement built at the Ministry of Finance through successive projects and research.
- Lack of capacity and government ownership limited the sustainability of project outcomes in Nigeria's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Project outcomes (a M&E system, a human resource strategy, and a management information system) were threatened by the lack of internalization of these procedures into Ministry practices. Furthermore, the Ministry was described as having contributed little to the project and as merely receiving a Bank grant.
- In Zambia, a similar threat from non-institutionalized M&E practices and computerized systems was described.

The Child Welfare project failed to sustain outcomes because of project design issues including inadequate capacity, insufficient appropriation and management of material risks, and underestimated costs. The Bank did not pay attention to ensuring the QaE, ownership, or adequate key stakeholder consultations.

Efficiency


Efficiency was rated moderated unsatisfactory. Timeliness was the main negative factor while cost efficiency was assessed more positively. Project delays were associated with weak design, onerous Bank procedures, and complicated arrangements with other DPs.

Assessment Criteria	Rating
Timeliness	Unsatisfactory
Cost efficiency	Moderately satisfactory
Efficiency	Moderately Unsatisfactory

Efficiency was assessed as moderately unsatisfactory. The major factor driving this negative assessment was the weak timeliness of the projects assessed, especially for public sector. For private sector operations, supervision and administration also showed a particularly weak performance (Figure 17).

This is a serious issue as low efficiency affected effectiveness. The qualitative analysis of the project assessments showed evidence that low efficiency and delays in the early phase of a project in particular could have knock-on or compounding consequences affecting the effectiveness of the project (Box 5).

Figure 17. PRA ratings for efficiency and sub-components (% in number)




Box 5. Delays affect outcomes

- In Ghana, a hospital construction project that began nearly two years after the loan approval was subsequently delayed by national procurement processes. During the interim period, the population size in the catchment area grew to such an extent that the initial estimates were no longer valid and the designs had to be readjusted. The original loan was insufficient for two redesigned hospitals. As a result, only one hospital was partially constructed, was unfinished and unmaintained three years after project completion. This clearly impeded development outcomes and constituted an inefficient use of Bank and country resources.
- In Tanzania's Lake Tanganyika Integrated Public Agriculture program (PRODAP), price escalations created delays that forced a reduction in the number of training sessions delivered and therefore the number of beneficiaries.
- Delays may have also opened the Bank to considerable risk. Zambia's CETZAM project is an example. Allegations that the management team misrepresented the client's financial standing suggested that the project was always at high risk of failure outside of Bank control. However, the Credit Review Committee cited lengthy delays between appraisal, approval, and signature of the loan agreement as having exposed the Bank to undue risk.

Delays were a main driving factor for low efficiency. More than half (55%) of the projects examined were rated negatively for timeliness. By volume, the proportion was lower (48%). This suggested that large projects tend to manage delays slightly better than smaller scale projects. This negative overall picture also covered large variations (Figure 18). While about a third of the Bank's funded projects reviewed were completed on time or ahead of schedule, more than a quarter of them exceeded the planned implementation time by more than 25%. Almost half of all of the projects in the sample were delayed by one year or more. It should be noted that the quality of data also affected calculated delays, as estimations are complicated by changes in project scope. For example, an industry project in Tunisia that scored well on timeliness was completed 18 months before schedule, but the client decided to drop two planned components, thereby reducing the scope significantly. In another case, the Railways Modernization project in Tunisia replaced an institutional capacity building component with technical studies to expedite project implementation. While this was sound from a project management point of view (adjusting project scope is a necessary response to changing conditions), it artificially lowered the proportion of projects with a time or cost overrun. Some projects also lacked time-bound targets and an assessment of the timeliness of outcomes was complicated by the lack of adequate baseline data. These could mean that the issue of timeliness may actually be worse than presented.


Figure 18. 28% of projects reviewed exceeded the planned implementation time by 25%



Delays between project approval and first disbursement were significant.

48% of the projects examined took more than 12 months after approval -- the Bank's first disbursement target maximum (Figure 19). A further breakdown shows that most projects were delayed between effectiveness and first disbursement. Almost 60% of the projects examined took, on average, 10.4 months from the date of effectiveness to the first disbursement compared to the Bank's target of two months. The number of projects delayed between approval and signature was lower (13.2%) but signature to effectiveness (27.1%) was still high. There was, however, some evidence of a decrease in delays. In the transport sector, for example,²³ the proportion of projects experiencing delays in approval to signature and signature to effectiveness dropped between the 2000-05 and 2006-11 periods. One practice instituted by country offices together with national partners with positive results was the readiness filter. It made sure that once an operation was approved by the Bank's Board, all conditions were in place for start-up (Box 6 provides further details).

Figure 19. Significant delays to first disbursement occurred across sectors



²³ African Development Bank Group, December 2014, Transport in Africa: The African Development Bank's Intervention and Results for the Last Decade, Summary Evaluation Report.

Box 6. Readiness filter: part of the solution to timeliness issues?

With a view to reducing delays to start-up and overall to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the interventions, country offices (e.g. Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zambia) together with national counterparts introduced readiness filters in addition to the standard readiness review undertaken at Bank headquarters. In Zambia, for example, these were largely mechanisms set up to facilitate the timely start-up of an operation, looking at aspects of staffing and capacities of the executing agency, opening project accounts, the availability of government counterpart funding, early preparation of procurement documents and accounting and financial manuals, terms of reference for consultants or for studies, and the finalization of safeguard requirements including relocation and compensation for affected peoples as applicable to the operation under consideration. In Tanzania, the CSP 2011-15 established a target of having all new projects under ADF XII (2011-13) adopt a 'readiness filter' i.e. a set of preliminary conditions: (i) key staff designated and an implementation plan ready by the time of Board approval; (ii) baseline data in place; (iii) M&E schemes/staff and a comprehensive results-framework set up before project implementation.

Readiness filters were applied variably. In Zambia, all projects since 2012 have applied them. In Tanzania, by contrast, the target was not met. The recommendation was repeated in the Country Portfolio Improvement Plan 2014-2015. The measure has had a positive effect on the portfolio in Ethiopia. Since 2010, the Bank has made considerable progress in reducing the time to first disbursements. The delay has continued to be around one year for the seven projects approved in 2010-2012 and examined by the evaluation. In Zambia, the average time elapsed between approval and first disbursement dropped from 16 months in 2011 to 12 months in 2014.


However, readiness filters did not solve all challenges. They needed to be applied but even when they were, other challenges remained. In Zambia, for example, despite improvements, the existing designs with the government for civil works were often of poor quality and needed expert review. This required recruiting experts, which caused further delay. Counterpart funding was difficult to come by and it was not easy to ensure availability in advance.

Efficiency was higher when country conditions**were more favorable.**

The efficiency of projects was more likely to be rated positively in non-fragile contexts than in transition states where delayed project implementation and completion were associated with sub-optimal government processes. These included assessing and awarding contract work, completing construction files, obtaining required project documentation, and adding project modifications. Efficiency ratings were higher overall for ADB financed projects. When looking at % in volume, ADB projects scored less favorably. This was driven by the significant drop in the cost effectiveness component of efficiency

for ADB-financed projects when examined in terms of volume. Given the sample size, however, no specific conclusion could be drawn about ADB project cost effectiveness. When looking at instruments, budget support operations were more efficient than others. In particular, their timeliness was much more positive (Figure 20).

Figure 20. PRA ratings for efficiency by country, window, instrument (% in number)



Weak supervision contributed to lower efficiency in private sector operations. Although private sector operations tended to be rated more favorably on efficiency, supervision was found to be a particularly weak area. Only about half the projects scored positively. Cost-related indicators were overall positive. They showed no significant difference between public and private sector operations. Some evidence suggested that private firms were able to ensure project profitability despite the challenges of operating in a developing country context. Evidence from the transport sector evaluation also suggested that minimal cost and time overruns occurred when projects were completed with PPPs. In this case, firms were reportedly able to ensure profitability despite the challenges of operating in a developing country context. However, the results can only be generalized to a very small degree. On the other hand, energy sector projects using the PPP model did not guarantee value for money because PPP projects were subject to the same exogenous and endogenous factors as privately funded projects. For example, the Bank's promotion of the private sector was successful in some (Cameroun-Dibamba, Cameroun-Sonel, South Africa-Sere) energy projects but not all (Ghana-Takoradi). However, the

analysis from this sector cautions against seeing private sector involvement as a panacea for project effectiveness and sustainability.

Poor design was a major factor driving delays. Design issues were associated with delays and cost overruns, and included an underestimation of costs, poorly informed design (sometimes due to insufficient ESW), the use of unrealistic inflation rates and inadequate risk assessment. In the transport sector, for example, the time and budget required for appraisal missions limited the depth of the pre-approval assessment process. In some instances, the quality of engineering was a major issue as budget constraints were prioritized over technical standards. The resulting delays and cost overruns could not be rectified by traditional measures such as supervision or project counseling. These issues could be compounded in post-conflict situations. In Burundi, for example, the PREIEL Public Power project underestimated costs because it could not establish an appropriate baseline: there were no projects during the conflict period. The scope of the project needed to be adjusted as a result, and the World Bank had to fund some aspects later²⁴. The SME evaluation also cited the example of the Growth-oriented women entrepreneurs program in Kenya that disbursed far less than planned due to slow project rollout and to ambitious goals that were not supported by design and implementation.

Bank procedures were also a contributor to implementation delays. The benefits of decentralized field offices were limited by an excessive focus on transactional compliance with Bank rules, with risk aversion, and with an ineffective or variable use of procurement resources. For example, infrastructure projects tended to be more likely to benefit from expert input into procurement plans by involving consultants and design engineers. In contrast, social sector projects generally did not benefit from expert input and therefore suffered serious delays in implementation. Other specific procurement process issues included unnecessary delays in reviews, inadequate Bank support for capacity building, rigid application of rules, and ICB procedures that were used too often²⁵, even when not necessary. Bank procedures may have caused delays in some sectors but not others. The no-objection procedure was cited by Bank clients as a primary cause of delays.²⁶ Yet this was not found to be the case in the transport sector where governance and procurement factors were more important²⁷. The new procurement policy is expected to introduce more flexibility and a risk-based approach that will ease these constraints. Another case was the use of MIC grants. Despite the typically low amounts, these grants could take as long to approve as large investment projects. This reduced their usefulness in a context where quick response to client demand is key. Box 7 provides an additional illustration of broad factors causing delays in the Bank's program in South Africa.

Box 7. Timeliness factors for Bank operations in South Africa

An analysis of the 13 projects included in the in-depth assessments, supplemented by a desk review of 6 other projects in the portfolio showed that some factors lowered timeliness more frequently than others:

- Delays focused on project start-up including clients meeting the Bank's pre-commitment conditions and disbursement conditions.
- Layers of processes on the side of the Bank affected energy projects delays and efficiency of grant operations in the portfolio.
- Contracting issues relating to contract and contractor management.
- Poor Bank supervision and monitoring. The emphasis on the frequency rather than the quality of supervision, poor reporting in lines of credit operations, and an emphasis on financial performance rather than on development outcomes
- Bank and partner capacity to dedicate adequate and relevant human and financial resources (at various stages).

Other factors came to into play over which the Bank had less control. These include RMC processes and procedures, and harmonization with DPs. Delays were sometimes caused by the time taken to ratify loans at the national level. The Ghana performance case study, for example, cited delays in signing loan agreements due to the requirement for internal ratification as a main cause in delaying loan effectiveness. Another factor that contributed to delays was the lack of

²⁴ Burundi, Réhabilitation et Extension des Infrastructures Electriques (PREIEL) – évaluation de la performance de projet.

²⁵ African Development Bank Group, August 2014, Operational Procurement Policies and Practices of the African Development Bank: An Independent Evaluation.

²⁶ African Development Bank Group, March 2012, The Preferred Partner? A client assessment of the African Development Bank.

²⁷ African Development Bank Group, December 2014, Transport in Africa: The African Development Bank's Intervention and Results for the Last Decade, Summary Evaluation Report.

harmonization among DPs. Evidence from the client assessment study showed that the Bank was perceived as having relatively efficient procedures for allowing country access to emergency funds. However, this process was quickly complicated and made more unpredictable by the involvement of other partners through multi-donor budget support and sectoral frameworks. The recommendation to eliminate counterpart fund requirements for transition states and countries with high risk or actual debt distress was made. If that was not possible, the recommendation was to clearly communicate the funds in advance of country budgeting so as to minimize disruptions to program execution. In multinational projects, delays were caused by a lack of coordination or harmonization of RMCs (e.g. BOAT Corridor in Burundi/Rwanda, for which Bank support was postponed for 18 months). At country level, process delays were also apparent in Mozambique. The Japanese development partner (JICA) co-financed a road project and expressed concerns about the Bank's delay in issuing the Accelerated co-Financing for Africa (ACFA) notice required to proceed with disbursement. Both JICA and the Bank attributed these delays, at least in part, to the poor performance of the implementing agency. However, differences in partner approaches and procedures were also cited as a major cause.

Crosscutting themes

Inclusive growth was frequently mentioned in CSP goals and project outcomes that included addressing regional disparities across a range of sector projects. Gender and age outcomes appeared less frequently. Green growth outcomes were integrated routinely in some sectors (energy) but not in others (transport).

Assessment Criteria	Rating
Extent to which Bank interventions have considered Inclusiveness	Moderately Satisfactory
Extent to which Bank interventions have considered environmental sustainability and support to transition to green growth	Satisfactory
Consideration to crosscutting themes	Moderately Satisfactory

Two broad sets of crosscutting themes driven by the Bank's TYS were examined. These were (i) inclusiveness, the extent to which Bank interventions addressed disparities with respect to gender, region, or age, and (ii) consideration of environmental sustainability. The assessment was based on a qualitative review of project assessments. Although the Ten-year Strategy (TYS) was approved after the evaluation period, the two broad crosscutting themes were considered relevant given the focus of earlier Bank strategies. In addition, they were considered to be a good basis for forward-looking lessons.

The consideration of inclusiveness was rated moderately satisfactory. 56%, 46% and 31% of project outcome measures mentioned gender, regional disparities, and age respectively. This included projects that suggested attention to disparities targeting women, region, or age in either project design or outcomes. The analysis focused on a design perspective and did not systematically consider whether outcomes had been achieved. However, both the transport and energy sector evaluations showed that outcomes appeared to have expanded the economic base across regions. Regional interconnection and rural access were key outcomes in the majority of energy and transport project outcomes.

The consideration of environmental sustainability was rated satisfactory. One third of the projects in the sample were assessed as having a potential impact on the environment, and all completed environmental assessments. However, only about half of the project outcome measures considered environmental sustainability. At the more strategic level, strategies and actions addressing inclusive growth and green growth were rated respectively as MS+ in 69% and 100% of CSPs assessed for QaE²⁸. The CSPs tended however to lack any analysis of country-specific strengths and weakness and how they informed priorities and strategic choices.

²⁸ African Development Bank Group, January 2015, Strategizing for the "Africa We Want": An Independent Evaluation of the Quality at Entry of Country and Regional Integration Strategies Summary Report

With respect to outcomes that directly contributed to environmental sustainability, sector strategies and project outcomes were coherent in some sectors (energy) but not in all (transport). The energy sector strategy included green growth in its strategic objectives. This included renewable energy, and operational outcomes in individual projects reducing carbon emissions or increasing electricity generation from hydroelectric or wind energy. In addition, inclusive growth was a successful outcome in energy interconnection projects where the vast majority of rural electrification projects aimed at and succeeded in increasing energy access to rural communities and households²⁹. The transport sector targeted the urban environment and aimed to improve traffic management schemes and vehicle road-worthiness testing. However, an evaluation of the transport sector showed that there were no achievements related to green growth. With the exception of two projects -- one to sensitize individuals to environmental protection and the other to improve locomotive efficiency,³⁰ projects were not designed to address urban environment issues such as traffic management or vehicle inspection.

About half (56%) of projects had the potential to directly address gender disparities. However, the majority did so as a secondary objective. Even though their primary objective was not identified as reducing disparities and their target group was not uniquely women, the results of these projects showed targeted benefits to women. For example, projects increasing water access, such as the AEPA project in Senegal or Morocco, benefitted women by reducing the time needed to complete domestic chores and thereby increasing the time available for other educational or occupational interests.³¹ Other projects such as the Dakar Terminal Container Project resulted in job creation and were described as having particular benefits for women and students.³² By contrast, positive examples were found in microfinance projects, such as the Morocco PADESFI project that tended to explicitly target women and students.³³

4. Has the Bank proposed results focused strategies and programs?

This and the following section seek to clarify the main determinants of the Bank's performance in delivering results. They examine various factors identified in the overall Bank ToC that are assumed to influence Bank performance. This section examines factors internal to the Bank as it designs and implements its operations, strategic selectivity, the capacity to propose adapted responses to country needs, and managing for development results. Data from the various lines of evidence is presented in detail in *Annex E: Data tables*. When assessing performance, this data was examined against the S+ bar for all factors in this section. Indeed, these factors relate to the core work of the Bank and their importance was already recognized at the start of the period reviewed. As such, this evaluation considered that the Bank should aim for at least satisfactory performance for these factors.

Selectivity

Despite clear improvement over time, country strategies failed to systematically select sector-specific objectives that focus Bank efforts in its areas of comparative advantage. Furthermore, the portfolio could lack coherence and focus on these objectives.

²⁹ African Development Bank Group, July 2016, Evaluation of Bank Assistance in the Energy Sector.

³⁰ Cameroun, Programme de facilitation de transport sur les corridors Douala-Bangui et Douala-N'Djamena – évaluation de la performance de projet; Republic of South Africa, Transnet Limited – Project performance assessment.


³¹ IDEV, March 2016, Évaluation du dixième projet d'alimentation en eau potable AEP 10, Maroc.; Sénégal, April 2016, Programme d'approvisionnement en eau potable et d'assainissement en milieu rural, Phase II – rapport d'évaluation des résultats.

³² Sénégal, Dakar container terminal – évaluation de la performance de projet.

³³ IDEV, April 2016, Évaluation de la performance du Programme d'Appui au Développement du Secteur Financier (PADESFI-III); IDEV, April 2016, Évaluation de la performance du programme d'appui à la relance économique et au développement inclusif, Tunisie.

The selectivity of Bank strategies and operations was not optimal in the period reviewed. It was strategically assessed, examining whether a thorough analysis of the Bank's positioning and comparative advantage was performed, and the breadth of sectors and/or strategic outcomes that it intended to influence. Selectivity was also assessed programmatically by examining the focused selection of projects to achieve strategic objectives. The low level of S+ ratings across lines of evidence show a need for further improvement (Figure 21).

Figure 21. CFR ratings for strategic focus



The analysis underlying the positioning of the Bank was not always complete and thorough. This was reflected by S+ ratings of only around 20% in the case studies and 30% for the relevant dimensions examined by the evaluation of QaE of CSPs³⁴. Two areas of improvement related to this analysis were the choice of supporting ESW and the analysis of the Bank's comparative advantage in the country context.³⁵

The Bank was not selective enough in its choice of sector-specific objectives. The case studies show that the Bank's CSPs were occasionally too broad and general (Box 8). Multiple case studies noted an improvement over time, and was confirmed by the evaluation of the QaE of CSPs that examined only the latest CSP. This resulted in a rather positive (84% MS+) rating although not necessarily good (27% S+) of the analysis underlying the choice of strategic pillars.

Box 8. Selectivity issues related to a broad sector base in Tanzania

The review of CSPs revealed that the Bank had fully aligned with country needs and harmonized with the strategies of other development partners (DPs), but harmonization did not occur across all sectors. Here, the Bank was described as having limited selectivity, resulting in a level of effort in some sectors that was insufficient to make a difference. Widespread coverage was attributed at least partially to the nature of the national poverty strategy framework and to the dynamics of the division of labor among DPs, both of which favored engagement across all sectors rather than selectivity.

Finally, **strategic selectivity did not always translate into operational selectivity.** This is reflected by the low rating (11% S+) in the evaluation of the QaE of CSPs for the choice of interventions by sector and selection of projects, and confirmed by the qualitative analysis of CFRs. In many instances, the portfolio was found to be dispersed and unfocused, with multiple projects outside of priority areas (e.g. Burundi). Clients themselves perceived the Bank as being unselective in its portfolio, especially in sectors outside the mainstream sectors usually covered in CSPs such as higher education³⁶. The qualitative analysis found large variations among countries regarding project selectivity, albeit with a few positive examples. In some cases, the selection process resulted in a cohort of projects that were coherent with sector-specific strategies and objectives. Here the Bank's comparative advantage was based on responsiveness, continuity, and credibility built over time with the RMC (e.g. Tunisia and Morocco). This process was usually supported by a thorough analysis of the Bank's positioning with respect to other DPs, including an analysis of the DPs' strategic partnerships and an exhaustive presentation of their active portfolios.

³⁴ The definition of the MS selectivity rating for the QaE CSP evaluation is "Demonstrates selectivity but fails to fully ground it in analysis of Bank positioning and comparative advantage." Similarly, the definition of the MS rating for Strategic Focus in the CFR, "The Bank's strategy presents an analysis of the respective positioning of development partners and areas of comparative advantage but the analysis does not fully show how this translates into priority areas of assistance for the Bank matching the evolving context and challenges of the country."

³⁵ African Development Bank Group, January 2015, Strategizing for the "Africa We Want": An Independent Evaluation of the Quality at Entry of Country and Regional Integration Strategies, Summary Report, p.22.; African Development Bank Group, 2013, Review of the African Development Bank's Economic and Sector Work (2005–2010).

³⁶ African Development Bank Group, March 2012, The Preferred Partner? A client assessment of the African Development Bank., p14.

The driving factors for good selectivity were a candid assessment of comparative advantage, assessments of DPs' positioning, and selective management of the project portfolio. This was clearly the case in Nigeria where the Bank participated in an umbrella platform to coordinate and create synergies with other DPs. This harmonization helped the Bank create a portfolio with a particular niche. Country conditions did not always facilitate the Bank's ability to select projects based on an analysis of their positioning in relation to other donors. In South Africa, for example, the portfolio was actually more focused than planned (Box 9).

Box 9. Portfolio selectivity

- In Nigeria, the Bank was firmly entrenched in the 2013 Country Assistance Framework. This is a common strategic approach developed by development partners in Nigeria (World Bank Group, AfDB, AFD, and others) to support the government's development plans by using common arrangements to deliver aid and by harmonizing programming and policy dialogue. Portfolio examples of selectivity include the Agricultural & Rural Institutions support project, which filled a specific sectoral niche that other donors did not address at the time (the collection and analysis of information on agricultural development). In the education sector, the Skills Training and Vocational Education Project that started in 2005 also filled a specific niche where support from other donors has been comparatively limited.
- In South Africa, the portfolio of investments was more focused in practice than the strategy envisaged. Specifically while the Bank grew its energy and finance portfolios, it was less successful in growing its water and transport engagement as described in the CSPs. Bank lending in Rand was found not to be competitive in the SA context, and there was an arguably limited potential for business development due to a lack of government interest in providing government guarantees, with few exceptions. Such issues were judged inadequately considered in the design of the CSP focus areas, and the need for the Bank to find instruments more suitable for the highly competitive market in South Africa was emphasized. The equity portfolio covering a broader range of sectors comprised the exception to the high level of selectivity but was not acknowledged to be a result of the country strategy.
- In Zambia, by contrast, although CSPs have become more selective in thematic terms, the number of sectors covered under each portfolio increased over time: interventions were approved in four sectors between 2004 and 2006, in 5 sectors between 2007 and 2010, and in 7 sectors between 2011 and 2015. Despite the broader range of sectors, however, the Bank's strategy effectively became more coherent in that projects across a range of sectors supported fewer strategic outcomes. For example, under the 2011-2015 CSP, interventions in the finance, energy, transport, social, and multi-sectors complemented each other in removing barriers to private sector growth. The advantage of this approach was that the Bank could address multiple facets of each targeted outcome. However, as indicated by the independent evaluation of QaE for the 2011-2015 CSP, the approach also risked dispersing resources too thinly among multiple sectors and limiting the achievement of results.


Adaptation and innovation

While QaE improved overall, the design of strategies and operations still failed to fully take into account the country challenges and propose solutions ensuring the full achievement of planned results. Innovative approaches were found across a small but important number of projects in terms of financing and participative mechanisms, but not necessarily across country strategies.

Proposing adapted solutions to country challenges was found to be an area for improvement. Adaptation to country context and innovation were assessed in terms of the Bank doing the right things (proposing a good intervention logic based on an understanding of the context) and the doing things right (proposing adapted solutions realistically taking into account challenges and innovative options to ensure successful implementation). Only about 20% of case studies achieved an S+ rating (Figure 22).

The Bank's capacity to propose clearly articulated strategies on the basis of a thorough understanding of context improved over time.

Figure 22. CFR ratings for adaptation



Overall CSP QaE improved, although case studies across countries did not find consistent improvements. Improvement to the quality of the results frameworks remained necessary. One other area found to be challenging in multiple case studies

was the identification of challenges and risks and the implementation of adequate mitigation measures to ensure that strategic objectives are achieved. These gaps were found across all types of countries and are examined in greater detail in the next section. This is corroborated by the low attention to capacity found in the evaluation of QaE of CSPs (S+ ratings lower than 10%).

In transition states, moving beyond an accurate analysis of factors of fragility to an integrated approach to managing them was a particular challenge. Case studies for transition states generally demonstrate a good understanding of factors of fragility and the Bank's responsiveness to a changing context. However, an integrated response for addressing these factors was missing. The evaluation of the QaE of CSPs also showed a general weakness of CSPs in transition states with respect to support to building citizens' capacity and facilitating broad-based participation in national decision making process.

The adoption of innovative country responses was variable, despite the availability of new instruments at the corporate level. At the strategic level, innovation was looked at mainly through the explicit adoption of new instruments such as guarantees to complement the more standard loans and grants and respond to challenges such as private sector development. From the analysis of CFRs and PRAs, no specific link was found between the strategic and the project levels since innovative projects could be found in countries where the strategy showed no specific innovation responding to country challenges (Box 10).

Box 10. Innovation at country level

- Over the course of the evaluation period, the mix of project mechanisms implemented in Ghana became increasingly diversified: ADB resources were used more to support private sector development, from 6.6% of projects approved in 2002-2004 to 27% in 2012-2014. Consultations with the Bank's Office in Ghana confirmed that the use of ADB funds was being emphasized to support the private sector given Ghana's transition to middle income status. The project portfolio showed that trust fund resources and grants were being used more over time to finance technical assistance (TA) operations. Consultations were ongoing with the government about using the Partial Risk Guarantee to backstop government guarantees underpinning private power investments and power purchasing agreements.
- In Nigeria, the approach to the financing of the Lekki Toll Road project, through its special purpose vehicle, the Lekki Concession Company, has been very innovative in the Nigerian context. The project showcased the concept of Public-Private Partnerships in the transport sector.
- In South Africa, examples of innovative approaches included (i) the Bank's involvement in the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer program for private renewable energy generation, though a small investment; (ii) support to new technology (concentrated solar power); (iii) attempts at syndication to leverage more funds from the private sector; (iii) targeting disadvantaged groups and affordable housing with small loans (Nedbank sub-debt), and (iv) combining local and foreign currency loans.
- In contrast, in Ethiopia, with the notable exception of the PBS, the Bank resorted to a narrow range of traditional instruments, mainly loans and grants. However, over the period of the evaluation it increasingly adopted a more innovative approach recently: ongoing discussions on the possible introduction of Partial Credit Guarantees; an Institutional Support Project that was recently approved to support PPPs, and a Sector Wide Approach that was under way in the water supply and sanitation sector.


Managing for development results

The quality of project logic models and supervision performance improved although weaknesses persist in both areas. The Bank did not consistently implement lessons learned at strategic or project levels. In general, well-coordinated joint M&E frameworks with governments and other DPs strengthened performance. Finally only limited evidence of the Bank's contribution to building in-country M&E capacity was found, although some positive findings emerged.

Managing for development results (MfDR) is not well anchored in the Bank's practice. A general assessment of Bank MfDR systems at country level, including the capacity to learn from previous experience, was combined with more focused assessments of design quality and supervision at both the strategic and operational levels (Figure 23).

Overall, the results orientation of strategies and projects improved in the period of the evaluation. Case studies showed the presence of a set of agreed performance indicators and corresponding data sources. They exhibited appropriate monitoring systems and mechanisms to inform results, and lessons on the decision-making process and policy dialogue (e.g. Tanzania) even when weaknesses existed, for example, around the quality of indicators and the adequacy of data collection (e.g. Ethiopia).

Figure 23. CFR ratings for managing for results



Yet, the focus was more on outputs rather than outcomes and the quality/appropriateness of indicators varied. The sector-level outcome review of project ToC revealed a high degree of variability in the quality of outcome indicators and their supporting data. In general, the absence of realistic (not superficial) measures of outputs and outcomes in appraisal and completion reports made it harder to identify lessons learned. For example, a review of Ethiopia's portfolio found that output indicators tended to be clearly identified whereas outcome indicators were problematic in about half of the project level results frameworks reviewed (referring to sectoral national targets or missing altogether, especially those related to technical assistance and capacity building).

No explicit ToC guided Bank strategies or programs at country or sector levels. As explained in the Limitations section, the review of project ToCs revealed a high degree of variability in the presentation of project outcomes relative to sector-specific outcomes defined in the Bank's broader ToC and reconstructed by this evaluation. This finding pointed to the absence of an overall, explicit Bank ToC despite the existence of the broader corporate Results Measurement Frameworks (RMF), as well as the absence of sector specific ToCs. Moreover, project level ToCs were found to be unclear in some cases, which made the achievement of results more difficult. Box 11 illustrates the case of lines of credits (LoCs).

Box 11. Theory of change for LoCs or, striking the right balance between good banking and good development banking

For the finance side of the Bank's portfolio in South Africa, the use of LoCs to on-lend outside of the country has been successful for growing the portfolio and reaching LICs while managing risk, which is held by intermediaries. However, this has not helped the Bank achieve objectives related to domestic job creation or access to finance in South Africa. In addition, information about sub-loans in other countries is insufficient to enable the Bank to understand the development results to which it is contributing although they were included in the initial log-frames proposed at approval.

Project design improved but was still inadequate: risk management clearly needs improvement.

Project level assessments showed that the relevance of project design generally improved from 69% of projects rated MS+ in 2004-2008 to 88% in the 2009-2013 period (by number of projects). However, when expressed as share of net amount, the situation looks different. Here there was a statistically significant deterioration in the relevance of project design from 85% of projects rated MS+ in 2004-2008 to 70% in 2009-2013. This finding suggested that, the design of large-scale projects remained an issue. Lower scores in design were often attributed to shortcomings in risk analysis and mitigation strategies, examples of which were identified in almost every country. For example, in South Africa, issues with large energy projects raised questions about whether the Bank had the capacity to appraise such projects given that key technical/implementation risks were not identified and mitigated at the outset. Across countries where there was insufficient risk analysis, risks were often broadly stated, and their magnitude was not assessed nor were there mitigation measures (or mitigation measures were outside of Bank control). Weaknesses in the project design phase were cited as the primary influences on sub-par achievement in project efficiency, and also as leading some projects to have unrealistic objectives or targets. In Mozambique, weak QaE scores in 2005 and 2008 were caused by weak project design, weak intervention logic, and low-quality studies. This resulted in overambitious projects and subsequent cost implications³⁷.

³⁷ African Development Bank Group, January 2015, Strategizing for the "Africa We Want": An Independent Evaluation of the Quality at Entry of Country and Regional Integration Strategies Summary Report.

These factors were compounded in fragility situations where overly ambitious targets, unrealistic timing, and lack of attention to local institutional capacity led to significant delays.³⁸

Despite improvements, weaknesses remained in the supervision process especially with respect to private sector operations. The timeliness and quality of Bank supervision improved over time in many countries, and was largely attributed to opening country offices. Positive evidence showed countries where all projects were supervised at least once a year, where supervision missions were often inclusive (performed with other stakeholders), and where regular review meetings allowed participants to analyze performance, identify difficulties, and suggest an action plan while also serving to build capacity in procurement and disbursement. The limitations included irregular missions, neglected site visits, task manager turnover, and an overly heavy workload. However changes introduced across the Bank to project level monitoring on the public sector side did not impact how monitoring was done for private sector projects. The assessment of private sector operations as part of this evaluation (see Efficiency section), several case studies and previous evaluations all pointed to this³⁹. Box 12 illustrates some causes for low quality supervision.

Box 12. Supervision at country level

- In Mozambique, the Bank's performance in assistance, monitoring, and supervision improved over time. All but the social sector exceeded the target of at least one yearly supervision. However, interviews with project leaders showed that they felt that Bank monitoring was not frequent or thorough enough to lead to an accurate understanding of what was happening in the field. Additionally, project supervision and implementation documentation was sometimes missing or not archived centrally, and task managers did not always provide these reports in a timely manner, which could hamper monitoring efforts. The government of Mozambique also indicated that multiple supervision missions caused dissatisfaction and reflected poor coordination between department and project teams. The high per person project load (pp) in the field office of 25-26pp constrained monitoring, supervision, and communication.
- In Zambia, the Bank adhered to minimum supervision requirements. However, evidence from private sector projects indicated that supervision might not have been adequate to mitigate risks to development outcomes. Information on project performance was sometimes poor/misleading. While project supervision became timelier, frequency varied by sector and was generally linked to project performance. Supervision was inadequate for agriculture and multi-sector where there were considerable delays in project execution and procurement.
- In Burundi, supervision missions were conducted at least twice/year for 8/15 projects. Issues were reported in team composition, especially in projects related to infrastructure. These shortcomings made it impossible to mobilize the necessary expertise to fix the issues.
- In South Africa, only 4 of 11 private sector operations reviewed achieved the moderately satisfactory bar for supervision quality. Three operations had commercial banks as clients and two were led by another DP (including for monitoring). For finance projects, Project Status Reports focused on the financial health of the intermediary. While annual financial data was included, coverage of developmental aspects was minimal. The content of back to office reports varied, but was focused on risk and financial aspects as opposed to progress towards development results. What was included on development results was contingent on data provided by the intermediary and varied in quality and detail. In the last two years, financial intermediaries were asked to complete development outcomes templates but the evaluation team found some to be incomplete.

The Bank initiated multiple reforms to improve performance on design and supervision. However, progress was found to be limited in the period of the evaluation. Project design and supervision were identified as key determinants of project performance by the Bank as well as by the World Bank's IEG⁴⁰ and by an analysis of Asian Development Bank (ADB) project

³⁸ Burundi, Programme d'Appui aux Réformes Economiques et à la Gouvernance (PAREG) 2005-2006 – Evaluation de la performance des projets.

³⁹ The "Supervision and administration" criterion under Efficiency shows a portfolio for which half of private sector operations get a negative rating (60% in volume). The IDEV evaluation of the implementation of Bank commitments (2015) raised the different levels of progress in improving project supervision in public and private sector operations. See also the 2015 evaluation of support to SMEs and the 2012 evaluation of non-sovereign operations.

⁴⁰ Conclusion from the 2015 Independent Evaluation Group's Results and Performance of the World Bank Group Report (page 46), <http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations/results-and-performance-2015>. Analysis of data on investment project closed in FY09–FY14 finds that project performance is highly correlated with quality at entry, quality of supervision, M&E quality, and to a much lesser extent, project size.

portfolio performance. This was corroborated by the QCA analysis performed across the 14 case studies that showed these two were the most plausible explanatory factors (together with country conditions) for achieving results. The Bank had already recognized their importance and initiated multiple related reforms (Table 3). Nonetheless, this evaluation finds that both project design and supervision remained sub-optimal. A recent evaluation of the implementation of ADF and GCI commitments indicated that the “measures to enhance operational quality at each main stage of the public sector project life cycle are solid, but have not had sufficient time to take hold systematically.” The report mentioned however the “the Bank is moving in the right direction.”⁴¹ A study commissioned by the Bank's management over 2013-2014, at the end of this evaluation period, reaffirmed the same issues.⁴²

Slow progress despite multiple reforms suggests deeper behavioral issues may be hindering full implementation. The evaluation of budget management reforms⁴³ pointed to specific “soft” issues related to the implementation of reforms in general, and in particular the need to address behavioral and cultural issues. These included leadership, coherence in the coordination of reforms, and a targeted change management as well as the need to strengthen accountability frameworks through revised KPIs, improved performance feedback loops, and increased transparency.

Table 3. Bank initiatives to improve performance of supervision and project design

Supervision	Project Design
<p>2004-2013</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Field-based staff increased 63% since 2009. Proportion of projects supervised twice yearly increased from 40% in 2009 to 64% in 2012. Proportion of projects task managed in the field increased from 16% in 2009 to 42% in 2012. New delegation of authority matrix introduced in 2012 to facilitate greater delegation of authority to field offices Standard template for Expanded Supervision Reports for Private Sector Projects introduced. Four new field offices open in transition states. Regional resource offices opened in Pretoria and Nairobi. Physical presence increased to 37 countries representing 95% of the Bank's portfolio by value. Implementation Progress and Results Reports to better assess progress toward outcomes established. Project Completion Report guidelines revised. <p>After 2013</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delivery and Performance Management Office (COPM) established to respond to the need for proactive performance monitoring and reporting. Monthly “portfolio flashlight reports” established to track portfolio performance against KPIs. Monthly executive dashboard established. 	<p>2004-2013</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Staff guidance on QaE criteria and standards for public sector. Readiness review Revised results-based logical framework (RBLF) for public sector operations - An Information Note. African Development Bank Group's integrated safeguards system to establish the guiding principles for an Integrated Safeguard System that consolidates and revamps existing environmental and social safeguards. Implementation of the Decentralization Road Map and the Delegation of Authority Matrix. Dissemination and training related to quality assurance tools. ‘Quality Assurance Assistant’ site established in 2013, including a ‘Quality Assurance Helpdesk’ function. Coaching sessions on quality assurance tools, including the RBLF. Presidential directive no. 03/2013 concerning Bank group operations review process to enhance the effectiveness of the Bank Group operations review process Revised Staff guidance on QaE criteria and standards for public sector. <p>After 2013</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Updated Operations Manual Presidential Directive no. 02/2015 on the Design, implementation and cancellation of Bank group sovereign operations.

⁴¹ African Development Bank Group, April 2015, Independent Evaluation of General Capital Increase-VI and African Development Fund 12 and 13 Commitments: Overarching Review, Summary Report.

⁴² Board presentation on Streamlined Project Development Process, September 2015 (slide 2): problems found by the 2013-2014 study included: (i) Persistent project implementation delays; (ii) Design of Bank Group operations carries several inherent weaknesses; (iii) the supervision process of Bank Group operations is ineffective, and (iv) Inadequate dialogue on portfolio issues within and outside the Bank.

⁴³ African Development Bank Group, August 2015, Independent Evaluation of Administrative Budget Management of The Bank Group, Summary Report.

Learning was found to be far from systematic, which may possibly explain slow progress. At a strategic level, the evaluation of the QaE of CSPs found that lessons from country teams did not fully leverage previous CSPs. This was reflected in the absence of any clear pattern of improvement over time, as various country performance case studies confirmed. Lessons learned are often repeated either for lack of appropriate measures taken or because they relate to systematic, complex problems that are difficult to solve (e.g. Ethiopia). In addition, the lessons learned from supervision and other oversight mechanisms were not fully taken into account in several countries (e.g. Senegal).

Finally, there was little systematic evidence about the extent to which Bank projects and strategies contributed to building in-country M&E capacity despite this being recognized as a key influencing factor. Achievement was positively impacted when there was a strong, well-established overarching national M&E framework. Stakeholders stressed the need for mutual accountability in M&E arrangements. MfDR performance was hindered by deficiencies in the national statistical system. Weak capacity of RMC and implementing partners had a detrimental impact on MfDR outcomes whereas strong capacity was cited as an important determinant for success. Some positive findings about the Bank's role in this area emerged in countries that performed more strongly in MfDR. In Ghana, for example, the Bank was involved in the M&E sector-working group and held a workshop on M&E for Bank staff and project implementation units in Morocco in 2010. A multinational operation aiming at statistical capacity building also exists, but assessments conducted in three countries showed here again weak design that did not allow achieving full results.

5. Has the Bank emerged as a valued partner at country level?

This section follows on the previous section examining determinants of the Bank's performance in delivering results. It focuses on three factors related to the interaction of the Bank with its clients and partners at country level. (Data from the various lines of evidence examined is presented in detail in *Annex E: Data tables*.) When assessing performance, data from the various lines of evidence was examined against the MS+ bar for all factors in this section. This acknowledges that these factors were related to areas that were not at the core of the Bank's work, at least in its traditional understanding. Rather, they corresponded to complex areas of transformation.


Knowledge and advisory services

Overall, the Bank did not fulfill its role as a knowledge broker, advisor, and convener. Clients did not perceive the knowledge produced by the Bank to be easily available or useful. This limited the specific contribution of the Bank's ESW. The exceptions were in fragile contexts where the Bank was recognized for its critical role as advisor.

Bank performance in delivering knowledge work and advisory services was assessed by examining whether the Bank delivered influential knowledge work, and whether it leveraged it to take leadership positions in policy dialogue at country level.

Overall, the Bank was unable to leverage knowledge work to position itself at country (or global) level as an advisor (Figure 24). Case studies showed overall as much of a positive as a negative picture of the Bank from this perspective. They provided evidence of limitations regarding the utility of the ESW⁴⁴ produced by the Bank. This included the general approach to constructing ESWs (e.g. lack of comprehensive policy, dispersed, difficult to find and inconsistent portfolio, limited planning due to resource availability, poor coordination and prioritization). They also related to their utilization (e.g., limited dissemination across RMC field offices, low credibility to influence decision-making). This evidence was corroborated by

Figure 24. CFR ratings for knowledge and strategic advice



⁴⁴ As pointed out by the ESW evaluation, while there is no common definition of ESW, "Multilateral Development Banks use the term ESW virtually exclusively, to designate a knowledge-based instrument used to diagnose development problems and identify policy and investment solutions."

the ESW evaluation,⁴⁵ which had noted the absence of a clear policy and of a clear definition of the suite of ESW products. This situation persists as noted in this evaluation.

Stakeholders and clients widely perceived the Bank to be a lending institution rather than an advisor. The Bank was not recognized for its capacity to produce knowledge or to inform decision-making. Virtually the entire population (90%) for which the Bank provided knowledge reported using that knowledge to inform policy “occasionally” or “never”⁴⁶. For governments, this was explained by the perceived lack of availability and quality of the knowledge and statistics produced. This finding was confirmed by more recent case studies.⁴⁷ Respondents from the private sector reported that Bank data and research were insufficiently detailed, country-specific, or tailored to policy or business decision-making questions. The limited contribution of the Bank's analytic capacities was further connected to an expectation that the Bank would lead rather than follow other DPs in policy discussions. The Bank's limited contribution to policy dialogue in this regard was associated with staff shortages, reorganizations, and lack of funds.

The choice of ESW underlying the CSP analysis was identified as an area of weakness. However, improvements were noted in recent years. An increasing volume of ESW was prepared, some of which underpinned CSPs. In Zambia, for example, the 2011–2015 CSP was informed by two pieces of ESW: an assessment of Zambia's competitiveness in the livestock, tourism and mining sectors, and a public expenditure review assessing the country's resource use efficiency in the peri-urban water and sanitation sub-sector. In South Africa, ESW was described as having had an important role underpinning the development of the most recent CSP. However despite the growing volume of work, its use and influence remained limited.

The Bank's position as knowledge broker and advisor was more visible in fragile contexts. The Bank's credibility improved when both dialogue and analytic work operated in strong conjunction with one another. The Bank's effectiveness, particularly with transition states (TS), was developed through longstanding partnerships during difficult periods that helped build the trust with the RMC (Box 13). The Bank further established credibility with TS by focusing on hard infrastructure while increasing initiatives in fiscal administration, economic and sector analysis and employment-type (i.e. soft) interventions. An explicit strategic orientation with an implementation plan, policy dialogue and analytic work in CSPs contributed positively to the Bank's role in policy dialogue. The Bank's analytic capacity was ranked as favorable in some transition states (Togo, Burundi) but not all (DRC). Evidence from the Burundi case study described projects with the Bank as assuming an advisory role across all project levels (i.e. central and local administration). DRC received a less favorable rating, but the case study still described the Bank as having supported strong and inclusive growth during the transition from a post-conflict-based strategic focus to an approach based on developing intelligent infrastructures, agricultural projects, appropriate reform, and the reinforcement of administrative and economic capacities.

Box 13. Quality partnership in Togo

The quality of its partnership with the parties involved in Togo gave the Bank the status of a trusted partner in the eyes of all involved. The Togolese authorities consulted regularly with the Bank on strategic issues. The Bank played a decisive role in the resumption of international collaboration, along with the other partners. From the beginning of the process, the Bank was energetically engaged in resuming the policy dialogue and in mobilizing specific and appropriate instruments to create the conditions for reengaging the international community in Togo.

Skills and resources of the country office were key drivers for positioning the Bank well as an advisor, independent of the level of country income. The Bank's success in positioning itself as knowledge broker and advisor was not related to country income level. It could have been imagined that such positioning would prove more difficult in countries where Bank services were not much in need, particularly in MICs. However, evidence from the case studies showed positive and negative examples in all categories of countries (Box 14). They also pointed to the skills and resources of the country office as favoring a leadership role in policy advice, in addition to the existence of a strong cooperation framework.

⁴⁵ African Development Bank Group, 2013, Review of the African Development Bank's Economic and Sector Work (2005–2010).

⁴⁶ African Development Bank Group, March 2012, The Preferred Partner? A client assessment of the African Development Bank.

⁴⁷ CEDR, Country Factors Review – South Africa

Box 14. Bank influence on policy dialogue

- In Morocco, a recent analytical work focused on growth⁴⁸ was central to Bank interventions since 2014 and all projects are aligned with it. The government was implementing the report's conclusions, which made it possible to mobilize Millennium Challenge Corporation resources. Other DPs have approached the Bank about collaboration on the basis of this report, which will be used in an underlying analysis for framing the next CSP.
- In South Africa, a dialogue described as limited in scope, modest, general and ill defined, limited the potential for the Bank to influence policy. This resulted in CSPs that failed to address fundamental policy and regulatory issues that thwarted the achievement of CSP objectives. It is fair to note, however, that other DPs also experienced limited influence in South Africa
- In Tanzania, the Bank's role and influence in policy dialogue grew over time, especially in areas where the Bank had a distinct added value, (energy sector and partly in transport and water sector. The Energy Sector Review provided a useful basis for the energy sector reform process and for developing the multi-donor GBS new operation Power Sector Reform and Governance Support Program.

Finally, the role of the Bank as advisor at project level could not be fully assessed. In some cases, training and the provision of expertise for the project were clearly inadequate.⁴⁹ But the extent to which the Bank was directly responsible and failed to reach expectations could not be ascertained from the project reviews, which were not specifically focused on that aspect. Capacity development and provision of training were oftentimes not the sole responsibility of the Bank but rather part of the projects' aims, and something that various intermediaries and borrowers aimed to achieve through Bank operations.

Cooperation and coordination

The Bank performed well in planning for coordination in its CSPs. However, this did not fully translate into an alignment of priorities and operational coordination, particularly in transition states. The presence of a country office and of an overarching DP coordination structure in the country influenced whether or not effective country level cooperation was established and maintained.


Bank performance in establishing cooperative, coordinated partnerships was assessed in terms of the design and implementation of country strategies in consultation and cooperation with other DPs, and their translation in operations (Figure 25).

The Bank paid attention to cooperation and coordination at the strategic level. Weak analysis notwithstanding, CSPs usually included a description of the coordination framework with

other donors and was usually subjected to wide consultations with various country stakeholders. A lack of appropriate tools to guide consultations with the private sector and with civil society and unsystematic documentation of consultations were identified as limiting opportunities to assess partnership effectiveness⁵⁰. In rare instances, the Bank operated under the umbrella of a joint assistance strategy: in Tanzania (CSP 2006-2010), and in Zambia where the Bank did not create a separate CSP from the 2007-2010 Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia.

Overall, this did not fully translate into an alignment of priorities and operational coordination. Other than some joint budget-support operations, there was only limited synergy with the operations of other DPs. Lack of harmonized

Figure 25. CFR ratings for partnership and coordination



⁴⁸ Diagnostic de croissance du Maroc (18/02/2015) Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc, BAD, MCC.

⁴⁹ Zambia, Project to support Lake Tanganyika Integrated Regional Development Program (PRODAP) PRA.

⁵⁰ African Development Bank Group, January 2015, Strategizing for the "Africa We Want": An Independent Evaluation of the Quality at Entry of Country and Regional Integration Strategies, Summary Report.

procedures often prevented participation in joint mechanisms, triggering delays and transaction costs. Consultations with government counterparts on project design and implementation did not always include all relevant parties for ensuring relevance. In Ghana, the Bank coordinated with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, given the usually close relationship with that ministry, but neglected other ministries (e.g. health, education) that were directly involved with implementation and cooperation/coordination with beneficiaries. This resulted in financing Bank projects that were poorly aligned with sector-specific priorities and needs. There were, however, a few positive outcomes: in Senegal, the Bank established inclusive, diversified partnerships with stakeholders and technical/financial partners to develop and implement a multi-sectorial project. The constructive intra-sectoral dynamic between private sector and civil society organizations reportedly contributed to greater credibility and professionalism in organizations involved.

Fragility was a compounding factor for operational coordination. Despite efforts to structure cooperation in these contexts, effective partnerships were hampered by the lack of government leadership and national institutions that were sub-optimal in their functioning (often leading to bilateral and informal dialogue). Successful, sustained partnerships were associated with beneficiary engagement and a well-structured network of appropriate and diverse stakeholders, and with high-level engagement yet sufficient latitude for decision-making.

Evidence showed that difficulties could still be overcome, even in challenging conditions. Positive findings emerged about the Bank's role in partner coordination in different contexts, as in Tunisia post the 2011 crisis. Evidence also emerged of good partnership cooperation in acute emergency contexts. Here the Bank delegated project operations in areas where other organizations had comparative advantage (e.g., natural disasters). For example, evidence in Togo's case study indicated that the Bank adapted its approach in specific emergency circumstances to delegate operations to the Food and Agriculture Organization or to government departments where they had greater expertise.

The evidence also showed that the presence of a country office could positively influence the Bank's ability to establish and maintain formal and informal partnerships and work effectively with government bodies and DPs⁵¹. This was accomplished by enhancing the Bank's understanding of a specific country context and by increasing its ability to participate in and influence policy dialogue through sector working groups and other formal coordination structures. The participation of a country office staff member in such groups and structures that helped establish the Bank as a key development partner and create a stakeholder perception of it as a leader. This was often associated with the staff members' position as head, chair, or co-chair of development working platforms (e.g. sector working groups). DPs perceived their leadership role and their credibility to be influenced by their experience in implementing projects in a given sector. In addition, the Bank's ability to effectively cooperate and coordinate was strongly influenced by the overarching DP cooperation framework in the country. Generally, a more established, long-standing DP framework provided the necessary structure and culture required to foster effective cooperation. In some countries, the Bank played the role of promoting dialogue between the government and other DPs. For example, other DPs in Zambia saw the Bank as having a special relationship with the government. This led them to ask the Bank to take a leadership role in the discussions of some policy issues.


Leverage

The Bank mobilized additional resources at the corporate level and demonstrated instances of leveraging at project level. The potential was limited by the lack of concrete, systematic action plans and strategic plans at country level. New opportunities for leveraging were also underutilized because of limited coordination with emerging donors.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

The Bank's leveraging and capacity to attract additional resources have been examined strategically and at project level. Bank documents described strategic types of activities and tools for leveraging, including co-financing, domestic resource mobilization, private finance, leveraging funds from emerging donors (particularly the private sector and emerging donor countries), partial risk guarantees, scaling up, and replicating localized projects.

Figure 26. CFR ratings for leverage



At the strategic level, leveraging was increasingly cited as an explicit goal over time. However, it was not always supported by a concrete action plans or frameworks at country level. The level of

resources mobilized centrally, including from emerging donors, increased significantly during the period examined. Financing for operations from sources other than ADB, ADF or the NTF more than quadrupled between the 2004-2008 and 2009-2013 periods, reaching more than UA 1.1 billion or 5.2% of total approvals in the later period. At country level also, CSPs increasingly mentioned leveraging as a strategic goal but that did not translate into concrete plans or results (Figure 26). In some cases, the CSPs focused more strongly on leveraging without having had sufficient time to show results (e.g. Nigeria CSP 2013–2017) (Box 15).

Box 15. Strategic leveraging in Nigeria

The 2013-2017 strategy in Nigeria identified the country's huge financing needs. The Bank's ADF allocation was relatively small and the Sustainable Lending Limit limited ADB resources. Accordingly, the strategy emphasized the importance of deploying the full range of Bank instruments (including lending and non-lending): private sector lending, PPP arrangements, Partial Risk Guarantees, capacity building, ESW, and budget support. It also emphasized the importance of a catalytic role for the Bank by leveraging third-party investments in the form of co-financing and a facilitating role by mobilizing other investors, including emerging partners such as BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). In practice, however, this did not appear to have come to fruition. There was little evidence that this had taken place, in part because the strategy was recent.

At the project level, leveraging was rather opportunistic, and without an explicit plan. Project-level evidence confirmed the disconnect between strategic and operational levels. Project leveraging activities were seldom linked to the strategic aims of their CSP. Even when a connection was made to broader country-level leveraging strategies, no concrete leveraging activities necessarily followed. For example, projects may have stated that the Bank and other partners jointly agreed to harmonize interventions to achieve synergy and development impact, but there were no specific activities to achieve this. Alternatively, projects using private funding mechanisms described these as a response to country strategies addressing poverty⁵². Senegal in particular showed a positive case where the Bank was able to position itself favorably as a lead on PPPs after assisting the government in adopting a Framework Law on PPPs, and leveraging private sector financing through that channel. At the other end of the spectrum, missed opportunities by the Bank to create synergies with other partners were also identified along with missed opportunities to benefit from the comparative advantage of various partners⁵³. This was true when lack of government leadership resulted in poor coordination between development partners (e.g. DRC).

At the project level, leveraging activities were most often discussed in terms of co-financing. When co-financing was accompanied with an efficient partnership structure⁵⁴, it contributed to achieving results and sustainability⁵⁵. Projects

⁵² Sénégal, Projet d'appui à la réforme économique et financière – évaluation de la performance de projet.

⁵³ Togo, Système intégré d'information sur l'eau (SIIEAU) – évaluation de la performance de projet; Burundi, Programme d'appui aux réformes économiques et à la gouvernance (PAREG) 2005–2006 – évaluation de la performance de projet; Sénégal, Programme de renforcement des capacités statistiques dans les pays membres régionaux et dans les organisations sous régionales – évaluation de la performance de programme.

⁵⁴ Sénégal, Programme d'approvisionnement en eau potable et d'assainissement en milieu rural Phase II – rapport d'évaluations des résultats; Democratic Republic of Congo, Projet d'appui au secteur de l'éducation (PASE) – évaluation de la performance de projet; Burundi, Programme d'appui aux réformes économiques Phase IV (PARE IV) – évaluation de la performance de projet.

⁵⁵ Sénégal, Programme d'appui de la réduction de la pauvreté (PASRP) – évaluation de la performance de projet; Mozambique, Institutional support for public sector reform – project results assessment report; Sénégal, Programme d'approvisionnement en eau potable et assainissement en milieu rural Phase II – rapport d'évaluation des résultats; South Africa, Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) LoC IV – project performance assessment.

may have alternatively aimed to create synergies from the results achieved from on-going or preceding projects⁵⁶. Here, the role of the Bank was described in engaging partners and obtaining financial, technical or administrative resources⁵⁷ to facilitate the borrower's ability to leverage credit or to use competitive bidding and, ultimately, to reduce energy supply tariffs⁵⁸. However, co-financing did not guarantee that projects benefited from the partners' comparative advantage. For example, in the Multinational Statistical Capacity Building project in Togo and Senegal, the Bank missed an opportunity to influence partners' allocation of funds to maximize project impact⁵⁹. Positive examples in the portfolio show capability and innovation (Box 16).

Box 16. Leveraging additional resources

- In Tunisia, the Bank's credibility alone positively leveraged funds by reducing perceived risk among other lenders.⁶⁰ In other cases, capital investment mechanisms were successfully used to leverage funds⁶¹.
- In Nigeria, the Bank was favorably described for the speed and efficiency with which it leveraged funds and resources in the Nigerian UBA-ELE project⁶². Elsewhere, in the Lekki project, the Bank leveraged funds from the local financial sector, which was initially skeptical about the project⁶³.
- In Mozambique, the success of the One Stop Shops project (co-financed with the government) gained increasing support from the donor community because of its catalytic role in improving public service delivery and enabling private sector development⁶⁴.
- In South Africa, there were two cases where the Bank sought to leverage in private sector funds using its B-loan facility. The first, with Transnet led to limited results. While commercial banks expressed interest, Transnet found cheap finance elsewhere. The second, with ESKOM, is ongoing. On the back of the Bank's USD 375 million loan, ESKOM secured the interest of 10 commercial Banks for an additional USD 950 million. The banks were attracted by the ability to piggyback on AfDB's preferred creditor status. Discussion with clients about the finance and infrastructure sides of the portfolio indicated appreciation for a Bank ready to be the first to fund, which incited others' confidence. In the case of Land Bank, the Treasury was encouraging DP support in recent years, but the World Bank started appraising its own line of credit only after the AfDB line of credit. The Bank also brought in Clean Technology Fund resources for the two public sector renewable energy projects to complement ADB funding.

Donor coordination challenges prevented leveraging activities in some cases. The lack of coordination between partners and the absence of a long-term vision prevented other interested funders (e.g., infrastructure sector in Tunisia) from getting involved. In terms of initiating leveraging activities, the Bank's role sometimes constituted good practice from a donor coordination and cooperation standpoint, but its performance was considered weak when analyzed through a leveraging lens (e.g., Burundi, Ghana). The Bank participated in leveraging activities with other DPs, but did not initiate them. Evidence was scarce about this failure to initiate leveraging activities. The Bank's ability to leverage funds might be hindered by the absence of a framework and by stakeholder perception of it as a financial partner rather than as the primary initiator of interventions (e.g. Tanzania).

⁵⁶ Sénégal, Programme de renforcement des capacités statistiques dans les pays membres régionaux et dans les organisations sous-régionales – évaluation de la performance de programme; Togo, Terminal à conteneurs de Lomé – évaluation de la performance de projet; Togo, Système intégré d'information sur l'eau (SIIEAU) – évaluation de la performance de projet; Togo, Aide d'urgence au programme d'actions pour atténuer les effets des incendies des marchés de Lomé et de Kara – évaluation de la performance de projet; Togo, Projet d'assistance aux personnes affectées par les inondations au Togo (aide humanitaire d'urgence) – évaluation de la performance de projet; Togo, Projet d'appui au renforcement des capacités institutionnelles (PARCI 2) – évaluation de la performance de projet; Togo, Programme d'appui aux réformes et à la gouvernance (PARG 2) – évaluation de la performance de projet; Togo, Réhabilitation et modernisation de la route Aflao – Sanvee condji – Frontière Bénin: tronçon rond-point Port-Avépozo – évaluation de la performance de projet.

⁵⁷ Sénégal, Dakar container terminal – évaluation de la performance de projet; Sénégal, Autoroute Dakar Diamniadio – évaluation de la performance de projet.; Nigeria, Lekki Concession Company – Project performance assessment.

⁵⁸ South Africa, Standard Bank of South Africa – Project performance assessment.

⁵⁹ Togo, Programme de renforcement des capacités statistiques dans les pays membres régionaux et dans les organisations sous-régionales – Évaluation de la performance du programme; Sénégal, Programme de renforcement des capacités statistiques dans les pays membres régionaux et dans les organisations sous-régionales – Évaluation de la performance du programme.

⁶⁰ Tunisie, Évaluation de la performance du Projet de mise en valeur du champ gazier Hasdrubal.

⁶¹ Tunisie, Évaluation de la performance du programme d'appui à la relance économique et au développement inclusif.

⁶² Nigeria, UBA Emergency Liquidity Facility (ELF) Project performance assessment.

⁶³ Nigeria Lekki Concession Company Project performance assessment.

⁶⁴ Mozambique, Institutional Support for Public Sector Reform – Project performance assessment.

The lack of an overarching DP cooperation framework was also noted in relation to emerging partnerships (e.g. private industry partners, emerging donor countries). Opportunities to leverage additional funds from emerging partners and to increase the depth, impact, and sustainability of programs have been of particular interest in higher low-income and middle-income countries (e.g. Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa). However details about the sectors of their involvement and the exact contributions of emerging donors are unclear. In Ghana, for example, a focus group conducted to develop a case study revealed that no explicit strategy had been employed to attract co-financing from non-traditional donors or from the private sector because a series of challenges. The challenges included the fact that emerging donors do not participate in sector working groups, which limits their opportunities for strategic engagement to acquire a mutual understanding of needs and opportunities. In Mozambique, stakeholders did not feel that the Bank used its full potential, that many donors who could be bringing resources to projects are not doing so because there is no framework, and that the Bank is not well equipped at country level to mobilize the resources in question.

6. Conclusions about Bank performance: What did or did not work and under which conditions?

This concluding section seeks to synthesize the findings of the evaluation into broad conclusions, linking Bank performance and country conditions. As this evaluation did not question the strategic orientation of the Bank by design, these conclusions are focused on implementation.

The Bank's performance was influenced by country conditions. Where leadership, ownership, and national capacity to implement existed, interventions were more effective and more sustainable and Bank performance was also higher in other strategic roles such as leverage.

Unsurprisingly, Bank activities and interventions were most successful when country political and economic conditions facilitated the effective functioning of all aspects of operations—from the strategic level, to project planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Within the broader context, government ownership and leadership, and its capacity to carry out the necessary project implementation steps largely influenced the success of operations. Strong technical and administrative capacity in project implementation units played an important role in achieving successful outcomes. Bank projects benefitted when the RMC had institutionalized management for development results procedures. Conditions were particularly favorable when the project was coordinated with other DPs and RMCs and accompanied with a joint M&E framework with mutual accountability.

The Bank was more effective in countries whose development cooperation framework was well established and functional. Frameworks, together with the country's economic situation (e.g. more developed private sector), were an important determinant for the success of leveraging efforts. Examples of ad-hoc leveraging also emerged. This suggested a greater understanding of the process and triggers required for the Bank to fully capitalize on new opportunities (e.g., emerging donors). Leveraging with private partners was particularly successful in higher income countries. The private sector was more developed in these countries, and opportunities for multilateral investments were stronger, based on formal strategies encouraging coordinated investments across multiple partners.

When country conditions were less favorable, the Bank did not systematically gather a deep enough understanding of contextual constraints such as lack of ownership or capacity. This insufficient understanding was found to be a key factor of low effectiveness and sustainability.

At a strategic level, CSPs were not aligned with RMC needs when there were insufficient analyses of past performance, fragility, and capacities. This resulted in neglecting important RMC limitations. A lack of coordination and consultation with DPs and RMC stakeholders, often in the absence of a development cooperation framework, and an insufficient analysis of the Bank's added value, also contributed to inadequate project selectivity and a dispersed portfolio. This was more likely when Bank consultations overall were limited and when actors from the private sector, local administration, and civil society were not actively involved in a sustained dialogue with the Bank.

In fragility situations, one or more of the crucial pieces required to trigger effective mechanisms was often missing. These included restricted human capacity (compounded by high turnover), limited infrastructure capacity, weak government leadership/ownership, or the absence of embedded frameworks for achieving policy dialogue and collective progress. CSPs in transition states have generally described factors of fragility but the lack of an integrated approach for addressing them coherently led to sub-optimal performance.

At project level, the design phase was particularly important in establishing context- and capacity-appropriate realistic outcomes that considered the magnitude and likelihood of risks and planned mitigation measures. This increased the likelihood that projects would remain on time and on budget.

The presence of the Bank in country provided a positive context for a better understanding of country constraints and needs. This created favorable conditions for Bank interventions to be relevant, effective, and sustainable. In fragile situations, longstanding partnerships facilitated the Bank's work despite the challenges of working in settings constrained by capacity or resources.

Effective policy dialogue with government partners was a key determinant for the Bank to acquire the necessary contextual knowledge and conditions to be selective in strategies and programming and therefore to implement effective, sustainable programs. Positive evidence from the case studies showed the importance of proximity. It allowed the Bank to engage in policy dialogue with the government and other development partners, to play an active leadership and participation role in sector working groups, to engage in formal and informal meetings with government and DPs, and to act to improve the implementation capacity of RMC actors.

Creating such opportunities for more frequent, higher quality dialogue, presence also enhanced the credibility of the Bank among stakeholders. The Bank was perceived in a more positive light when it was deeply involved in country development mechanisms embedded in the frameworks (e.g. sector working groups), when it had demonstrated experience in the sectors in which it was working, and had built a reputation as a reliable, effective partner. The perception of the Bank as a competent, reliable partner was also a determinant of its ability to leverage effectively.

The Bank was equally likely to be described as a 'trusted partner' in transition states, and in low and middle-income countries. Its credibility was strong among governments and other financial and technical partners in all types of countries when the conjunction of dialogue and analytic work was strong. Across all types of countries, an explicit strategic orientation with an implementation plan for policy dialogue and analytic work in CSPs made a positive contribution to the Bank's role in policy dialogue.

In transition countries, Bank effectiveness was built through longstanding partnership during difficult periods, which built trust. The Bank established credibility by focusing on infrastructure (i.e. hard) interventions while increasing action in fiscal administration, economic and sector analysis, and employment type (i.e. soft) interventions. The Bank's role as a knowledge broker was also positively assessed in fragility contexts.

Finally, opening country offices also made it possible to improve management for development results (MfDR) (including timely risk mitigation and closer project monitoring and supervision), improving (but not guaranteeing) the efficiency and effectiveness of project implementation.

Presence alone was not a sufficient condition for the Bank to perform its various roles effectively. Corporate level constraints, capacity issues, and risk-averse behavior at country level limited the effectiveness of country offices. The Bank was also broadly perceived as a project and finance partner as opposed to a knowledge broker or advisor.

While the perception that the Bank is a trusted partner in informing policy reform is important, its limited credibility as a knowledge broker could weaken it. This situation was influenced by conditions where the Bank was perceived to have insufficiently disseminated knowledge products and to perceptions about the suboptimal quality of the research it produced. Specific limitations in low- and middle-income countries referred to Bank data as too general to inform decision-

making. The broad perception of the Bank as a project funder limited the impact of its economic and sector work uptake, and its ability to act as the initiator of leveraging activities. Country presence did not balance this perception, despite its positive effect elsewhere.

In a context where formal cooperation structures or coordination mechanisms did not exist at country level, the Bank was not seen as taking counter-initiatives to foster effective partnerships even when it was present in the country. This was true for middle-income countries, for example, due to the complexities of large co-financed projects and to issues that arose when donors did not share procurement rules. The same applied for leveraging additional resources, in particular from emerging donors. This was mainly favored by the existence of frameworks and not Bank presence per se.

An excessive focus on transaction compliance and ineffectively used procurement procedures finally hindered the effectiveness of in-country field offices, which also had different capacity constraints. In addition, when task managers or supervisors were based outside the country or region, their lack of proximity to project implementation and for oversight could contribute to the loss of lessons learned and missed opportunities for building local capacity for project implementation. Procedures constraints limited the usefulness of the Bank in MICs where, for example, small grants took too long to approve.

Positive findings however emerged in various countries around the Bank being able to provide opportunistically the appropriate piece of knowledge work relating to existing policy issues in a timely manner, and to use its relationship with the RMC to support policy reforms. From this perspective, work around PPPs including both the set-up of regulatory frameworks and fostering the use of the mechanism, was mentioned. Such positive practice was related to the active role taken by the country office in pursuing a niche agenda.

Despite improvement, weak design and supervision were still constraints to effective and efficient projects. Behavioral issues related to culture and incentives prevented the reform agenda to yield full results.

In addition to the lack of consideration for contextual constraints, a poor ToC design, combined with unspecific indicators and lack of a timeframe, impeded project effectiveness. Limitations in the logic and operational strength of ToCs at project level were spread and as likely to appear in public or private projects. Corporate strategies not being guided by clear ToC was a contributing factor to weak theories at project level.

Logical theory of change with operational indicators that were followed and measured over time also influenced and engaged project supervision and monitoring. The timeliness and quality of Bank supervision improved over time and in many countries. This was largely attributed to opening country offices. However, the Bank-wide changes introduced for public sector operations supervision did not affect the supervision of private sector operations, which was often focused on financial performance only.

Quality of design and effective supervision proved be the most important yet most limiting for explaining country portfolio performance. Their roles were equally important in all forms of projects. Their importance was clearly recognized and multiple reforms were initiated related to these factors, but not only. Recent evaluations found that the direction of travel was positive especially for reforms related to making the Bank a results-oriented learning organization. Slow progress could be related to weak learning from past experience but also suggested deeper issues hindering the full implementation of reforms more generally. Specifically, the need to address behavioral and cultural change through coherent incentives and to strengthen accountability frameworks.

7. Recommendations

Building on the findings of the evaluation and on the broad conclusions above, the evaluation proposes the following recommendations aiming at informing a transformational agenda for implementing the High 5s. As some actions on that front are ongoing, these recommendations should serve to feed lessons from experience into the process. This could facilitate the identification of priorities in issues to tackle.

Positioning in context

- i) Expand the analysis of comparative advantage in country strategies beyond sectoral considerations. This would mean

analyzing the type of role the Bank should/could play to add value, depending on the country context and priorities (e.g. knowledge broker, advisor, and/or project financier). This should include an understanding of how government and key partners perceive the Bank in relation to the strategic directions it wishes to take.

- ii) Generalize the analysis of potential partnerships at country level. This includes possible strategic roles, contributions and constraints, as well as associated threats and opportunities. Partnerships could include both the traditional knowledge/financing partnerships with development partners, but also new partnerships with civil society, the private sector, and emerging donors.
- iii) Strengthen the analysis of risks related to implementation and sustainability at the strategic country level and in projects. Risk analysis should include a detailed, context- and capacity-appropriate mitigation strategy to tackle constraints to implementation. For sustainability in particular, this would involve determining lending and non-lending contributions based on the capacity of the country to maintain project operations, and developing long-term partnerships. At project level, tools such as the “readiness filter” that mitigates the risk of delayed startup could be streamlined and generalized.
- iv) Enhance learning both at project and strategic level. Lessons learned should receive fuller, more detailed discussion in country strategies and project documents. They should also better integrate possible views of other stakeholders on Bank support. Sharing lessons could become a formal part of staff accountability so that lessons become more structured and more usable.
- v) Improve the design of country strategies based on the foregoing analysis. This implies (i) clarifying the strategic roles the Bank wishes to play in the country; (ii) positioning the Bank in broader partnerships, and (iii) clarifying the intervention logic and narrowing the Bank's contribution to a select set of sectors, and considering fewer and more modest CSP indicators.
- vi) Clarify the terms of references for country offices depending on the country context and the Bank's strategy. This includes defining performance with clear indicators for ensuring accountability on results. It also implies making the appropriate skills and adequate resources available for the office to fulfill its various possible roles in country (e.g. representation and liaison with stakeholders; strategic thinking and policy advice; technical design; risk management; and monitoring and evaluation).

Special attention should be given to transition states where the Bank has a comparative advantage with respect to relationships and dialogue.

Improving corporate services

- vii) Clarify and streamline the suite of ESW products (following on the 2013 ESW evaluation recommendations). The anticipated role of the ESW alongside the CSP should be revisited and appropriately resourced. Building on existing good practice, appropriate resources should be made available in countries where the Bank can fill knowledge gaps in specific niches related to its strategies and propose a relevant combination of ESW, dialogue and financing instruments to the client.
- viii) Ensure that corporate strategies (e.g. sector strategies) are based on a well-designed ToC shared with stakeholders as the basis for defining the outcomes guiding Bank interventions and common indicators. Mechanisms to have outcomes and indicators trickle down to country strategies and projects should be proposed.
- ix) Enhance flexibility and customization to country context in Bank procedures. A good example is the new procurement policy that proposes a flexible, risk-based approach. Special attention should be given to transition states to support the comparative advantage of the Bank in terms of relationship. In these countries, the Bank might consider consolidating multiple financing sources and streamlining trust funds to avoid delays and disruptions. In higher income countries, greater flexibility in Bank lending procedures could be considered (e.g. the need for sovereign guarantees).

Enhancing delivery

- x) Strengthen accountability frameworks and align incentives to influence changes in behavior moving towards a performance culture. This should include the revision and alignment of key performance indicators (KPIs) at all levels to ensure their coherence in driving results-oriented action (e.g. lending targets could be accompanied by quality and results targets).
- xi) Enhance the depth and quality of supervision for private sector operations. Options for enhancement include: (i) framing supervision on the basis of a project's risk profile, (ii) improving the results focus in particular with respect to development outcomes, and (iii) clarifying the frequency requirements for supervision of private sector operations.

- xii) Strengthen the implementation of supervision for public sector operations. This could be done by: (i) strengthening accountability and aligning incentives around supervision, (ii) improving existing tools as needed (e.g. tracking disbursement performance against a benchmark disbursement profile by sector), and (iii) strengthening capacity at country level on the side of the Bank and of its national counterparts. This should be done when possible by using national monitoring and evaluation systems and/or advancing their institutionalization.

8. Annexes

Annex A: Methodology

Lines of evidence

Context factor reviews (CFRs)

Context factor reviews (CFRs) consisted of a review of Bank performance based on the ToC. CFRs assessed contextual factors (internal, drivers of performance, and external, country conditions) assumed to influence Bank achievement of results and defined based on the overall Bank's theory of change. CFRs were conducted as an integral part of the CSPE process in all 14 countries selected, through a document review of corporate strategy documents from the 14 countries and field data collection.

Detailed guidance was provided to minimize risks of non-consistent assessment across countries for CFRs. In addition to the guidance, a quality assurance process is implemented internally guided by a QA form and involving a concurrent review of each CFR by two different staff followed by comparison / discussion to qualify each CFR (as meeting the minimum quality threshold for inclusion in the synthesis or to be reviewed or rejected).

Project results assessments (PRAs)

For each of the 14 countries, a detailed project-level assessment was conducted for completed and ongoing projects close to completion. The assessment was done jointly by consultants and IDEV staff who systematically assessed four evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability⁶⁵. Detailed guidance on conducting PRAs was provided to the evaluators in order to minimize the risk of non-consistent assessment across countries. In addition to the guidance, a quality assurance process was implemented internally, guided by a QA form, involving a concurrent review of each PRA by two different staff. This was followed by a comparison/discussion to qualify each PRA as meeting the minimum quality threshold for inclusion in the synthesis or to be reviewed or rejected. PRAs varied, however, in the amount of detail. Some concisely addressed project questions while others provided a far longer narrative with contextual information and a specific appreciation of the Bank's contribution to the project outcomes.

A total of 202 PRAs were planned and 167 were delivered further to the IDEV internal quality assurance process.⁶⁶ Table A1 provides the number of projects included in this evaluation by country. One PRA (Ethiopia Protection of Basic Services, Phases 1-2-3) covered a three-phase project, bringing the total number of Bank projects covered by PRAs to 169. These figures include 12 projects approved before 2004 and 2 projects approved after 2013⁶⁷.

Table A1. Total projects (n=169) by country

Country	Number of projects		Volume	
	Number	%	Net-loan (UA million)	%
Burundi	13	7.7	131.29	1.4
Cameroon	5	3.0	148.61	1.6
Dem Rep Congo	8	4.7	219.36	2.3
Ethiopia	14	8.3	878.50	9.4
Ghana	9	5.3	281.15	3.0
Morocco	16	9.5	1557.70	16.6
Mozambique	11	6.5	316.82	3.4
Multinational	7	4.1	2.65	0.03
Nigeria	17	10.1	610.82	6.5
Senegal	13	7.7	276.03	2.9

⁶⁵ The OECD DAC criterion of impact was not included in the assessment, since it was considered not to be evaluable in many cases. However, unintended outcomes were assessed within the effectiveness criteria.

⁶⁶ All delivered PRAs went through a standardized quality assurance process: a third party reviewed the document against standard criteria to ensure alignment with rating guidance, quality control, and consistency across teams. The majority of PRAs required some minor changes before undergoing the process, and a minority of PRAs was completely excluded.

⁶⁷ These projects were added after consultation of country teams about projects that should be included to make the building block evaluations more helpful and relevant.

South Africa	13	7.7	2833.88	30.3
Tanzania	15	8.9	555.93	5.9
Togo	9	5.3	102.98	1.1
Tunisia	12	7.1	1372.45	14.7
Zambia	7	4.1	76.79	0.8
Total	169	100.0	9364.95	100.0

Accounting only for the projects approved during 2004-2013, the number of PRAs drops to 155 with a net loan of about UA 8.8 billion, representing 31.2% and 51.5% of the number of projects and net loans respectively in the overall Bank portfolio approved in the same period that correspond to the same eligibility criteria for PRAs.

The sample of projects subjected to PRAs is not statistically representative of the Bank portfolio 2004-2013 for two reasons:

- There were 500 projects approved Bank-wide during 2004-2013 that were closed or were ongoing with a disbursement rate above 80%, and an approved net-loan above UA 1 million. For the sample size of **155**, the margin of error at 95% confidence level is **6.55%**, which is above the desired standard (5%). Conversely, the required sample size at a 95% confidence level and 5% confidence interval for the 500 projects is 217.
- The selection of the PRA sample was not systematically drawn according to any random sampling technique.

Evaluation reports and studies used for triangulation

A total of 10 recent evaluations and studies conducted independently of the CEDR were included in this line of evidence, as well as 12 country-specific CSP QaE assessments (Table A2). Evidence from these evaluations and studies was used for triangulation purposes as part of the synthesis.

Table A2 List of evaluations and studies used for triangulation

Name of evaluation / study
1. The preferred partner? A client assessment of the African Development Bank. African Development Bank Group, 2012
2. Review of the African Development Bank's Economic and Sector Work (2005–2010). Operations Evaluation Department 2013
3. Durabilité des projets routiers financés par la BAD : Temps pour des solutions innovatrices ? Département de l'évaluation des opérations, Septembre 2013
4. Operational Procurement Policies and Practices of the African Development Bank: An Independent Evaluation. Summary Report. IDEV August 2014
5. Transport in Africa: The African Development Bank's Intervention and Results for the Last Decade. Summary Evaluation Report. IDEV December 2014
6. Strategizing for the "Africa We Want": An Independent Evaluation of the Quality at Entry of Country and Regional Integration Strategies. Summary Report. IDEV January 2015
Including: Results of the quality-at-entry assessments for 12 countries including South Africa (2013-2017), Burundi (2012-2016), Cameroon (2010-2014), Democratic Republic of Congo (2008-2017), Ethiopia (2011-2015), Ghana (2012-2016), Morocco (2012-2016), Nigeria (2012), Tanzania (2011-2015), Togo (2009-2010), Tunisia (2014-2015), Zambia (not stated).
7. Independent Evaluation of General Capital Increase-VI and African Development Fund 12 and 13 Commitments: Overarching Review, Summary Report. IDEV April 2015
8. Independent Evaluation Of Administrative Budget Management of The Bank Group, Summary Report. IDEV August 2015
9. Evaluation of Bank Group Assistance to Small and Medium Enterprise (2006–2013), IDEV September 2015
10. Evaluation of the African Development Bank's Assistance in the Energy Sector: Summary Report. IDEV (draft) April 2016

Data analysis

Data analysis for all lines of evidence began with deductive coding following on directly from the evaluation matrix (i.e., indicators), followed by inductive coding to add interpretation to deductive codes, including facilitating/inhibiting conditions and consequences. Evidence in the background papers was also coded and analyzed using Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis software tool.


In addition to past evaluation reports, the evaluation considered two reviews completed in May 2016 by the IDEV: a quantitative review, “A review of the portfolio or project results assessments for the CEDR: Coverage, trends and features,” and a qualitative review, “A qualitative comparative analysis of the Bank’s theory of change for the CEDR: Evaluating factors thought to contribute to AfDB performance at country level.” Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is a data analysis technique for determining the logical conclusions supported by a data set. It is a means of analyzing the causal contribution of different conditions (e.g. aspects of an intervention and the wider context) to an outcome of interest⁶⁸.

Sampling of PRAs for the synthesis

All PRAs (n=167) were analyzed to describe the presence or absence of key factors in accordance with relevant evaluation indicators and an in-depth analysis was made of a restrained sample (n=84), after a proportional sampling framework by sector that included all PRAs from transition states and the top performing and least performing projects. In-depth analysis means the PRAs were read in full and coded for relevant indicators that were analyzed to achieve saturation; i.e. successive PRAs validated the analysis results to ensure that no new information appeared. Saturation occurred when the same relationships and themes began to appear. PRAs were then coded for descriptive and validation purposes.

⁶⁸ Ragin, C. C. Department of Sociology and Department of Political Science, University of Arizona, (n.d.). What is qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)? Retrieved from website: http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/250/1/What_is_QCA.pdf.

Annex B: Bank's Theory of change underpinning the CEDR



Assumptions

ER 7-14

- Financial resources are sufficient in volume and well targeted based on needs and where Bank adds value.
DR 1, 2
- Funding instruments are appropriate for context.
DR 1, 2
- Expertise and skills in the Bank are developed, maintained and applied.
ER 11, 13
- Shareholders, investors and clients are aware of Bank performance.

- Strategic focus/priorities is clearly articulated and carried through into CSPs and projects.
- Operations are designed based on solid analysis and design is relevant to achieving objectives.
- Instrument and design appropriate for country context, based on analytical work, consultation and identification of added value.
- Clients meet conditions to allow for disbursement, bank process disburses on schedule.
- Knowledge and analytical work is relevant to Bank and beneficiary needs and priorities; and of high quality; political will exists to take forward apply knowledge work.
- Political will for partnership approach amongst RMCs and other DPs exists.
- Bank has sufficient reputation and capacity to play leverage and convener role.
- Projects and country portfolio and well supervised/monitored and necessary corrective actions taken.
- Political will exists in Bank, RMCs and clients to make use of lessons from past M+E.
- Capacity of Bank staff and in country presence.
- Good governance/management of resources by client/implementing agency.
- Ownership by country of Bank supported activities and objectives.
- National capacity to implement Bank projects.

DR 3-6

- Technical soundness of project design, budgeting.
- No major escalations in project cost.
- Project implementation schedule respected/delays do not effect outputs.
- Gaps in capacity are identified and capacity support is well designed, targeted, applied and owned.
- Quality and scale of outputs delivered is sufficient and context appropriate.
- O&M functions are sufficiently resourced.
- Country readiness for reforms/political will.
- Trained staff are retained.
- New technology and good practices adopted by target.
- There is institutional space to ensure enhanced individual capacity and new tools can be applied.
- Security and stability allow project implementation.
- Natural phenomenon do not undermine project implementation.
- Other resources (DPs and private) are available.
- Government stability, in individual champions as well as more broadly.
- National capacity to maintain and service.

- Broader economic context – exchange rates, commodity prices etc – does not deteriorate/continues to improve.
- Security and stability does not deteriorate.
- No unexpected natural disasters or major weather events.
- Government stability.

Sector outcomes and impact pathways

Sector / Outcomes	Impact Pathway
Transport	
Enhanced mobility and accessibility for people, business and trade	<p>The Bank and other DPs provide RMCs with funding, TA, equipment and knowledge to build and maintain physical and soft transport infrastructure (including multinational).</p> <p>High-quality transport infrastructure built (including regional). Effective regulatory framework is established to ensure infrastructure is properly maintained through controls (e.g., Axle Load) and availability of funding for maintenance. Public servants and maintenance service providers are trained in operation and maintenance of transport infrastructure. Management of transport sector is improved. Cross-border agreements and protocols are put in place. Automated custom clearance system is established. Customs employees are trained in operating the customs clearance system.</p> <p>Inter-rural connectivity and connectivity between rural and urban areas is enhanced. Congestion in urban areas is reduced. Travel time and costs are also reduced. Increased access to social services (education and health). Management of border-crossing system is improved. Cost and time to cross borders are reduced. Increased of mobility of people, and exchange goods and services between countries.</p>

Sector / Outcomes	Impact Pathway
Enhanced competitiveness & access to private sector markets	<p>The Bank along with other DPs provides RMCs with funding, technical assistance, equipment and knowledge to build and maintain physical and soft transport infrastructure (including multinational).</p> <p>High-quality transport infrastructure built (including multinational). Effective regulatory framework is established to ensure infrastructure maintenance and “liberalize the transport industry”. Public servants and maintenance service providers are trained in operation and maintenance of transport infrastructure. Management of transport sector is improved.</p> <p>Freight costs and travel times are reduced. Access to markets is facilitated. Freight price is reduced.</p>
Decreases in transport related injuries	<p>The Bank along with other DPs provides RMCs with funding, technical assistance, equipment and knowledge to integrate safety into its existing and new infrastructure.</p> <p>High-quality transport infrastructure built or rehabilitated (including regional) with appropriate safety standards. Effective regulatory framework is established which includes considerations of safety. Public servants and maintenance service providers are trained in transport safety management.</p>
Energy	
Increased access to reliable, quality and sustainable electricity to rural and non-rural private and business customers	<p>The Bank along with other DPs provides RMCs with funding, technical assistance, equipment and knowledge to construct and/or rehabilitate electricity facilities.</p> <p>High-quality electricity infrastructure (including both hardware and software relating to generation, transmission and distribution) are built and/or rehabilitated in both urban and rural areas. Electricity sector actors (ministries, power utilities, electricity users etc.) are trained on the operation and maintenance of electricity facilities and in sector management (including managing IPPs). Load dispatching center is effectively functioning and efficient SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system in place. Regulatory framework for electricity sector (including tariffs, Demand Side Management, power purchase agreement, fuel purchasing policies, Independent Power Producer, power trading system, power pool system) is established. Equipment (electricity metering systems) is provided to power utilities/municipalities. High-quality studies on electricity sector management issues are conducted and used. Campaigns to raise awareness on electricity use and tariffs are effectively carried out. Service delivery by different actors is improved (e.g. maintain electricity distribution networks and metering device, improve management of PPP and setting tariffs). Accompanied measures to ensure users effective connection and productive use of electricity (output-based aid; microfinance for small business, appropriate cost recovery procedures) are put in place. Synergy between rural electrification and other rural development projects (irrigation, telephony, crafts, and microcredit) is improved.</p> <p>Electricity production is increased. Grid/transmission operation is improved. Load shedding is reduced. Operation and maintenance skills of power utilities/local municipalities are improved. Capacity and knowledge with regard to increased reliability and quality of electricity-based service are enhanced. Access to electricity service for customers is increased. Affordability of electricity service for customers is increased. Greater awareness of productive use of energy, energy efficiency, basis for tariffs, and energy safety issues. Willingness to pay energy services is increased. Cross-border electrical power exchange is increased. Usage of power pool system as a whole is enhanced. Government revenues for electricity exporting country are increased.</p>
Reduction in pollution related to energy generation	<p>The Bank along with other DPs provides RMCs with funding, technical assistance, equipment and knowledge to construct and/or rehabilitate electricity facilities.</p> <p>High-quality electricity infrastructure (including both hardware and software relating to generation, transmission and distribution) are built and/or rehabilitated. Electricity sector actors (ministries, power utilities, electricity users etc.) are trained on the operation and maintenance of electricity facilities and in sector management (including managing IPPs). Regulatory framework for electricity sector (including CO2 emission trading) is established. Equipment (electricity metering systems) is provided to power utilities/municipalities. High-quality studies on electricity sector management issues are conducted and used. Campaigns to raise awareness on renewable energy use are effectively carried out.</p>

Sector / Outcomes	Impact Pathway
	Renewable sources in electricity production are increased. CO2 emissions are reduced by installation of renewable energy sources. Greater awareness of productive use of renewable energy.
Water and sanitation	
Reduced incidence of W&S related disease	<p>The Bank along with other DPs provides RMCs with funding, technical assistance, equipment and knowledge to construct and/or rehabilitate water supply and sanitation/sewage facilities, build capacity in water system management and after care maintenance and raise hygiene awareness.</p> <p>High-quality water supply and sanitation/sewage facilities are built and/or rehabilitated. Water sector and sanitation actors (ministry, artisans, water users etc.) are trained on the operation and maintenance of water and sanitation/sewage facilities and in water system management (including managing PPPs). Regulatory framework for water and sanitation sector (including tariffs) is established. Equipment (e.g., water metering systems) is provided to municipalities. High-quality studies on water sector and sanitation management issues are conducted and used. Campaigns to raise awareness on hygiene, health education, sanitation, water use and tariffs are effectively carried out. Service delivery by different actors is improved (e.g. build better sanitation facilities, maintain water supply, improve management of PPP and setting tariffs).</p> <p>Reliable production of high-quality (according to WHO safety standards) water is increased. Access to safe water supply by household is increased. Beneficiaries handle water properly and keep it clean.</p> <p>High-quality sanitation services are increased. Volume of sewage reaching the treatment plant and as a result the volume of sewage effectively treated increases. Volume of solid waste effectively disposed of increases leading to an improvement in dumpsite management. Beneficiaries practice proper hygiene.</p>
Reduced water collection burden	<p>The Bank, along with other DPs, provides RMCs with funding, technical assistance, equipment and knowledge to construct and/or rehabilitate water supply facilities, build capacity in water system management and after care maintenance.</p> <p>High-quality water supply facilities are built and/or rehabilitated. Water sector actors (ministry, artisans, water users etc.) are trained on the operation and maintenance of facilities and in water system management (including managing PPPs). Regulatory framework for water sector (including tariffs) is established. Equipment (e.g., water metering systems, sewer pipes) is provided to municipalities. High-quality studies on water sector issues are conducted and used. Campaigns to raise awareness among water users (especially women and youth) on hygiene, health education, water use and tariffs are effectively carried out. Service delivery by different actors is improved (e.g. maintain water supply, improve management of PPP and setting tariffs).</p> <p>Reliable production of high-quality (according to WHO safety standards) water in rural areas is increased. Access to safe water supply by households in rural areas is increased and sustained. Beneficiaries handle water properly and keep it clean. Time to fetch water in rural areas is reduced and as a result, beneficiaries have more time available for other productive activities.</p>
Reduced W&S-related pollution	<p>The Bank, along with other DPs, provides RMCs with funding, technical assistance, equipment and knowledge to construct and/or rehabilitate sanitation/sewage facilities and raise awareness on waste disposal.</p> <p>High-quality sanitation/sewage facilities are built and/or rehabilitated. Water sector and sanitation actors (ministry, artisans, water users etc.) are trained on the operation and maintenance of water and sanitation/sewage facilities and in water and sanitation system management (including managing PPPs). Regulatory framework for water and sanitation sector (including tariffs) is established. Equipment (e.g., water metering systems, sewer pipes) is provided to municipalities. High-quality studies on sewage and solid waste management are conducted and used. Campaigns to raise awareness on sanitation and solid waste disposals, water use and tariffs are effectively carried out. Service delivery by different actors is improved (e.g. build better sanitation facilities, improve management of PPP and setting tariffs). Beneficiaries handle water properly and keep it clean.</p> <p>High-quality sanitation services are increased. Volume of sewage reaching the treatment plant and as a result the volume of</p>

Sector / Outcomes	Impact Pathway
	sewage effectively treated increases. Volume of solid waste effectively disposed of increases leading to an improvement in dumpsite management. Beneficiaries practice proper sewage and solid disposal. Reuse of treated water and sludge is increased.
Finance	
Increased access to financial services for underserved groups	<p>The Bank provides finance, knowledge and advisory services to support near universal access to basic financial services (i.e. bank accounts and to increase coverage of the informal sector. The Bank works through intermediaries to do so.</p> <p>The Bank provides finance, knowledge and advisory services to increase access to financial resources (i.e. lending) for underserved groups and entities – notably women, youth, and SMEs. The Bank works through intermediaries to do so, including micro-finance institutions and private banks, and local currency for local on-lending.</p> <p>The Bank provides finance, knowledge and advisory services to support development of skills within the financial sector, notably amongst financial institutions.</p> <p>The Bank provides finance, knowledge and advisory services to support broader financial stability and governance of the financial sector, to ensure more inclusive coverage of underserved groups, including through: support to improve financial sector policies; stronger financial sector regulatory and supervisory frameworks; enhancing capacity of financial institutions to ensure an inclusive financial sector, regulatory and supervisory authorities; and by facilitating Africa wide engagement and experience sharing on increasing access to finance amongst policy makers, regulators and supervisors.</p>
Broadened and deepened financial systems.	<p>The Bank provides long-term finance, which lowers intermediation costs, and involves a range of different innovative and traditional products as well as local and foreign currency. This increases long-term and competitive funding options to African private sector entities to deepen national and regional capital markets and financial infrastructure (that includes institutional framework, and payment and credit systems).</p> <p>The Bank provides finance, knowledge and advisory services to support broader financial stability and governance of the financial sector, including through: support to improve financial sector policies; stronger financial sector regulatory and supervisory frameworks; enhancing the capacity of financial institutions, regulatory and supervisory authorities, and by facilitating Africa wide engagement and experience sharing among policy makers, regulators and supervisors.</p>
Governance	
Improved PFM and economic management	<p>The Bank along with other DPs provides RMCs with funding, technical assistance, equipment and knowledge to support the development and implementation of reforms in public financial and economic management.</p> <p>Robust policy, legal and institutional frameworks are effectively developed. Persons who will implement the new framework are trained and are provided with appropriate tools (including equipment) to implement the framework.</p> <p>New laws, regulations and policies in public financial and economic management are effectively applied by all relevant entities. They institute measures to enhance transparency and accountability.</p> <p>RMCs' performance in public financial and economic management, including transparency and accountability, are enhanced. Government revenue collection capacity enhanced.</p>
Increased public accountability & oversight. Reduction in wastage and corruption in service delivery	<p>AFDB provides, along with other development partners, RMCs with funding, technical assistance, equipment and knowledge to support governance of key sectors.</p> <p>Robust policy, legal and institutional frameworks are effectively developed. Persons who will implement the new frameworks are trained and are provided with appropriate tools (including equipment) to implement the frameworks.</p> <p>New laws, regulations and policies in key sectors are effectively applied by all relevant entities. They institute measures to enhance</p>

Sector / Outcomes	Impact Pathway
	<p>transparency and accountability.</p> <p>A more transparent, accountable and effective operating environment in key sectors.</p>
Enhanced business enabling environment	<p>The Bank along with other DPs provides RMCs with funding, TA, equipment and knowledge to improve the business-enabling environment for private sector development.</p> <p>Reforms, robust policy, legal and institutional frameworks are effectively developed. Persons who will implement the new reforms and frameworks are trained and are provided with appropriate tools (including equipment) to implement the frameworks.</p> <p>New laws, regulations and policies in key sectors are effectively applied by all relevant entities. They institute measures to remove bottlenecks and hurdles to domestic business creation and growth and FDI.</p>
Agriculture	
Increased rural household income	<p>The Bank along with other DPs provides RMCS with funding, TA, equipment and knowledge to build irrigation schemes, rural feeder roads, marketing and storage facilities, and agriculture research and technology.</p> <p>Irrigation schemes, rural feeder roads, marketing and storage facilities are built. Public servants working in the agriculture sector are trained and are provided with appropriate tools and knowledge to plan, monitor and evaluate agricultural interventions. Farmers are trained and are provided with appropriate tools and knowledge to carry out their farming activities.</p> <p>Planning, monitoring and evaluation in the agriculture sector, and natural resource management are improved. Farming production and productivity, marketing and value addition of agricultural products and employment increase leading to an increase in rural household income.</p>
Improvement in national food security (and where appropriate increased food exports)	<p>The Bank along with other DPs provides RMCS with funding, technical assistance, equipment and knowledge to build irrigation schemes, rural feeder roads, marketing and storage facilities, distribution and weather insurance/mitigation schemes as well as agriculture research and technology.</p> <p>Facilities are built or rehabilitated. Public servants working in the agriculture sector are trained and are provided with appropriate tools and knowledge to plan for national level food security. Farmers are trained and are provided with appropriate tools and knowledge to carry out their farming activities, to increase production.</p> <p>Planning, monitoring and evaluation in farming and food distribution, and natural resource management are improved. Farming production and productivity, marketing and value addition of agricultural products and employment increase leading improvement in national food security (and in certain cases increased exports).</p>
Improved resilience of producers and national supply to shocks.	<p>The Bank along with other DPs provides RMCS with funding, technical assistance, equipment and knowledge to build irrigation schemes, rural feeder roads, marketing and storage facilities, and agriculture research and technology.</p> <p>Irrigation schemes, rural feeder roads, marketing and storage facilities are built. Public servants working in the agriculture sector are trained and are provided with appropriate tools and knowledge to plan and monitor food production and mitigate for climate shocks. Farmers are provided with appropriate tools and knowledge to reduce their vulnerability to climate and economic changes.</p> <p>Natural resource management is improved.</p>

Annex C: Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation Core Issues	Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Indicators	Project Results Assessments (PRAs)	Contextual Factors Review (CFR)	Portfolio Review	Qualitative Comparative	Past Evaluation
Development Results - What has the Bank achieved over the past decade? Has it made a difference?							
Relevance	DR1. How aligned are Bank interventions (country strategies, programs and projects) with (i) the needs of the countries and targeted beneficiaries; and (ii) the Bank's strategic priorities?	DR1.1 % of country strategies rated as MS or above on relevance		●			
		DR1.2 Extent of alignment shortcomings in country strategies with: (a) RMC development needs; (b) RMC development strategies and priorities; (c) the needs of beneficiaries; and d) Bank strategies and priorities.		●			
		DR1.3 Assessment of relevance (alignment with MTS) in QAE evaluation and change since previous QAE					●
		DR1.4 Assessment of relevance (alignment with country priorities, consultation) in the QAE evaluation and change since previous QAE					●
		DR1.5 % of projects assessed MS or higher on relevance	●		●		
		DR 1.6 Extent to which projects have shortcomings in their alignment with: (a) RMC development needs; (b) RMC development strategies and priorities; and (c) the needs of beneficiaries; and d) with CSPs and Bank's sector strategies.	●				
		DR 1.7 Disconnect between Management's ratings (PCR) and IDEV's ratings (PRAs) on relevance.	●		●		
Effectiveness	DR2. To what extent have Bank interventions achieved the expected development	DR 2.1a Extent to which projects have achieved intended intermediate outcome DR 2.1b Extent to which projects are likely to achieve the intended intermediate outcome (based on the latest value of the outcome indicators and the analysis of other relevant exogenous risks/factors and assumptions).	●				

Evaluation Core Issues	Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Indicators	Project Results Assessments (PRAs)	Contextual Factors Review (CFR)	Portfolio Review	Qualitative Comparative	Past Evaluation
	outcomes?	DR 2.2: % of projects (PRAs) getting MS or higher rating on achievement of (i) outputs and (ii) outcomes overall	●		●		
		DR 2.3: % projects in transition states (TS) achieving MS or higher on achievement of (i) outputs and (ii) outcomes overall compared to broader sample	●		●		
		DR 2.4a): Variation in output and outcome PRA ratings across: 1) Transport, 2) Energy, 3) Water & Sanitation, 4) Finance, 5) Governance, 6) Multi-sector and 7) Agriculture sectors DR2.4b): Extent to which these output and outcome ratings triangulate with existing ratings from past evaluation reports and portfolio review (where evidence is present).	●		●		●
		DR 2.5: Identification of outcomes used to attribute achievement ratings	●				●
		DR 2.6a: Presence / absence of major factors influencing the achievement of outcomes (e.g., national capacity, institutional space, availability of resources, etc.) DR 2.6b: Presence / absence of major factors influencing the achievement of outcomes in TS	●	●		●	●
		DR 2.7a: % projects assessing projects' unintended effects (both positive and negative) DR 2.7b: Identification of major unintended effects (both positive and negative)	●				
	DR3. To what extent have Bank interventions benefited target groups?	DR 3.1a): % of projects which included an outcome measuring the project's direct benefits on a target group (i.e., end-user of service or resources) DR 3.1b: % of projects having achieved direct outcomes for target beneficiaries DR 3.1c: % of projects likely to achieve direct outcomes for target beneficiaries	●				
		DR. 3.2 Identification of positive benefits (either achieved or likely to be achieved) for target beneficiaries	●				
Crosscutting issues	DR4. To what extent are Bank interventions environmentally sustainable and support	DR4.1: Extent to which QaE criteria consider the risks of environmental impact					●
		DR4.2: % of category I or II projects for which environmental assessments were conducted	●				

Evaluation Core Issues	Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Indicators	Project Results Assessments (PRAs)	Contextual Factors Review (CFR)	Portfolio Review	Qualitative Comparative	Past Evaluation
	the transition to green growth?	DR4.3 Identification of outcomes that contributed directly to environmental sustainability	●		●		●
	DR5. To what extent are Bank interventions inclusive in terms of gender equality, regional disparity, and age groups?	DR 5.1a: % of projects that have addressed gender in their design			●		
		DR 5.1b: % of projects that have addressed gender in their outcome measures	●		●		
		DR 5.2a: % of projects that have addressed regional disparity in their design			●		
		DR 5.2b: % of projects that have addressed regional disparity in their outcome measures	●		●		
		DR 5.3a: % of projects that have addressed age groups in their design			●		
		DR 5.3b: % of projects that have addressed age groups in their outcome measures	●		●		
		DR 5.4: extent to which Bank CSPs have integrated inclusiveness					●
		DR 5.5: Identification of outcomes that expanded the economic base across genders	●		●		●
		DR 5.6: Identification of outcomes that expanded the economic base across regions	●		●		●
		DR 5.7: Identification of outcomes that expanded the economic base across ages, e.g., youth	●		●		●
Sustainability	DR6. To what extent have benefits continued or are likely to continue once Bank interventions are completed?	DR 6.1a: % of projects achieving MS or above in (i) overall sustainability rating, and (ii) each component rating. DR 6.1b: Extent to which sustainability ratings triangulate with existing ratings from past evaluation reports and portfolio review (where evidence is present).	●		●		●
		DR 6.2: Key factors identified as influencing sustainability	●	●	●	●	●

Evaluation Core Issues	Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Indicators	Project Results Assessments (PRAs)	Contextual Factors Review (CFR)	Portfolio Review	Qualitative Comparative	Past Evaluation
		DR 6.3 Extent to which the achievement of the outcomes of Bank projects will be adversely affected by factors related to the technical design of the interventions	●				
		DR 6.4 Extent to which Bank projects have put in place mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability and the flow of benefits associated with the projects are expected to continue after completion (the extent to which funding mechanisms and modalities (e.g. Tariffs, user fees, maintenance fees, budgetary allocations, other stakeholder contributions, aid flows, etc.) have been put in place to ensure the continued flow of benefits after project completion, with particular emphasis on financial sustainability).	●				
		DR 6.5 Extent to which Bank projects were critical in building or strengthening institutional capacities in the concerned sector / area of intervention. Country systems and capacities are excellent and sufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the projects after completion.	●				
Enabling Results - How and why were the development results achieved or not?							
Selectivity	ER7. How selective and strategically focused are Bank country strategies, programs and projects?	ER 7.1 Extent to which Bank projects are selective based on an analysis of the Bank's positioning and comparative advantage in a specific country context		●		●	
		ER 7.1: % of CFRs that rate strategic focus as MS or above (M3)		●		●	
		ER 7.2: % of CSPs assessed as MS or above on selectivity (under relevance) in QAE evaluation, and change since previous QAE					●
		ER 7.3: % funds (by approval) going to transition states over time			●		●
		ER 7.4: Extent to which the Bank's funding mechanisms influences the achievement of project outcomes	●		●		●
Efficiency	ER8. Has the Bank delivered its support	ER 8.1a: % of projects achieving MS or above of dimensions of efficiency (i) cost, (ii) timeliness	●				
		ER 8.1b: Project efficiency by public sector and private sector projects					

Evaluation Core Issues	Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Indicators	Project Results Assessments (PRAs)	Contextual Factors Review (CFR)	Portfolio Review	Qualitative Comparative	Past Evaluation
	efficiently, in terms of timeliness and cost?	ER 8.1c: Project efficiency by country type (transition vs. non-transition)					
		ER 8.2a: Variation in project efficiency ratings across: 1) Transport, 2) Energy, 3) Water & Sanitation, 4) Finance, 5) Governance, 6) Multi-sector and 7) Agriculture sectors	●		●		●
		ER 8.2b: Extent to which project efficiency ratings triangulate with ratings from past evaluation reports and portfolio review (where evidence is present).					
		ER 8.3 Actual implementation time compared to planned (average, min, max)	●		●		●
		ER 8.4: Variation in project efficiency ratings by country type (transition vs. non-transition)	●		●		
		ER 8.5: Factors influencing budget and timeline adherence	●				●
		ER 8.6: Presence/absence of major factors influencing budget and timeline overruns	●				●
		ER 8.7: Influence of budget and timeline overruns on project outcomes	●				●
Partnerships	ER9. How effective has the Bank been in engaging in productive partnerships?	ER9.1: Extent to which the Bank has established effective partnership arrangements and frameworks.		●		●	
		ER9.2: % CFRs achieving MS or above on partnership and coordination (M9)		●		●	
		ER9.3: % of CSPs assessed as MS or above on partnership frameworks in QAE evaluation, and change since previous QAE					●
		ER9.4: Extent to which partners were involved in the Bank's interventions (and, if possible, were they appropriate?)	●				●
Leverage	ER10. How well has the Bank leveraged resources?	ER 10.1: Extent to which Bank projects have had a catalytic effect		●		●	
		ER10.2: % CFRs achieving MS or above on leverage (M4)		●		●	
		ER10.3: Identification of the Bank's leveraging activities	●	●			

Evaluation Core Issues	Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Indicators	Project Results Assessments (PRAs)	Contextual Factors Review (CFR)	Portfolio Review	Qualitative Comparative	Past Evaluation
		ER10.4: Identification of strengths and weaknesses in maximizing leveraging	●	●			
Analytical Capacity	ER11. Has the Bank fulfilled its role as a knowledge broker, advisor, and convener?	ER11.1: % of CFRs achieving MS or above on knowledge and advice (M3)		●			
		ER11.2: Extent to which results triangulate with ESW evaluation 2013					●
		ER11.3: Extent to which clients report that Bank support (e.g., policy guidance, technical expertise, training, etc.) is available and useful	●				●
Innovation	ER12. How innovative has the Bank been in adapting its approach for different country contexts?	ER12.1a): % of CFRs achieving MS or above on adapted solutions (M2) ER12.1b): Extent to which these results corroborate with ratings from past evaluation reports		●			●
Managing for Development Results	ER13. Are Bank country strategies and programs designed, monitored and managed for development results?	ER 13.1 Extent to which Bank projects and country strategies have established an appropriate and realistic results-based framework (RBF)	●	●			●
		ER13.2: Extent to which Bank projects and country strategies contribute to building Monitoring and Evaluation capacity in countries.	●	●			●
		ER13.3: % of CFRs scoring MS or above on (i) MfDR (M8); (ii) supervision (M5), project focus (M7).		●			
		ER13.3: % of projects scoring MS or above on supervision (or advancement)	●				
		ER13.4: % of projects scoring MS or above on design	●				
	ER14. Does the Bank learn from experience?	ER14.1: % of performance ratings that improve/decline over time					●
		ER14.2: Extent to which Bank projects and CSPs integrate lessons learned from predecessors	●	●			●

Annex D: Rating scale used for the synthesis⁶⁹

Criteria /sub-criteria	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
Relevance						
Extent to which objectives of Bank interventions are aligned with the country's development strategies, applicable Bank sector strategies and beneficiary needs	Objectives of most Bank interventions have major shortcomings in their alignment with: i) the Bank's CSP, ii) applicable Bank sector strategies, iii) the country's development strategies, and iv) beneficiary needs.	Objectives of more than half of Bank interventions have major shortcomings in their alignment with: i) the Bank's CSP, ii) applicable Bank sector strategies, iii) the country's development strategies, and iv) beneficiary needs.	Objectives of a significant number (more than 25%) of Bank interventions work have major shortcomings in their alignment with: i) the Bank's CSP, ii) applicable Bank sector strategies, iii) the country's development strategies, and iv) beneficiary needs.	Objectives of more than half of Bank interventions have minor shortcomings in their alignment with: i) the Bank's CSP, ii) applicable Bank sector strategies, iii) the country's development strategies, and iv) beneficiary needs.	Objectives of most (more than 75%) of Bank interventions have no shortcomings and the remaining projects with minor shortcomings in the alignment with: i) the Bank's CSP, ii) applicable Bank sector strategies, iii) the country's development strategies, and iv) beneficiary needs.	Objectives of all of Bank interventions reviewed have no shortcoming in their alignment with: i) the Bank's CSP, ii) applicable Bank sector strategies, iii) the country's development strategies, and iv) beneficiary needs.
Extent to which design of interventions is conducive to the achievement of results.	Design of most Bank interventions is not conducive to achieving results. The original design of most interventions (more than 75%) was either weak or lost its relevance during implementation; major adjustments to the scope, implementation arrangements or technical solutions were required during implementation, but these were done with substantial delays which negatively affected the achievement of the intended outcomes and outputs.	Design of more than half of Bank interventions is marginally conducive to achieving projects' results. The original design of more than half of projects (was either weak or lost its relevance during implementation; major adjustments to the scope, implementation arrangements or technical solutions were required during implementation, but these were done with substantial delays which negatively affected the achievement of the intended outcomes and outputs.	Design of a significant number of projects (more than 25%) is somewhat conducive to achieving projects' results. The original design of a significant number of projects (more than 25%) was either weak or lost its relevance during implementation; major adjustments to the scope, implementation arrangements or technical solutions were required during implementation, but these were done with substantial delays which negatively affected the achievement of the intended outcomes and outputs.	Design of more than half of projects is largely conducive to achieving projects results. The remaining were moderately conducive to achieving projects results. More than half of projects have a solid original design and remained appropriate throughout implementation and did not require any or required minor adjustments to the scope, implementation arrangements or technical solutions were required to ensure outcomes' achievement.	Design of most (more than 75%) of projects is fully conducive to achieving projects' results and the design of the remaining 25% is largely conducive to achievement of projects results. The majority (more than 75%) of projects had a solid original design and remained appropriate throughout implementation and did not require any adjustments to the scope, implementation arrangements or technical solutions were required to ensure the achievement of the intended outcomes and outputs.	Design of all projects is fully conducive to achieving projects' results. The original design was solid and remained appropriate throughout implementation; no adjustments to the scope, implementation arrangements or technical solutions were required to ensure the achievement of the intended outcomes and outputs.
Effectiveness						

⁶⁹ Efficiency was also rated in the report although not explicitly addressed in the table. The same proportions as for sustainability have been used to rate efficiency criteria examined.

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Criteria /sub-criteria	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
Extent to which intermediate outcomes have been achieved (selected intermediate outcomes)	A few Bank interventions have achieved or are likely to achieve (plausibility) the intended intermediate outcomes based on the latest value of the outcome indicators and the analysis of other relevant exogenous risks/factors and assumptions.	Some Bank interventions have achieved or are likely to achieve (plausibility) the intended intermediate outcome based on the latest value of the outcome indicators and the analysis of other relevant exogenous risks/factors and assumptions.	Less than half of Bank interventions or more have achieved or are likely to achieve (plausibility) the intended intermediate outcome based on the latest value of the outcome indicators and the analysis of other relevant exogenous risks/factors and assumptions.	Half or more Bank interventions have achieved or are likely to achieve (plausibility) the intended intermediate outcome based on the latest value of the outcome indicators and the analysis of other relevant exogenous risks/factors and assumptions.	Most Bank interventions (more than 75%) have achieved or are likely to achieve (plausibility) the intended intermediate outcome based on the latest value of the outcome indicators and the analysis of other relevant exogenous risks/factors and assumptions.	All Bank interventions have achieved or are likely to achieve (plausibility) the intended intermediate outcome based on the latest value of the outcome indicators and the analysis of other relevant exogenous risks/factors and assumptions.
Extent to which Bank interventions have led to positive benefits for target beneficiaries	A few Bank interventions (less than 10%) have led to or are likely to lead to positive benefits for target beneficiaries.	Some Bank interventions (between 10% and 25%) have led to or are likely to lead to positive benefits for target beneficiaries.	Less than half of Bank interventions (but more than 25%) have led to or are likely to lead to positive benefits for target beneficiaries.	Half or more Bank interventions led to or are likely to lead to (plausibility) to lead to positive benefits for target beneficiaries.	Almost all Bank interventions led to or are likely to lead to (plausibility) to lead to positive benefits for target groups.	All projects led to or are likely to lead to significant positive benefits for target beneficiaries.
Cross-cutting Issues						
Extend to which Bank interventions have addressed Inclusiveness	A few Bank interventions (less than 10%) have properly addressed in their design and outcome measures: a) gender; b) regional disparity; and c) age groups.	Some Bank interventions (less than 25%) have properly addressed in their design and outcome measures: a) gender; b) regional disparity; and c) age groups.	Less than half of Bank interventions have properly addressed in their design and outcome measures: a) gender; b) regional disparity; and c) age groups.	Half or more Bank interventions have properly addressed in their design and outcome measures: a) gender; b) regional disparity; and c) age groups.	Most Bank interventions (75% or more) have properly addressed in their design and outcome measures: a) gender; b) regional disparity; and c) age groups.	All Bank interventions have properly addressed in their design and outcome measures: a) gender; b) regional disparity; and c) age groups.
Extent to which Bank interventions have considered environmental sustainability and support to transition to green growth	A few Bank interventions (less than 10%) have: a) considered the risks of environmental impact; b) environmental assessments; and c) addressed environmental sustainability in their outcome measures.	Some Bank interventions (less than 25 %) have: a) considered the risks of environmental impact; b) environmental assessments; and c) addressed environmental sustainability in their outcome measures.	Less than half of A few Bank interventions have: a) considered the risks of environmental impact; b) environmental assessments; and c) addressed environmental sustainability in their outcome measures.	Half or more of Bank interventions have: a) considered the risks of environmental impact; b) environmental assessments; and c) addressed environmental sustainability in their outcome measures.	Most Bank interventions (75% or more) have: a) considered the risks of environmental impact; b) environmental assessments; and c) addressed environmental sustainability in their outcome measures.	All Bank interventions have: a) considered the risks of environmental impact; b) environmental assessments; and c) addressed environmental sustainability in their outcome measures.
Sustainability						
Technical Soundness	It is highly likely that the achievement of the results of the vast majority of interventions will be adversely affected by	It is likely that the achievement of the results of most projects will be adversely affected by factors	It is likely that the achievement of results of half of the projects will be adversely affected by	It is unlikely that the achievement of the results of most projects will be adversely affected by	It is unlikely that the achievement of the results of the vast majority of projects will be adversely affected by factors related to the	It is highly unlikely that the achievement of the results of all projects (75% or more) will be adversely affected by factors related

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Criteria /sub-criteria	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
	factors related to the technical design of the interventions	related to the technical design of the project.	factors related to the technical design of the project.	factors related to the technical design of the project.	technical design of the project.	to the technical design of the project.
Financial and Economic Viability	Most Bank interventions (75% or more) have not put in place any mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability, and the flow of benefits associated with the project are not expected to continue after completion.	Half of Bank interventions or less have a few mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability, but they are not expected to be sufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion.	Most Bank interventions (75% or more) have a few mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability, but they are not expected to be sufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion.	Most Bank interventions (75% or more) and more have sufficient mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability that are deemed sufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion.	Almost all Bank interventions have in place sufficient mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability that are deemed sufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion.	Most projects (75% or more) have in place robust mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability that are very likely to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion.
Institutional sustainability and strengthening of capacities	Most Bank interventions (75% or more) did not contribute to strengthening institutional capacities in the concerned sector / area of intervention and or parallel systems had to be used intensively. Country systems and capacities are very weak and not able to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion.	Half of Bank interventions or more did not contribute to strengthening institutional capacities in the concerned sector / area of intervention and/or parallel systems had to be used. Country systems and capacities remain weak and are deemed insufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion.	A significant number of Bank interventions did not contribute to strengthening institutional capacities in the concerned sector / area of intervention and/or parallel systems had to be used. Country systems and capacities remain somewhat weak and are deemed insufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion.	Most Bank interventions (75% or more) contributed to strengthening institutional capacities in the concerned sector / area of intervention. Country systems and capacities are good and deemed sufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the projects after completion.	Almost all Bank interventions contributed to strengthening institutional capacities in the concerned sector / area of intervention. Country systems and capacities are very good and deemed sufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the projects after completion.	Most Bank interventions (75% or more) were critical in building or strengthening institutional capacities in the concerned sector / area of intervention. Country systems and capacities are excellent and sufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion.

Annex E: Data tables**Table A3. Lines of evidence for relevance**

Lines of evidence	U-	MU-	MS+	S+	U-	MU-	MS+	S+
	% in number				% in volume			
CFRs: Alignment	0%	7%	93%	57%				
CFRs: Project focus	0%	0%	100%	93%				
CFRs: Project design	14%	71%	29%	14%				
PRAs: Overall Relevance	0%	6%	94%	67%	0%	2%	98%	66%
PRAs: Overall Relevance (ADB/Blend)	0%	3%	97%	73%	0%	0%	100%	62%
PRAs: Overall Relevance (ADF)	0%	8%	92%	63%	0%	8%	92%	75%
PRAs: Overall Relevance (Public sector)	0%	7%	93%	68%	0%	3%	97%	65%
PRAs: Overall Relevance (Private sector)	0%	3%	97%	61%	0%	0%	100%	71%
PRAs: Overall Relevance (Transition states)	0%	18%	82%	48%	0%	20%	80%	61%
PRAs: Overall Relevance (LIC)	0%	5%	95%	71%	0%	5%	95%	78%
PRAs: Overall Relevance (MIC)	0%	0%	100%	72%	0%	0%	100%	61%
PRAs: Overall Relevance (Budget support)	0%	5%	95%	78%	0%	3%	97%	80%
PRAs: Overall Relevance (Other than budget support)	0%	6%	94%	63%	0%	2%	98%	58%
PRAs: Relevance of project's objectives	0%	0%	100%	94%	0%	0%	100%	96%
PRAs: Relevance of project's design	5%	24%	76%	37%	1%	23%	77%	43%
Triangulation								
QaE CSP ⁷⁰ : Alignment of Bank strategy with government development plans and priorities	2%	7%	93%	55%				

⁷⁰ African Development Bank Group, January 2015, Strategizing for the "Africa We Want": An Independent Evaluation of the Quality at Entry of Country and Regional Integration Strategies, Summary Report.

Table A4. Lines of evidence for effectiveness

Lines of evidence	U-	MU-	MS+	S+	U-	MU-	MS+	S+
	% in number				% in volume			
PRAs: Overall Effectiveness	5%	18%	82%	36%	2%	15%	85%	36%
PRAs: Overall Effectiveness (ADB/Blend)	5%	18%	82%	42%	2%	15%	85%	33%
PRAs: Overall Effectiveness (ADF)	5%	19%	81%	31%	1%	15%	85%	41%
PRAs: Overall Effectiveness (Public sector)	4%	16%	84%	37%	0%	11%	89%	40%
PRAs: Overall Effectiveness (Private sector)	9%	27%	73%	30%	6%	28%	72%	20%
PRAs: Overall Effectiveness (Transition states)	0%	12%	88%	19%	0%	9%	91%	28%
PRAs: Overall Effectiveness (LIC)	6%	19%	81%	40%	1%	15%	85%	45%
PRAs: Overall Effectiveness (MIC)	5%	21%	79%	40%	2%	15%	85%	33%
PRAs: Overall Effectiveness (Budget support)	0%	15%	85%	35%	0%	17%	83%	48%
PRAs: Overall Effectiveness (Other than budget support)	6%	20%	80%	36%	3%	14%	86%	28%
PRAs: Outputs Achievement	4%	17%	83%	48%	2%	13%	87%	49%
PRAs: Outcomes Achievement	8%	27%	73%	28%	4%	25%	75%	27%

Table A5. Lines of evidence for sustainability

Lines of evidence	U-	MU-	MS+	S+	U-	MU-	MS+	S+
	% in number				% in volume			
PRAs: Overall Sustainability	5%	26%	74%	33%	1%	18%	82%	34%
PRAs: Overall Sustainability (ADB/Blend)	3%	16%	84%	52%	0%	16%	84%	36%
PRAs: Overall Sustainability (ADF)	6%	32%	68%	22%	3%	22%	78%	30%
PRAs: Overall Sustainability (Public sector)	5%	28%	72%	30%	1%	21%	79%	32%
PRAs: Overall Sustainability (Private sector)	3%	17%	83%	50%	0%	9%	91%	41%
PRAs: Overall Sustainability (Transition states)	18%	58%	42%	6%	16%	57%	43%	6%
PRAs: Overall Sustainability (LIC)	3%	20%	80%	34%	0%	15%	85%	37%
PRAs: Overall Sustainability (MIC)	0%	14%	86%	48%	0%	17%	83%	35%
PRAs: Overall Sustainability (Budget support)	2%	27%	73%	39%	0%	32%	68%	43%
PRAs: Overall Sustainability (Other than budget support)	6%	26%	74%	31%	1%	10%	90%	29%
PRAs: Technical Soundness (public sector)	5%	24%	76%	47%	1%	9%	91%	49%
PRAs: Financial and Economic Viability (public sector)	18%	41%	59%	28%	8%	20%	80%	30%
PRAs: Institutional sustainability and strengthening of capacities (public sector)	8%	32%	68%	41%	7%	23%	77%	44%
PRAs: Environment and Social sustainability	5%	20%	80%	45%	23%	32%	68%	38%
PRAs: Business success (private sector)	6%	19%	81%	56%	2%	25%	75%	44%

Table A6. Lines of evidence for efficiency

Lines of evidence	U-	MU-	MS+	S+	U-	MU-	MS+	S+
	% in number				% in volume			
PRAs: Overall Efficiency	8%	33%	67%	28%	18%	33%	67%	36%
PRAs: Overall Efficiency (ADB/Blend)	6%	25%	75%	35%	24%	38%	62%	34%
PRAs: Overall Efficiency (ADF)	10%	39%	61%	24%	4%	22%	78%	41%
PRAs: Overall Efficiency (Public sector)	9%	35%	65%	29%	21%	31%	69%	39%
PRAs: Overall Efficiency (Private sector)	6%	25%	75%	28%	7%	38%	62%	25%
PRAs: Overall Efficiency (Transition states)	21%	52%	48%	18%	14%	53%	47%	13%
PRAs: Overall Efficiency (LIC)	7%	32%	68%	28%	2%	19%	81%	47%
PRAs: Overall Efficiency (MIC)	3%	24%	76%	34%	24%	39%	61%	33%
PRAs: Overall Efficiency (Budget support)	3%	5%	95%	62%	0%	4%	96%	64%
PRAs: Overall Efficiency (Other than budget support)	10%	42%	58%	18%	28%	49%	51%	20%
PRAs: Cost-Benefit Analysis (public sector)	3%	7%	93%	78%	1%	2%	98%	91%
PRAs: Cost-Effectiveness (public sector)	10%	31%	69%	39%	5%	47%	53%	39%
PRAs: Timeliness	39%	55%	45%	33%	38%	48%	52%	40%
PRAs: Timeliness (public sector)	43%	60%	40%	30%	41%	48%	52%	42%
PRAs: Timeliness (private sector)	25%	37%	63%	47%	27%	47%	53%	26%
PRAs: Implementation progress (public sector)	6%	21%	79%	44%	22%	25%	75%	49%
PRAs: Bank investment profitability (private sector)	3%	9%	91%	72%	0%	3%	97%	65%
PRAs: Supervision and administration (private sector)	16%	48%	52%	16%	21%	60%	40%	7%

Table A7. Efficiency: Average time at project start up

	Average month	Number of projects*	% (no project)
Approval to signature	3.2	167	100.0
Delay	10.9	22	13.2
On time	2.0	145	86.8
Signature to effectiveness	4.2	166	100.0
Delay	10.8	45	27.1
On time	1.8	121	72.9
Effectiveness to first disbursement	6.4	166	100.0
Delay	10.4	98	59.0
On time	0.7	68	41.0

Source: SAP project profile report

*six months is the benchmark for approval to signature and signature to effectiveness and two months from effectiveness to first disbursement.

Table A.8 Lines of evidence for cross-cutting themes

Lines of evidence	%
Analysis of PRAs: % of projects mention gender	59%
Analysis of PRAs: regional disparities	46%
Analysis of PRAs: % of projects whose outcome measures mention age	31%
Analysis of PRAs: % of Category I and II projects having appropriately completed environmental assessments	100%
Triangulation	
QaE CSP: Alignment with Bank Group corporate strategic priorities on inclusive growth (MS+)	69%
QaE CSP: Alignment with Bank Group corporate strategic priorities on green growth (MS+)	100%

Table A9. Lines of evidence for knowledge and advisory services

Lines of evidence	U-	MU-	MS+	S+
CFRs: Knowledge and strategic advice	7%	50%	50%	21%
Triangulation				
QaE CSP: Analysis of Bank positioning and comparative advantage: choice of supporting ESW	11%	53%	47%	4%
ESW evaluation report ⁷¹ (qualitative data)				
Client assessment of the African Development Bank ⁷² (qualitative data)				

Table A10. Lines of evidence for partnerships

Lines of evidence	U-	MU-	MS+	S+
CFRs: Partnership and coordination	0%	43%	57%	7%
Triangulation				
QaE CSP: Cooperation/coordination frameworks with other development partners (including non-traditional) and alignment with their priorities	2%	14%	86%	27%

Table A11. Lines of evidence for leverage

Lines of evidence	U-	MU-	MS+	S+
CFRs: Leverage	14%	50%	50%	7%
Analysis of PRAs (no rating): Proportion of projects described as including leveraging: 48%				

Table A12. Lines of evidence for selectivity

Lines of evidence	U-	MU-	MS+	S+
CFRs: Strategic Focus	0%	36%	64%	21%
Triangulation				
QaE CSP: Analysis of Bank positioning and comparative advantage: selectivity and choice of strategic pillars	0%	16%	84%	27%
QaE CSP: Analysis of Bank positioning and comparative advantage: comparative advantage in the specific country context	5%	24%	76%	36%
QaE CSP: Analysis of Bank positioning and comparative advantage: choice of interventions by sector and selection of projects	4%	45%	55%	11%

⁷¹ African Development Bank Group, 2013, Review of the African Development Bank's Economic and Sector Work (2005–2010).

⁷² African Development Bank Group, March 2012, The Preferred Partner? A client assessment of the African Development Bank.

Table A13. Lines of evidence for adaptation and innovation

Lines of evidence	U-	MU-	MS+	S+
CFRs: Adapted solutions	0%	36%	64%	21%
Triangulation				
QaE CSP: Attention to capacity building measures	7%	56%	44%	4%
QaE CSP: Support to building citizens' capacity (particularly for FS)	23%	69%	31%	8%

Table A14. Lines of evidence for MfDR

Lines of evidence	U-	MU-	MS+	S+
CFRs: Managing for results & learning	7%	43%	57%	0%
CFRs: Supervision	0%	50%	50%	21%
CFRs: Project design	14%	71%	29%	14%
Triangulation				
QaE CSP: Appropriateness and realism of the results-based framework	11%	53%	47%	9%
QaE CSP: Comprehensiveness and appropriateness of the risk assessment and proposed mitigating measures	7%	36%	64%	9%
QaE CSP: Monitoring/evaluation arrangements	11%	40%	60%	7%
QaE CSP: Improving the country's M&E system	13%	51%	49%	11%

Annex F: Implementation information

Background documents

- Making A Difference In Africa: A Comprehensive Evaluation of the Bank's Development Results. Approach Paper. IDEV (then OPEV) March 2014
- Project Performance Assessment for Public Sector Project - Rating Guidance Note. IDEV June 2015
- Country template (CFR) - Guidance Note. IDEV September 2015
- Project Results Assessment for Private Sector Projects - Rating Guidance Note. IDEV October 2015
- Quality Assurance for PRAs. IDEV May 2016
- Quality Assurance for the Country Factors Reviews. IDEV May 2016
- Project Results Assessments (169 projects)
- Country factors reviews (14 countries)
- Making a Difference in Africa: Comprehensive Evaluation of Development Results. Terms of Reference, Synthesis of Building Blocks. IDEV April 2016
- Internal background paper: A review of the portfolio or project results assessments for the CEDR: Coverage, trends and features. IDEV July 2016
- Internal background paper: A qualitative comparative analysis of the bank's theory of change for the CEDR: Evaluating factors thought to contribute to AfDB's performance at country level. IDEV May 2016
- The preferred partner? A client assessment of the African Development Bank. African Development Bank Group, 2012
- Review of the African Development Bank's Economic and Sector Work (2005–2010). Operations Evaluation Department 2013
- Durabilité des projets routiers financés par la BAD : Temps pour des solutions innovatrices ? Département de l'évaluation des opérations, Septembre 2013
- Operational Procurement Policies and Practices of the African Development Bank: An Independent Evaluation. Summary Report. IDEV August 2014
- Transport in Africa: The African Development Bank's Intervention and Results for the Last Decade. Summary Evaluation Report. IDEV December 2014
- Strategizing for the "Africa We Want": An Independent Evaluation of the Quality at Entry of Country and Regional Integration Strategies. Summary Report. IDEV January 2015
- Results of the quality at entry evaluations for 12 countries including South Africa (2013–2017), Burundi (2012–2016), Cameroon (2010–2014), Democratic Republic of Congo (2008–2017), Ethiopia (2011–2015), Ghana (2012–2016), Morocco (2012–2016), Nigeria (2012), Tanzania (2011–2015), Togo (2009–2010), Tunisia (2014–2015), Zambia (not stated).
- Independent Evaluation of General Capital Increase-VI and African Development Fund 12 and 13 Commitments: Overarching Review, Summary Report. IDEV April 2015
- Independent Evaluation of Administrative Budget Management of The Bank Group, Summary Report. IDEV August 2015
- Evaluation of Bank Group Assistance to Small and Medium Enterprise (2006–2013), IDEV September 2015
- Evaluation of the African Development Bank's Assistance in the Energy Sector: Summary Report. IDEV (draft) April 2016

In addition, all building block evaluations relied on extensive documentary reviews. More information is available upon demand.

Evaluation teams

Country	IDEV Team	Consultants
Burundi	Herimandimby Razafindramanana, Chief Evaluation Officer Bansé Tonssour Clément, Evaluation Officer Eglantine Marcelin, Junior Consultant	Aide à la Décision Economique (ADE), team led by Mary van Overbeke
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Dem Rep Congo	Herimandimby Razafindramanana, Chief Evaluation Officer Mabarakissa Diomandé, Evaluation Officer Bansé Tonssour Clément, Evaluation Officer Eglantine Marcelin, Junior Consultant junior	Aide à la Décision Economique (ADE), team led by Jérôme Coste
Ethiopia	Girma Earo Kumbi, Principal Evaluation Officer Samer Hachem, Division Manager	Economisti Associati, team led by Enrico Giannotti, supported by Mauro Podano
Ghana	Madhusoodhanan Mampuzhasseril, Principal Evaluation Officer Erika MacLaughlin, Consultant Latefa Camara, Junior Consultant	BKP Development & Economisti Associati, team led by Derk Bienen and Enrico Giannotti, supported by Daniel Kwagbenu (Researcher/Senior Local Expert), Timothée Picarello (Evaluation Expert), Emmanuel Baudelet (Evaluation Expert), and Valentin Gerold (Evaluation Expert)
Morocco	Rafika Amira, Division Manager Samson Houetohossou, Research Assistant Boubacar Ly, Consultant	Mohamed Hedi MANAI, Senior Consultant Universalia, team led by Ali Anwer and Marie-Helene Adrien, supported by Idir Kendel, Mustapha Malki and Driss Benjelloun
Mozambique	Oswald Agbadome, Senior Evaluation Officer Carla Silva, Consultant Latefa Camara, Junior Consultant	E&Y Mozambique, team led by Hermenegildo Come
Multinational	Eneas Gakusi, Chief Evaluation Officer Bilal Bagayoko, Research Assistant John Mbu, Junior Consultant	
Nigeria	Khaled Samir Hussein, Principal Evaluation Officer Boubacar Ly, Consultant Eleonora Fornai, Junior Consultant	Ecorys Consulting, team led by Thijs Viertelhuizen, supported by Alessandro Rammella Pezza, Albert de Groot, Erik Klaassens, Obi Ugochuku
Senegal	Debazou Yantio, Consultant Mabarakissa Diomandé, Chargée d'évaluation Harcel Nana, Junior Consultant Wiem Bekir, Short term staff	Cynthia Bleu-Lainé (Energy), Amadou Wade Diagne (Social), Alioune Diallo (W&S), Mame Birame Diouf (Agriculture), Alain Rakotomavo (Transport) and Moctar Sow (Governance).
South Africa	Penelope Jackson, Chief Evaluation Officer Akua Arthur-Kissi, Evaluation Officer	Ecorys Consulting, team led by Andrew Danino, supported by Leon DeGraaf (Data Analyst), Mickael Modijefsky (Transport Expert), Thijs Viertelhuizen (Evaluation Expert, Quality assurance reviewer), and Ivo Gijsberts (Quality assurance reviewer)
Tanzania	Girma Earo Kumbi, Principal Evaluation Officer Samer Hachem, Division Manager	Economisti Associati, team led by Tommaso Grassi, supported by Mauro Podano
Togo	Herimandimby Razafindramanana, Chief Evaluation Officer Bansé Tonssour Clément, Evaluation Officer Eglantine Marcelin, Junior Consultant	Aide à la Décision Economique (ADE) team led by Mary van Overbeke
Tunisia	Rafika Amira, Division Manager Samson Houetohossou, Research Assistant Boubacar Ly, Consultant	Mohamed Hedi MANAI, Senior Consultant IDEA Consult, team led by Ali Chebbi and Chokri Ben Makhoul, supported by Mokhtar Metoui, Emel Ben M'Rad and Rafik Koubaa
Zambia	Madhusoodhanan Mampuzhasseril, Principal Evaluation Officer Erika MacLaughlin, Consultant Latefa Camara, Junior Consultant	AGRER, team led by Paolo Liebl Von Schirach (Private sector and Finance Specialist), supported by Vikramdityasing Bissoonauthsing (Research Officer), Habtom Asmelash (Agriculture Sector specialist), Bernd Drechsler (Governance, Multisector, Education, Social (and Gender) Sector specialist), John Murphy (Transport and Water & Sanitation Sector specialist), and Charles Haanyika (Power Sector specialist)

Number of institutions/persons interviewed

Country	Government and State-owned Institutions	Other national stakeholders (e.g. private sector, CSOs)	Development partners	AfDB staff	Total
Burundi	23	13	11	6	53
Cameroon	90	20	10	11	131
Dem Rep Congo	91	27	25	11	154
Ethiopia	56	10	19	11	96
Ghana	134	85	16	14	249
Morocco	89	10	6	10	115
Mozambique	15	8	2	10	35
Nigeria	16	26	0	12	54
Senegal	252	32	1	25	310
South Africa	72	24	20	22	116
Tanzania	121	18	11	14	164
Togo	73	11	18	14	116
Tunisia	59	21	6	17	103
Zambia	71	68	17	19	174

Annex G: Rating scale used in PRAs

Criteria /sub-criteria	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
Relevance						
Relevance of project objectives	It is demonstrated that the project objectives have severe shortcomings in their alignment with the following: i) the Bank's CSP, ii) applicable Bank sector strategies, iii) the country's development strategies, and iv) beneficiary needs.	It is demonstrated that the project objectives have major shortcomings in their alignment with two of the following: i) the Bank's CSP, ii) applicable Bank sector strategies, iii) the country's development strategies, and iv) beneficiary needs.	It is demonstrated that the project objectives have significant shortcomings in their alignment with one of the following: i) the Bank's CSP, ii) applicable Bank sector strategies, iii) the country's development strategies, and iv) beneficiary needs.	It is demonstrated that the project objectives have moderate shortcomings in their alignment with: i) the Bank's CSP, ii) applicable Bank sector strategies, iii) the country's development strategies, and iv) beneficiary needs	It is demonstrated that the project objectives have minor shortcomings in their alignment with: i) the Bank's CSP, ii) applicable Bank sector strategies, iii) the country's development strategies, and iv) beneficiary needs	It is demonstrated that the project objectives have no shortcoming in their alignment with: i) the Bank's CSP, ii) applicable Bank sector strategies, iii) the country's development strategies, and iv) beneficiary needs.
Relevance of project design to achieve those objective (public sector)	The project design was fully not conducive to achieving the project results. The original design was weak and remained irrelevant during implementation. Major adjustments to the scope, implementation arrangements or technical solutions were required during implementation, but these were not done which negatively affected the achievement of the intended outcomes and outputs.	From approval to closure, the design was marginally conducive to achieving the project results. The original design was weak and remained irrelevant. Major adjustments to the scope, implementation arrangements or technical solutions were required during implementation, but these were not done which negatively affected the achievement of the intended outcomes and outputs.	The design was somewhat conducive to achieving the project results. The original design was either weak or lost its relevance during implementation; major adjustments to the scope, implementation arrangements or technical solutions were required during implementation, but these were done with substantial delays which negatively affected the achievement of the intended outcomes and outputs.	The project design was moderately conducive to achieving the project results. The original design was to some extent, sound and remained appropriate throughout implementation; adjustments to the scope, minor implementation arrangements or technical solutions were required and they were carried out in a timely manner to ensure the achievement of the intended outcomes and outputs.	The project design was largely conducive to achieving the project results. The original design was solid and remained appropriate throughout implementation; minor adjustments to the scope, implementation arrangements or technical solutions were required to ensure the achievement of the intended outcomes and outputs.	The project design was fully conducive to achieving the project results. The original design was solid and remained appropriate throughout implementation; no adjustments to the scope, implementation arrangements or technical solutions were required to ensure the achievement of the intended outcomes and outputs.

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Criteria /sub-criteria	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
Relevance of project design to achieve those objective (private sector)	The Bank severely fell short of meetings its prescribed operational procedures and quality standards across all aspects of its work on the project and associated investment. As a direct consequence of such shortfall(s), there has been a material, detrimental effect on the project's development quality.	The Bank substantially fell short of meetings its prescribed operational procedures and quality standards across most aspects of its work on the project and associated investment. As a direct consequence of such shortfall(s), there has been a material, detrimental effect on the project's development quality.	The Bank marginally fell short of meeting its prescribed operational procedures and quality standards across some aspects of its work on the project and associated investment. However, such shortfall(s) have not had a material effect on the project's development quality.	The Bank moderately met its prescribed operational procedures and quality standards across all aspects of its work on the project and associated investment.	The Bank materially met its prescribed operational procedures and quality standards across all aspects of its work on the project and associated investment.	The Bank fully met its prescribed operational procedures and quality standards. Superior project design quality can be directly and unambiguously attributed to the Bank's front-end work.
Effectiveness						
Achievement of outputs	Based on the output execution ratio less than 35% of the project output targets were reached or are considered on track to be reached by the end of the project. Poor performance jeopardized the achievement of most expected outcomes and the possibility of stopping or suspending the project was considered.	Based on the output execution ratio between 35% and 49% of the project output targets were reached or are considered on track to be reached by the end of the project. Corrective actions were not implemented and closely monitored for off track indicators. Poor performance jeopardized the achievement of one or more outcomes of the project.	Based on the output execution ratio between 50% and 74% of the project output targets were reached or are considered on track to be reached by the end of the project. Corrective actions for off track indicators were not implemented in a timely manner to ensure that the end of project targets could be achieved.	Based on the output execution ratio between 75% and 89% of the project output targets were reached or are considered on track to be reached by the end of the project. Corrective actions for off track indicators were implemented in a timely manner to ensure that the end of project targets could be achieved in accordance with quality standards.	Based on the output execution ratio between 90% and 99% of the project output targets were reached or are considered on track to be reached by the end of the project. Corrective actions for off track indicators were implemented in a timely manner to ensure that the end of project targets could be achieved in accordance with quality standards.	Based on the output execution ratio all the project output targets were reached or are considered on track to be reached by the end of the project in accordance with quality standards.
Achievement of outcomes (public sector)	Taking into account the latest value of the outcome indicators and the analysis of other relevant exogenous risks/factors and	Taking into account the latest value of the outcome indicators and the analysis of other relevant exogenous	Taking into account the latest value of the outcome indicators and the analysis of other relevant	Taking into account the latest value of the outcome indicators and the analysis of other relevant	Taking into account the latest value of the outcome indicators and the analysis of other relevant exogenous risks/factors and	Taking into account the latest value of the outcome indicators and the analysis of other relevant exogenous risks/factors

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Criteria /sub-criteria	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
	assumptions, it is plausible to expect that very few (<5%) of the intended project outcomes were achieved or are likely to be achieved.	risks/factors and assumptions, it is plausible to expect that few (5-24%) intended project outcomes were achieved or are likely to be achieved.	exogenous risks/factors and assumptions, it is plausible to expect that few (25-49%) intended project outcomes were achieved or are likely to be achieved.	exogenous risks/factors and assumptions, it is plausible to expect that a substantial (50%-74%) intended project outcomes were achieved or are likely to be achieved.	assumptions, it is plausible to expect that most (75%) intended project outcomes were achieved or are likely to be achieved.	and assumptions, it is plausible to expect that all intended project outcomes were achieved or are likely to be achieved.
Achievement of outcomes (private sector) - Economic benefits	Both: (i) the project has largely failed to reach targeted groups of sub-borrower; and (ii) there is direct evidence (from sub-portfolio data) that most sub-borrowers are not economically viable, or indirect evidence (from market data) that market sectors supported by the project and/or more generally by the financial intermediary are weak economic contributors to society.	Either: (i) the project has largely failed to reach targeted groups of sub-borrower; or (ii) there is direct evidence (from sub-portfolio data) that most sub-borrowers are not economically viable, or indirect evidence (from market data) that market sectors supported by the project and/or more generally by the financial intermediary are weak economic contributors to society.	The project has largely failed to reach targeted groups of sub-borrower; however, there is evidence that sub-projects are economically viable.	Both: (i) the project has succeeded in reaching targeted groups of sub-borrower; but (ii) there is no evidence that sub-borrowers do not rely on economic distortions to maintain their commercial viability.	Both: (i) the project has succeeded in reaching targeted groups of sub-borrower; and (ii) there is direct evidence (from sub-portfolio data) that sub-borrowers are economically viable, or indirect evidence (from market data) that market sectors supported by the project and/or more generally by the financial intermediary are economically viable and do not rely on economic distortions to maintain their commercial viability.	Both: (i) the project has succeeded in reaching targeted groups of sub-borrowers; and (ii) there is direct evidence (from sub-portfolio data) that sub-borrowers have made strong economic contributions, or indirect evidence (from market data) that market sectors supported by the project and/or more generally by the financial intermediary are major economic contributors to society.
Achievement of outcomes (private sector) - Contribution to Private Sector Development	The project had substantial negative effects in respect of the Bank's mandate objectives of promoting economic development and poverty reduction by furthering private sector development or the development of efficient financial / capital markets, and these impacts are likely to be widespread, of long duration, or both.	The project had mainly negative effects in respect of the Bank's mandate objectives of promoting economic development and poverty reduction by furthering private sector development or the development of efficient financial / capital markets, but these negative effects are not expected to be of long	The project made no discernable contribution, either positive or negative as supported by available evidence.	The project had: (a) demonstrable positive effects consistent with the Bank's mandate objectives of promoting economic development and poverty reduction by furthering private sector development or the development of efficient financial / capital markets; However, there is lack	The project had: (a) demonstrable effects consistent with the Bank's mandate objectives of promoting economic development and poverty reduction by furthering private sector development or the development of efficient financial / capital markets; and (b) a clear preponderance of sustainable positive impacts in this respect.	Considering its size, the project had: (a) substantial positive effects consistent with the Bank's mandate objectives of promoting economic development and poverty reduction by furthering the country's private sector development or the development of efficient financial / capital markets; and (b) no negative impacts in this respect.

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Criteria /sub-criteria	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
		duration or broad applicability.		of evidence on the sustainability of such effects.		
Efficiency						
Cost-Benefit Analysis - Economic Performance (public sector)	If EIRR is less than 40 % of the opportunity cost of capital.	If (40% of the opportunity cost of capital \leq EIRR < 60% of the opportunity cost of capital).	If (60% of the opportunity cost of capital \leq EIRR < 80% of the opportunity cost of capital).	If (80% of the opportunity cost of capital \leq EIRR < 90% of the opportunity cost of capital).	If (90% of the opportunity cost of capital \leq EIRR < the opportunity cost of capital)	If EIRR is equal or above the opportunity cost of capital.
Cost-Benefit Analysis - Financial Performance public sector)	If FIRR < 0.7 x WACC.	If (0.7 x WCC \leq FIRR < 0.85 x WACC)	If (0.85 x WCC \leq FIRR < WACC)	If (WCC \leq FIRR < 1.1 x WACC)	If (1.1 x WCC \leq FIRR < 1.25 x WACC)	If (FIRR \geq 1.25 x WACC).
Timeliness	The ratio of planned implementation time (as per PAR) from the date of effectiveness and actual project implementation time from the date of effectiveness is expected to be <0.75.	The ratio of planned implementation time (as per PAR) from the date of effectiveness and actual implementation time from the date of effectiveness is expected to be <0.75 and \geq 0.80.	The ratio of planned implementation time (as per PAR) from the date of effectiveness and actual implementation time from the date of effectiveness is expected to be <0.90 and \geq 0.80.	The ratio of planned implementation time (as per PAR) from the date of effectiveness and actual implementation time from the date of effectiveness is expected to be <1 and \geq 0.90.	The ratio of planned implementation time (as per PAR) and actual implementation time from the date of effectiveness is expected to be 1.	The ratio of planned implementation time (as per PAR) and actual implementation time from the date of effectiveness is expected to be >1.
Implementation progress (public sector)	The average rating of applicable IP criteria ratings is comprised between 1.0 and 1.49. Most dimensions of implementation processes have not been satisfactory which has jeopardized the achievement of project results.	The average rating of applicable IP criteria ratings is comprised between 1.5 and 1.95. Several dimensions of implementation processes have not been satisfactory which has jeopardized the achievement of some project results.	The average rating of applicable IP criteria ratings is comprised between 2 and 2.49. The implementation processes has for the most part been satisfactory and has for the most part lead to the anticipated results.	The average rating of applicable IP criteria ratings is comprised between 2.5 and 2.95. The implementation processes has for the most part been satisfactory and has for the most part lead to the anticipated results.	The average rating of applicable IP criteria ratings is comprised between 3 and 3.49. The implementation processes have for the most part been highly satisfactory and has to lead to the anticipated results.	The average rating of applicable IP criteria ratings is comprised between 3.5 and 4. The implementation processes have for the most part been highly satisfactory and has to lead to the anticipated results.
Bank Investment Profitability (private sector)	Either: (a) the Bank has incurred loss of loan principal or carries specific loss reserves against the loan; or (b) the loan is in	Either: (a) the loan's net profit contribution falls short of the Bank's target return on capital employed or overall	Either: (a) the loan's net profit contribution falls short of the Bank's target return on capital employed	Either: (a) the loan's net profit contribution is just sufficient in relation to the Bank's target return on	Either: (a) the loan's net profit contribution is superior in relation to the Bank's target return on capital employed or overall profitability objectives,	By virtue of the size of investment/loan, its performance or the presence of income-enhancement features,

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Criteria /sub-criteria	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
	non-accrual status or has been rescheduled such that the Bank does not expect to recover its full funding cost, or the Bank has established specific loss reserves, or the loan has been or is expected to be wholly or partially converted to equity as a consequence of its non-performing status.	profitability objectives, but there is no expected loss of principal, or (b) the Bank carries modest, non-specific loss reserves (for example due to country conditions) that are not directly related to the loan.	or overall profitability objectives, but there is no expected loss of loan principal, or (b) the loan will not yield the full margin return originally expected by virtue of rescheduling, margin reduction or other concession, but no loss of principal is expected.	capital employed or overall profitability objectives, or (b) the loan is expected to be paid, or has been paid, as scheduled (or rescheduled) or prepaid, with no loss of capital, and has yielded the full margin return originally expected.	or (b) the loan is expected to be paid, or has been paid, as scheduled and has yielded the full margin return originally expected during appraisal.	either: (a) the investment/loan net profit contribution exceeds the Bank's target return on capital employed or overall profitability objectives by a factor of 1.25x, or (b) the loan is expected to be paid, or has been paid, as scheduled, and will yield a premium return in comparison to other Bank loans of a similar credit risk
Supervision and Administration (private sector)	The Bank fell short of its prescribed operational procedures and quality standards in one or more aspects of its monitoring and supervision of the project and associated investment. As a direct consequence of such shortfall(s), there has been a material, detrimental effect on the project's development quality and/or Bank investment profitability.	The Bank fell short of its prescribed operational procedures and quality standards in more than one aspects of its monitoring and supervision of the project and associated investment. However, such shortfall(s) have not had a material effect on the project's development quality and/or Bank investment profitability.	The Bank fell short of its prescribed operational procedures and quality standards in one of its monitoring and supervision of the project and associated investment. However, such shortfall(s) have not had a material effect on the project's development quality and/or Bank investment profitability.	The Bank should have materially met its prescribed operational procedures and quality standards in its monitoring and supervision of the project and associated investment, following commitment. However, the bank was not kept sufficiently informed to react in a timely manner to any material change in the project and/or company's performance.	The Bank should have materially met its prescribed operational procedures and quality standards in its monitoring and supervision of the project and associated investment, following commitment. The Bank should have kept itself sufficiently informed to react in a timely manner to any material change in the project and/or company's performance (or any event or circumstance that could be the basis for a claim under a Bank's guarantee), and have taken timely action where needed.	The Bank should have exceeded its prescribed operational procedures such that it has established a new quality standard for the monitoring and supervision of projects and their associated investments. Alternatively, superior project development quality and/or Bank investment profitability can be directly and unambiguously attributed to the Bank's execution of its monitoring and supervision responsibilities
Sustainability						
Technical Soundness (public sector)	There is a high likelihood that factors related to the technical design of the program or project may	There is a substantial likelihood that factors related to the technical design of the program or	There is a moderately substantial likelihood that factors related to the technical design of	There is a moderate likelihood that factors related to the technical design of	There is a likelihood that factors related to the technical design of the program or project may	There is a low likelihood that the achievement of the project results is adversely affected by factors related

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Criteria /sub-criteria	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
	severely impact the achievement of the project results. Such factors could include the following: the project is of high technical complexity; it was not informed by strong analytical work; it has a large number of components and subcomponents; the client or the Bank has no experience designing similar operations; the design incorporates or relies on untested or unfamiliar technologies and processes; and making adjustments to the operation's design would be very difficult and costly. It may also be the case that the project's economic benefits are largely dependent on factors project activities may not be realistic or cannot be properly calibrated.	project may adversely impact the achievement of the project results. Such factors could include the following: the project is technically complex; it was informed by limited analytical work; it has several components and subcomponents; the client or the Bank has limited experience with similar operations; and the design incorporates or relies on relatively new technologies and processes, which do not yet have a track record. It may also be the case that the project's economic benefits significantly depend on external factors that cannot be controlled through the operational design.	the program or project may adversely impact the achievement of the project results. Such factors could include the following: the project is technically complex; it was informed by limited analytical work; it has several components and subcomponents; the client or the Bank has limited experience with similar operations; and the design incorporates or relies on relatively new technologies and processes, which do not yet have a sufficient record. It may also be the case that the project's economic benefits to some extent depend on external factors that cannot be controlled through the operational design.	the program or project may adversely impact the achievement of the project results. Such factors could include the following: the project is technically moderately complex; it was informed by adequate analytical work; it has a small number of components and sub-components; the client or the Bank has some experience with similar operations; and the technologies and processes used in the design have been to some extent successfully used elsewhere. The operation's economic benefits depend primarily on factors that can be adequately addressed in the design.	adversely impact the achievement of the project results. Such factors could include the following: the project is technically moderately complex; it was informed by adequate analytical work; it has a small number of components and sub-components; the client or the Bank has some experience with similar operations; and the technologies and processes used in the design have been successfully used elsewhere. The operation's economic benefits depend primarily on factors that can be adequately addressed in the design.	to the technical design of the project. Reasons for this could include the following: the operation is technically simple; it was informed by extensive analytical work; the client and the Bank have extensive experience with similar projects or programs; and its economic benefits depend almost entirely on operation specific factors that can be effectively addressed in the operational design.
Financial and Economic Viability (public sector)	The project has not put in place any mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability, and the flow of benefits associated with the project are not expected to continue after completion.	The project has put in place very few mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability, but they are not expected to be sufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with	The project has put in place few mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability, but they are not expected to be sufficient to ensure the continued flow of	The project has put in place moderate mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability that are deemed sufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated	The project has put in place sufficient mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability that are deemed sufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion.	The project has put in place robust mechanisms for economic and financial sustainability that are very likely to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion.

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Criteria /sub-criteria	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
		the project after completion	benefits associated with the project after completion.	with the project after completion.		
Institutional sustainability and strengthening of capacities (public sector)	The project did not contribute to strengthening institutional capacities in the concerned sector / area of intervention and or parallel systems had to be used intensively. Country systems and capacities are very weak and not able to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion	The project very marginally contributed to strengthening institutional capacities in the concerned sector / area of intervention and/or parallel systems had to be used. Country systems and capacities remain weak and are deemed insufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion	The project marginally contributed to strengthening institutional capacities in the concerned sector / area of intervention and/or parallel systems had to be used. Country systems and capacities remain moderately weak and are deemed insufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion.	The project moderately contributed to strengthening institutional capacities in the concerned sector / area of intervention. Country systems and capacities are good and deemed sufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion.	The project significantly contributed to strengthening institutional capacities in the concerned sector / area of intervention. Country systems and capacities are very good and deemed sufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion	The project was critical in building or strengthening institutional capacities in the concerned sector / area of intervention. Country systems and capacities are excellent and sufficient to ensure the continued flow of benefits associated with the project after completion
Political and governance environment (public sector)	There is a high likelihood that political and governance factors could severely impact project results. Project results could be derailed by a high degree of political instability, fragility, uncertainty or transition. The country may be undergoing conflict or may have recently emerged from conflict, and the political context is fragile. The government's development priorities are unclear. Anti-corruption and public sector ethics regulations do not exist or are not enforced.	There is a major likelihood that political and governance factors significantly impact project results achievement. Project results could be impacted by significant political uncertainty or transition. This may include post-conflict countries that have achieved some level of political stability or countries that enjoyed a period of relative stability but have a history of endemic political upheaval with negative	There is a substantial likelihood that political and governance factors significantly impact project results achievement. Project results could be impacted by significant political uncertainty or transition. This may include post-conflict countries that have achieved some level of political stability or countries that enjoyed a period of relative stability but have a history of endemic	There is a moderate likelihood that political and governance factors adversely impact the project results. The political context is relatively stable and not likely to significantly affect project results. The government has a clear set of development priorities that are generally supported across the political spectrum and are consistent with the program. Adequate anti-	There is a likelihood that political and governance factors adversely impact the project results. At the program level, the political context is relatively stable and not likely to significantly affect the project results. The government has a clear set of development priorities that are generally supported across the political spectrum and are consistent with the program. Adequate anti-corruption and public sector ethics regulations exist and are generally enforced.	There is a low likelihood that political factors could adversely impact project results. The political and governance situation does not represent a risk to the project results thanks to political stability, consensus on development priorities, a strong anti-corruption and ethics environment and high levels of transparency, accountability, and participation. All relevant political decisions (including approval of laws and regulations) have been

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Criteria /sub-criteria	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
		effects on the operational engagement. Likewise, the government has taken initial steps to improve transparency, accountability and participation, but with limited impact.	political upheaval with negative effects on the operational engagement. Likewise, the government has taken initial steps to improve transparency, accountability and participation, but with limited impact.	corruption and public sector ethics regulations exist and are to some extent enforced.		taken and cannot be reversed easily.
Ownership and sustainability of partnerships (public sector)	The project has not been effective at involving the relevant stakeholders and there is no sense of ownership amongst the beneficiaries. No partnerships with relevant stakeholders have been established to ensure the continued maintenance and management of project outputs.	The project has involved only a small number of stakeholders and there is limited ownership among beneficiaries. No or marginally effective partnerships with relevant stakeholders have been put in place and are not considered sufficient to ensure the continued maintenance and management of project outputs.	The project has involved only a small number of stakeholders and there is limited ownership by beneficiaries. No or marginally effective partnerships with relevant stakeholders have been put in place and are not considered sufficient to ensure the continued maintenance and management of project outputs.	The project has been to a moderate extent effective at involving some stakeholders and promoting a sense of ownership among beneficiaries. Partnerships with relevant stakeholders have been put in place and are deemed somewhat sufficient to ensure the continued maintenance and management of project outputs.	The project has been effective at involving most stakeholders and promoting a sense of ownership among beneficiaries. Partnerships with relevant stakeholders have been put in place and are deemed sufficient to ensure the continued maintenance and management of project outputs.	The project has been highly effective at involving all the relevant stakeholders and there is a strong sense of ownership amongst the beneficiaries. Effective partnerships with relevant stakeholders (e.g. local authorities, civil society organizations, private sector) have been put in place to ensure the continued maintenance and management of project outputs.
Environmental and social sustainability (public sector)	The ESMP has not been implemented; institutional capacity and funding are not available to ensure the environmental and social sustainability of the operation.	The ESMP has been implemented with major delays or in an unsatisfactory manner; institutional capacity and funding are deemed insufficient to ensure the environmental and social sustainability of the operation.	The ESMP has been implemented with major delays or in a somewhat unsatisfactory manner; institutional capacity and funding are deemed moderately insufficient to ensure the environmental and	The ESMP has largely been implemented in a timely and satisfactory manner; institutional capacity and funding are deemed moderately sufficient to ensure the environmental and social sustainability of	The ESMP has largely been implemented in a timely and satisfactory manner; institutional capacity and funding are deemed sufficient to ensure the environmental and social sustainability of the operation.	The ESMP has been implemented in a timely and satisfactory manner; institutional capacity is strong and there is sufficient funding to ensure the environmental and social sustainability of the operation.

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Criteria /sub-criteria	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
			social sustainability of the operation.	the operation.		
Resilience to exogenous factors and risk management (public sector)	Project achievements highly depend on exogenous factors or/and have very significant high risks to achieving the intended results.	Project achievements substantially depend on exogenous factors or/and have major risks to achieving the intended results.	Project achievements to some extent depend on exogenous factors or/and have sufficient risks to achieving the intended results.	Project achievements marginally depend on exogenous factors or/and have marginal risks to achieving the intended results.	Project achievements very marginally depend on exogenous factors or/and have very marginal risks to achieving the intended results.	Project achievements did not depend on any exogenous factors or/and have low risks to achieving the intended results.
Business Success (private sector)	<p>1. The project's FRR or ROIC is lower than 0.7 x WACC.</p> <p>2. Actual performance has lagged appraisal projections such that the project has failed to meet its obligations to lenders and creditors and/or has yielded a return to shareholders that is less than the cost of debt.</p> <p>3. Most of the project's process and business goals articulated at approval are not met.</p> <p>4. Performance indicators have fallen short of appraisal estimates in the majority of key areas.</p> <p>5. The project company's prospects for sustainability and growth are weak or negative, such that it is clearly underperforming in relation to the market and its sector peers</p>	<p>1. The project's FRR or ROIC is equal to or greater than 0.7 x WACC.</p> <p>2. Actual performance has lagged appraisal projections such that the project has demonstrably met its obligations to lenders and creditors, but the return to shareholders is less than that deemed minimally acceptable albeit at least equal to the cost of debt.</p> <p>3. At least one of the project's process and business goals articulated at approval is not met.</p> <p>4. Performance indicators have fallen short of appraisal estimates in one or more key areas.</p> <p>5. The project company's prospects for sustainability and growth are weak, such that it is struggling to remain</p>	<p>1. The project's FRR or ROIC is equal to or greater than 0.9 x WACC.</p> <p>2. Actual performance has lagged appraisal projections such that the project has demonstrably met its obligations to lenders and creditors, but the return to shareholders is less than that deemed minimally acceptable albeit at least equal to the cost of debt.</p> <p>3. At least one of the project's process and business goals articulated at approval is not met.</p> <p>4. Performance indicators have fallen short of appraisal estimates in many key areas.</p> <p>5. The project company's prospects for sustainability and growth are promising.</p>	<p>1. The project's FRR or ROIC is equal to project company WACC.</p> <p>2. Actual performance only meets appraisal projections such that the project has demonstrably met its obligations to lenders and creditors, and has yielded the minimally acceptable return to its shareholders commensurate with the project risk.</p> <p>3. The project's process and business goals articulated at approval are broadly achieved or are deemed within reach albeit with some risk to their realization.</p> <p>4. Performance indicators are in line with appraisal estimates.</p> <p>5. The project company's overall profitability and prospects for sustainability and growth are sound, such that it is expected to remain competitive in relation to the market and its sector peers.</p>	<p>1. The project's FRR or ROIC is equal to or greater than the project company WACC.</p> <p>2. Actual performance meets or exceeds appraisal projections such that the project has demonstrably met its obligations to lenders and creditors, and has yielded the minimally acceptable return to its shareholders commensurate with the project risk.</p> <p>3. The project's process and business goals articulated at approval are broadly achieved or are deemed within reach albeit with some risk to their realization.</p> <p>4. Performance indicators are in line with appraisal estimates.</p> <p>5. The project company's overall profitability and prospects for sustainability and growth are strong, such that it is expected to remain competitive in relation to the market and its sector peers.</p>	<p>1. The project's FRR or ROIC is equal to or greater than 1.25 x WACC.</p> <p>2. Actual performance exceeds appraisal projections such that the project has demonstrably met its obligations to lenders and creditors, and has yielded a premium return to its shareholders well in excess of that commensurate with the project risk.</p> <p>3. The project's process and business goals articulated at approval are surpassed.</p> <p>4. Performance indicators demonstrate clear outperformance against appraisal estimates.</p> <p>5. The project company's overall profitability and prospects for sustainability and growth are strong, such that it is expected to retain or achieve market-leading status</p>

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Criteria /sub-criteria	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
		competitive in relation to the market and its sector peers.		prospects for sustainability and growth are sound, such that it is expected to remain competitive in relation to the market and its sector peers		
Environmental and Social Performance (private sector)	Both: (a) the company is not in material compliance with the Bank's at approval requirements (including implementation of an ESAP, if any); and (b) mitigation prospects are uncertain or unlikely, or non-compliance resulted in substantial and permanent environmental damage.	Both: (a) the company is not in material compliance with the Bank's at-approval requirements, and the ESAP is only partially implemented. However, company is addressing deficiencies through ongoing or planned actions; and (b) such non-compliance has not resulted in environmental damage.	Both: (a) the company is not in material compliance with the Bank's at-approval requirements, and the ESAP is only partially implemented.	The Company is in partial compliance with the Bank's at-approval requirements but ESAP is implemented, depending on the environmental categorization of the project).	The Company is in material compliance with the Bank's at-approval requirements (including implementation of an ESAP, depending on the environmental categorization of the project).	The company meets both the Bank's at-approval requirements (including implementation of an ESAP, depending on the environmental categorization of the project) and the Bank's at-evaluation requirements, and the extent of environmental and social change / impacts: (i) go beyond the expectations of the ESAP and key environmental and social requirements, or (ii) have materially improved overall environmental and social performance, or (iii) have contributed to a material improvement in the environmental and social performance of local companies (e.g., by raising industry standards, acting as a good practice example, etc.).

Annex H: Rating scale used in CFRs

Factors	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
Knowledge and strategic advice	The Bank has not delivered any significant piece of knowledge work. It is seen by most stakeholders as one actor among many in the development landscape of the country.	The Bank has delivered minimal knowledge work in a few sectors selected for its interventions with no recognition by/ influence on other DPs and the government. The Bank is routinely involved in policy dialogue.	The Bank has delivered limited knowledge work in a few sectors selected for interventions recognized by all other DPs, including the government. This is contributing to policy dialogue but with no linkage between the two aspects.	The Bank has delivered knowledge work in a few sectors selected for interventions recognized by all other DPs, including the government. This allowed the Bank to contribute to policy dialogue in these areas.	The Bank has delivered significant knowledge work in most sectors selected for its interventions recognized by all other DPs, including the government. This allowed the Bank to position itself as leader in policy dialogue in these areas, and triggered change in the policy and/regulatory framework of the country.	The Bank has delivered significant knowledge work in all sectors selected for interventions recognized by all other DPs including the government. This allowed the Bank to position itself as leader in policy dialogue in these areas, and triggered change in the policy and/regulatory framework of the country.
Adapted solutions	The Bank's strategy is disconnected from the evolving context of the country and used as justification for an ongoing portfolio of operations designed and implemented as a compilation of projects agreed with direct national counterparts in the area covered.	The Bank's strategy is based on an unclear intervention logic showing low understanding of the country's evolving context, proposing "business as usual" solutions variably adapted to this context depending on the area of intervention.	The Bank's strategy is based on an intervention logic showing partial understanding of the country's evolving context, proposing solutions variably adapted to this context depending on the area of intervention, and not showing much innovation (analysis and product mix) over time in responding to challenges to achieving results.	The Bank's strategy is based on a sound intervention logic demonstrating a good understanding of the country's evolving context, proposing solutions variably adapted to this context depending on the area of intervention, and not showing much innovation (analysis and product mix) over time in responding to challenges to achieving results.	The Bank's strategy is based on a sound intervention logic demonstrating a thorough understanding of the country's evolving context, proposing solutions variably adapted to this context depending on the area of intervention, and showing some innovation (analysis and product mix) over time in responding to challenges to achieving results.	The Bank's strategy is based on a compelling intervention logic demonstrating a thorough understanding of the country's evolving context, proposing solutions fully adapted to this context in all areas of intervention, and showing substantive innovation (analysis and product mix) over time in responding to challenges to achieving results.

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Factors	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
Strategic focus	The Bank's strategy replicates areas of intervention of the ongoing portfolio without any convincing analysis of positioning.	The Bank's strategy proposes a basic analysis of positioning and comparative advantage but fails to articulate clearly the result in terms of areas of intervention that overlap in practice with areas of intervention of the ongoing portfolio.	The Bank's strategy proposes an analysis of positioning and comparative advantage. Priority areas of assistance aligned with needs are proposed without relating them to this analysis.	The Bank's strategy presents an analysis of the respective positioning of development partners and areas of comparative advantage but the analysis does not fully show how this translates into priority areas of assistance for the Bank matching the evolving context and challenges of the country.	The Bank's strategy presents a clear analysis of the respective positioning of development partners, areas of comparative advantage and matching of this analysis with the evolving context and challenges of the country to define priority areas of assistance for the Bank but does not fully articulate interconnections and integration constraints in the program.	The Bank's strategy presents a compelling analysis of the respective positioning of development partners, areas of comparative advantage and matching of this analysis with the evolving context and challenges of the country to define priority areas of assistance for the Bank and the interconnections between those from a programmatic perspective.
Alignment	The Bank's interventions are not aligned with the development needs/challenges of the country and beneficiaries.	The Bank's interventions are partially aligned with the development needs/challenges of the country and beneficiaries. No clear analysis or evidence of consultation is available. Priority areas of Bank strategies relevant for the country are not covered in the analysis.	The Bank's interventions are partially aligned with the development needs/challenges of the country and beneficiaries. Analysis and consultation are available but the effect on alignment cannot be demonstrated. Some priority areas of Bank strategies relevant for the country are not covered in the analysis and the positioning.	The Bank's interventions are mostly aligned with the development needs/challenges of the country and beneficiaries however based on partial analysis and consultation. Some priority areas of Bank strategies relevant for the country are not covered in the analysis and the positioning.	The Bank's interventions are mostly aligned with the development needs/challenges of the country and beneficiaries based on sound analysis and consultation, as well as on relevant Bank policies and strategies.	The Bank's interventions are fully aligned with the development needs/challenges of the country and beneficiaries based on sound analysis and consultation, as well as on relevant Bank policies and strategies.
Leverage	The Bank had no leverage effect on financing in the country and does not articulate any action for that purpose.	The Bank mentions leverage as an objectives and articulates some action but with no visible effect.	Leverage is taken as an ad-hoc consideration at project level without specific attention	The Bank's has had an opportunistic but active role in bringing in additional financing in the country through	The Bank's has demonstrated a significant role in bringing in additional financing in the country through dialogue and usage	The Bank's has demonstrated an instrumental role in bringing in additional financing in the country

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Factors	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
			given at the strategic level. No specific consideration is given to scaling up.	dialogue and usage of relevant instruments. A few projects show a leverage effect and explicit attention to scaling up.	of relevant instruments with a leveraging effect of at least 1 to 3 overall. Most key projects show explicit attention to scaling up.	through dialogue and usage of relevant instruments, with a leveraging effect of at least 1 to 5 overall. The program design shows explicit and consistent attention to scaling up both at strategic and project level.
Supervision	The supervision process is managed on an ad-hoc basis to comply with institutional requirements and there is no evidence that it is having any sort of effect on the quality of the portfolio.	The Bank has established a monitoring system including timely supervisions, but the quality of supervision reports is poor and follow up on actions is not clear. There is no evidence that it is having any sort of effect on the quality of the portfolio.	The Bank has established a monitoring system including timely supervisions, but the quality of supervision reports is variable as is follow up on actions. It is difficult to clearly demonstrate the effect on the quality of the portfolio.	The Bank has established a monitoring system including timely and quality supervisions, and follow up on actions at the project level, with no overall review processes. It is difficult to clearly demonstrate the effect on the quality of the portfolio.	The Bank has established a monitoring system including timely and quality supervisions, and systematic follow up on actions. Review processes include issues and risks and involve all stakeholders, but are not systematic at all levels (operations to sector to country). The effect on the quality of the portfolio can be demonstrated.	The Bank has established a robust monitoring system including timely and quality supervisions, systematic follow up on actions, and review processes at all levels (operation to sector to country) including issues and risks and involving all stakeholders. The effect on the quality of the portfolio can be demonstrated.
Project focus	Less than 30% of the projects examined in the country had a rating of moderately satisfactory or higher for criteria 1a.	Less than 50% of the projects examined in the country had a rating of moderately satisfactory or higher for criteria 1a.	Less than 60% of the projects examined in the country had a rating of satisfactory or higher for criteria 1a. More than 50% had a rating of moderately satisfactory or higher.	More than 60% of the projects examined in the country had a rating of satisfactory or higher for criteria 1a. Less than 30% had a rating of unsatisfactory or less.	More than 80% of the projects examined in the country had a rating of satisfactory or higher for criteria 1a.	More than 90% of the projects examined in the country had a rating of highly satisfactory for criteria 1a. None had a highly unsatisfactory rating.
Project design	Less than 30% of the projects examined in the country had a rating of moderately satisfactory or higher for criteria 1b.	Less than 50% of the projects examined in the country had a rating of moderately satisfactory or higher for criteria 1b.	Less than 60% of the projects examined in the country had a rating of satisfactory or higher for criteria 1b. More than 50% had a rating of moderately	More than 60% of the projects examined in the country had a rating of satisfactory or higher for criteria 1b. Less than 30% had a rating of unsatisfactory or less.	More than 80% of the projects examined in the country had a rating of satisfactory or higher for criteria 1b.	More than 90% of the projects examined in the country had a rating of highly satisfactory for criteria 1b. None had a highly unsatisfactory rating.

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Factors	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
			satisfactory or higher.			
Managing for results & Learning	The Bank has no monitoring system in place. The lack of learning is visible in the same factors explaining poor performance mentioned over time.	The Bank's interventions are not guided by results with generally unclear intervention logics and monitoring generally focusing on financial aspects.. The lack of learning is visible in the same factors explaining poor performance mentioned over time.	The Bank's interventions and systems demonstrate the existence of monitoring mechanisms but without clear focus on results in design and implementation of strategy and projects. Lessons are routinely mentioned but there is no evidence they are used to improve the design of strategy and projects.	The Bank's interventions and systems demonstrate some of the characteristics of robust management for results: awareness and capacity of staff, strategic emphasis on results, robust monitoring systems guiding the portfolio, intervention logic and results-based framework are fully clear and realistic at both strategy and project levels. Bank's strategy and most projects identify lessons from previous CSPs, address past implementation issues, and include an analysis of sustainability of past interventions. However the integration of lessons in the design and the implementation of corrective measures are not systematic.	The Bank's interventions and systems demonstrate most characteristics of robust management for results: awareness and capacity of staff, strategic emphasis on results, robust monitoring systems guiding the portfolio, intervention logic and results-based framework are fully clear and realistic at both strategy and project levels. The Bank's strategy and most projects identify and integrate lessons from previous CSPs, include sound analysis of sustainability of past interventions, and comprehensively address past implementation issues implementing corrective measures.	The Bank's interventions and systems demonstrate all characteristics of robust management for results: awareness and capacity of staff, strategic emphasis on results, robust monitoring systems guiding the portfolio, intervention logic and results-based framework are fully clear and realistic at both strategy and project levels. Bank's strategy and projects systematically identify and integrate lessons from previous CSPs, include sound analysis of sustainability of past interventions, and comprehensively address past implementation issues implementing corrective measures.
Partnership and coordination	The design of the Bank's strategy and projects show no analysis of coordination constraints. No evidence of a consultation process with stakeholders can be found.	The design of the strategy and projects proposes a mapping of donor's positioning with no clear analysis. The design documents	The design of the strategy and projects proposes a mapping of donor's positioning with no clear analysis. The design	The design of the strategy and projects proposes an analysis of donor's positioning and coordination requirements, and	The design of the strategy and projects proposes a clear analysis of donor's positioning and coordination requirements, and involves a fully documented consultation	The design of the strategy and projects proposes a clear analysis of donor's positioning and coordination requirements, and involves a fully

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Factors	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
	The Bank Is inactive in the donor coordination mechanisms at country level.	mentions a consultation process with all stakeholders but does not provide any detail on this process. The Bank is a passive contributor to donor coordination in limited sectors. There is no evidence of consultations with all stakeholders during implementation.	documents the consultation process with all stakeholders but the effect of such consultation on the design is not documented. The Bank is a contributor to donor coordination in all sectors covered but not fully active in all. Consultations with all stakeholders are active during implementation but rarely documented.	documents the consultation process with all stakeholders. The effect of such consultation on the design is visible although not clearly demonstrated. The Bank is an active contributor to donor coordination in all sectors covered. Consultations with all stakeholders are active during implementation although not always documented.	process with all stakeholders with the effect of such consultation on the design partially demonstrated. The Bank is an active contributor to donor coordination in all sectors covered and leads in least one sector. Consultations with all stakeholders are active and mostly documented throughout the implementation of the program.	documented consultation process with all stakeholders fully demonstrating the effect of such consultation on the design. The Bank is an active contributor to donor coordination in all sectors covered and leads in at least half of the sectors. Consultations with all stakeholders are active and fully documented throughout the implementation of the program.